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ABSTRACT 
 
A key lesson learnt from the 2007-2009 global financial crisis was that central 
banks focused too much on price stability and monetary policy. Financial stability 
and macroprudential policy were the missing pillars to ensure proper supervision 
of the financial system. This study examines the challenges faced by central 
banks in implementing macroprudential policies, while having limited experience 
as to the effect on their economies. The countercyclical capital buffer is generally 
considered to be one of the main macroprudential policy instruments. Using South 
African data, the study furthermore calculates the credit gap which serves as early 
warning indicator of excessive credit growth and is used to determine the point at 
which a countercyclical capital buffer should be activated for banks. The 
calculation of the countercyclical buffer indicates that the credit gap remains below 
the lower threshold of the buffer add-on. Hence, there is no reason to consider a 
capital add-on for South African banks as yet. Despite the overall reliability of the 
credit gap, concerns remain on its reliability under certain circumstances.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND 
Prior to the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, there was general agreement 
amongst policymakers that global monetary policy was working well, as evidenced 
by a long period of stable inflation and well-anchored inflation expectations. In 
addition, most mainstream economists largely ignored the interaction of banks 
with the macro economy, and failed to understand the US housing boom and 
feedback loops between the financial system and the real economy (Kumhof and 
Jakab, 2016). 
On the regulatory side, monetary policy was aimed at price stability and regulators 
were satisfied that financial institutions were properly supervised and financially 
sound. The International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2009a), however, argued that 
during these years of economic boom and low inflation, central banks were too 
focused on inflation and failed to identify risks associated with growing 
macroeconomic imbalances such as excessive house price rises and dangerously 
high levels of leveraging among financial institutions, particularly in the United 
States (US), that eventually resulted in a build-up of massive systemic risks in the 
financial sector as a whole. Excessive house price increases generally refer to 
sharp and unsustainable increases in property valuations relative to incomes, 
price-to-rent ratios, and other economic indicators of affordability. When the 
housing bubble eventually burst in 2007, the US financial system was severely 
exposed. 
Former Federal Reserve Board (Fed) Chairman Alan Greenspan was often 
criticised for "engineering" the housing bubble by keeping US policy rates too low 
for too long (Taylor, 2009). Low interest rates, coupled with excess market 
liquidity, sparked a search for higher returns among global investors, which 
eventually led to the rapid and widespread adoption of financial innovations such 
as complex derivative and structured finance products. Many of the new 
structured investment vehicles such as collateralised debt obligations were 
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complex instruments that were difficult to understand, even by those mortgage 
lenders who repackaged and issued them.  
As a result, the US regulatory framework failed to adequately regulate financially 
innovative banking products, with particular reference to the so-called “shadow 
banking system”. The shadow banking system, which included investment banks, 
hedge funds and mortgage originators, was largely unregulated and not subject to 
Basel II prudential capital requirements. Over time, most of these institutions 
experienced high levels of growth and became highly interconnected, overly 
leveraged and systemically important, which financial regulation failed to detect. 
Market participants ignored the high levels of risk underlying new instruments that 
were designed to meet the needs of investor demand for higher yields. Financial 
institutions could take excessive risks which resulted in systemic banking 
instability (Levine, 2010: p1). A further risk was the increased reliance by most 
commercial banks on funding through money markets instead of the more stable 
funding through retail deposits. 
Bernanke (2010a) also argued that it was not just low policy rates, but also 
regulatory failure that contributed to the bursting of the US housing bubble in 2007 
and the subsequent financial crisis. The concept of financial stability was not well 
understood by regulators who paid too little attention to the interconnectedness 
and systemic importance of financial institutions such as Lehman Brothers and 
Northern Rock and too much attention to the supervision of individual financial 
institutions. Central banks depended too much on conventional monetary policy as 
well as microprudential measures which focused on the health and soundness of 
individual banks in the financial sector and did not take into account banks' 
collective behaviour-induced risks.  
A general consensus emerged that ineffective regulation and monitoring was one 
of the main causes of the crisis. Whilst conventional monetary policy was aimed at 
achieving price stability by setting the interest rate at appropriate levels, it was not 
really focussed on detecting the build-up of asset price bubbles, largely ignoring 
endogenous risks and the interconnectedness between individual financial players 
as well as between the financial system and the rest of the economy (Persaud, 
2009). In essence, lessons learnt from the crisis have illustrated that price stability 
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is not a pre-condition for financial stability or an indication of effective 
macroprudential policy. 
The Bank of England (BoE, 2009) was also of the view that financial stability and 
macroprudential policy were the missing pillars required to fill the gap between 
monetary policy and the conventional microprudential regulation of financial 
institutions. The BoE (2009: p4) provides the following definition of financial 
stability: "Financial stability prevails where the financial system is sufficiently 
resilient that worries about bad states of the world do not affect confidence in the 
ability of the system to deliver its core services to the rest of the economy." "Bad 
states of the world" refer to economic recessions and other negative factors such 
as large and unsustainable current account deficits (where a country is unable to 
secure financing for the deficit), high levels of debt accumulation, local asset price 
bubbles and their subsequent bursting, and high default risk within or between 
countries. These negative factors are also referred to as macroeconomic 
imbalances and can pose risks to a financial system as a whole. Such imbalances 
may also reflect discrepancies between saving and investment rates and differing 
capabilities of financial institutions to intermediate between borrowers and savers. 
The result may be large cross border capital flows to fill these gaps. 
Against this backdrop and since the onset of the crisis, the terms "macroprudential 
policy" and "financial stability" have become common currency and have changed 
central banking discourse globally.  At present, there are various other definitions 
of macroprudential policy by different international organisations. In the Group-of-
Twenty (G20) Seoul Summit document (November 2010: paragraph 40), the IMF, 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and Financial Stability Board (FSB) define 
macroprudential policy as using  prudential tools to limit systemic or system-wide 
financial risk that can pose serious consequences for the real economy.  
This could be achieved by dampening the build-up of macroeconomic imbalances, 
which arise in the form of deviations in trends of credit and asset prices during 
periods of booms and busts (Assenmacher-Wesche & Gerlach, 2009) and, by 
identifying and addressing common exposures and risk linkages that are sources 
of contagion and spillover risks that may threaten the functioning of the system as 
a whole.  
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Similarly, Borio (2011) views macroprudential policy as a calibration of regulatory 
and supervisory arrangements from a systemic point of view rather than from the 
efficiency of individual financial institutions. This point of view follows a top-down 
approach which assesses the soundness of the financial system as a whole and 
then reviews the health of individual financial institutions, as opposed to the 
bottom-up approach implicit in traditional microprudential policy.  
A new regulatory framework was envisaged to "marry" microprudential supervision 
with macroprudential policy. Macroprudential policy has the aim of dealing with 
systemic risk on a macro level by reducing procyclicality and common exposure 
and interlinkages of the financial system. According to Ingves (2011), an important 
component of the macroprudential framework is the design of the governance 
arrangements which are necessary to ensure that the regulator responsible for 
macroprudential policy has a clear mandate to promote financial stability, has 
access to the correct information and proper analytical skills to set policy, and 
exerts sufficient control over a toolkit of macroprudential tools to achieve its 
mandate. Whilst many macroprudential measures have been identified, there has 
not been wide consensus among policymakers on what the primary instrument of 
macroprudential policy should be (BIS, 2010a), analogous to the policy interest 
rate as the primary instrument of conventional monetary policy.  
The IMF (2011a: p8) recognised some of the most frequently used instruments 
that can be used to address systemic risk, which include measures for credit-
related, liquidity-related and capital-related risks. Credit-related measures include 
limits on the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, loan-to-income (LTI) ratio and debt-to-
income (DTI) ratio, foreign currency loans and credit growth. Liquidity-related 
measures consist of reserve requirements, capital controls and limits on currency 
mismatches and liquidity funding ratios‟. Finally, capital-related measures include 
countercyclical capital buffers, leverage ratios and capital add-ons for global 
systemically important banks (SIBs) as well as dynamic loan provisioning.  
When regulators choose these macroprudential tools, it is important that they 
consider factors such as the stage of economic development of a country and its 
financial sector, the type of exchange rate regime (that is, fixed or managed), and 
the type of shocks to which its economic position is vulnerable.  For example, a 
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country which is highly reliant on capital inflows to finance its current account 
deficit is particularly vulnerable to a reversal of these flows. Similarly, a country 
which is highly dependent on commodity exports for its economic prosperity is 
particularly vulnerable to fall in commodity prices. Several emerging markets have 
recently been negatively affected by such economic shocks.  
When considering the design of a macroprudential framework, it is imperative that 
macroprudential instruments be compatible with other policy objectives. Where 
there are overlaps between the use of microprudential policy and macroprudential 
policy, mechanisms need to be put in place to ensure consistency. For example, 
the recent crisis has shown that loose monetary policy (long periods of low policy 
rates) can result in excessive risk-taking by financial institutions, which causes 
higher credit growth and leverage and creates systemic weaknesses in the 
financial sector. Low interest rates results in lower borrowing costs which 
encourages borrowing by individuals to purchase residential housing, which is one 
possible cause of house price increases.   
This was evident in the pre-crisis years as house prices rose sharply in many 
countries and consumers became highly indebted. When the housing bubble burst 
in the US in 2007, several banks came under acute financial stress which caused 
weaknesses in the financial system as they could not refinance themselves 
through their ordinary sources, and had to be rescued by government and central 
bank bailout packages. 
The above-mentioned developments illustrated that using the policy rate to target 
price stability can have the unintended consequence of allowing the build-up of 
asset price bubbles and the resultant systemic risk in the financial system, which 
undermines the financial stability objective. The opposite is also true. 
Macroprudential policy instruments can also negatively affect price stability as 
banks' lending rates are a function of the central bank's policy rate (plus a mark-
up) as well as of financial regulations imposed on banks to promote financial 
stability and consumer protection. Higher financial regulation may cause banks' 
funding costs to rise and these costs may eventually be passed on to customers 
via higher interest rates on bank products. In addition, more regulation could result 
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in more stringent credit rationing criteria and therefore limit credit availability to the 
public. 
Instability in the financial system could also result in substantial macroeconomic 
costs for the real sector, given the interconnectedness between the real sector 
and the financial sector. Factors that may cause such costs include banking 
failures, excessive asset-price volatility and distressed market liquidity conditions, 
which could lead to disruptions in the payment and settlement system. Thus, the 
recent financial crisis has revealed just how interconnected the financial world has 
become as shocks in one asset class can have a sizable impact on the stability of 
institutions, other markets and the real economy on a country level as well as a 
global level. 
Systemic risk arises where a liquidity shortage at a single bank runs the risk of 
spilling over to other banks in the financial system, thereby causing a run on 
banks by panicky creditors who withdraw their deposits (or other types of short-
term funding) held at these banks. The IMF, FSB and BIS embarked on some 
work for the G20, and describe systemic risk as a disruption to financial services 
by impairing all or parts of the financial system and having the potential to lead to 
serious negative consequences for the real economy. It was expressed that a 
bank failure, market impairment, a breakdown in market infrastructure or a 
substantial rise in the cost of financial services could have negative consequences 
for other market participants.  
Borio (2003) and Caruna (2010a) identified two dimensions of systemic risk, 
namely; a cross-sectional dimension (common exposure) and a time dimension 
(procyclicality). In the cross-sectional dimension, the way in which the financial 
system responds to shocks or spillover effects is largely dependent on the 
structure of the financial system, such as common exposures and interlinkages 
across institutions. In the time dimension, the build-up of financial risks over time 
is related to the macroeconomic cycle and policy is centred on how to minimise 
procyclicality in the financial system.  
Procyclicality refers to the tendency of financial variables to fluctuate around a 
trend during an economic cycle. Increased procyclicality implies fluctuations with 
broader amplitude (Landau, 2009). For example, during periods of bad economic 
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times when asset prices are declining and capital conditions are tight, banks are 
forced to reduce the book values of their assets and to look for additional capital, 
which will cause them to restrict lending, thereby further worsening the bad times. 
Conversely, in economic boom times asset prices are typically on an upward 
positive trend, which results in higher bank credit extension as consumers are in a 
position to pledge more collateral.  
Macroeconomic up- and downturns are thus inherently self-reinforcing. The more 
pressured banks become in a recession, the less they can afford to lend to 
companies and households that are dependent on loans. Therefore, it is 
imperative for banks to build up capital buffers in times of strong economic growth 
to see them through the bad times. 
Despite potential short-term conflicts between the objectives of monetary policy 
and financial stability, both policies do complement each other and the success of 
one is highly dependent on the success of the other. According to the Papademos 
(2009), in the longer run, monetary policy (price stability) and macroprudential 
policy (financial stability) do not involve any trade-offs. This is largely owing to the 
fact that, because most financial contracts are concluded in nominal terms, stable 
prices prevent an unsystematic redistribution of income and wealth between 
borrowers and lenders that could result from unexpected price developments. 
Such unsystematic redistribution of income and wealth can lead to defaults.  
In this way, effective monetary policy which results in price stability does promote 
financial stability.  The European Central Bank (ECB, 2013a) argues that the 
opposite is also true. A stable financial system promotes stable monetary policy as 
it reduces the occurrence of macroeconomic shocks originating in the financial 
sector. 
This was somewhat demonstrated during the recent crisis where the ECB's price 
stability objective resulted in the firm anchoring of inflation expectations which 
minimised the risk of deflation, thereby supporting financial stability and steady 
economic growth in the euro area. There appeared to be a strong interrelationship 
between price stability and financial stability, particularly when it involved the 
avoidance of deflation. An effective regulatory infrastructure and sound institutions 
enhance financial stability which, in turn, contributes towards economic 
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performance. Hence both price stability and financial stability should form part of a 
central bank's objective or mandate with each its own set of policies and 
instruments. 
Internationally, substantial progress has been made to improve institutional 
arrangements with regard to assessing systemic risk in the financial sector. The 
ECB (2013: p99) points out that macroprudential oversight bodies were introduced 
in most of the advanced economies, for example, the European Systemic Risk 
Board in the European Union (EU), the Financial Stability Oversight Committee 
(FSOC) in the US and the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) in the UK. Many of 
these countries have also made some progress towards formulating 
macroprudential toolkits, although a lot of work still lies ahead in identifying 
primary targets. 
In the South African context, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB, 2015b) 
refers to financial stability as "a financial system which is resilient to systemic 
shocks, facilitates efficient financial intermediation, and mitigates the 
macroeconomic costs of disruptions in such a way that confidence in the system is 
maintained". Thus, financial stability is not an end in itself but, like price stability, is 
generally regarded as an important precondition for sustainable long-term 
economic growth and job creation. 
The SARB was given a revised mandate by the National Treasury (NT) in October 
2010 to assume the responsibility for financial stability. Since then, the NT and the 
SARB created a joint task team to formulate and implement a macroprudential 
policy framework for financial stability. In 2013, the NT published a policy 
document called "Implementing a Twin Peaks Model of Financial Regulation in 
South Africa" (National Treasury, 2013) and also created the Financial Stability 
Oversight Committee (FSOC) to support the SARB in its governance role on 
financial stability. 
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1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The 2007-2009 global financial crisis highlighted that macroprudential policy and 
financial stability were the missing ingredients in pre-crisis policy frameworks. Pre-
crisis macroeconomic policy frameworks did not target systemic risk. As a result, 
regulators did not supervise financial systems in their entirety and failed to assess 
the common exposures of systemically important institutions and identify the build-
up of asset price bubbles.  
The SARB and other central banks embarked on expanding their mandates to 
include financial stability and macroprudential policy, and not just price stability. 
The research problem consists of the fact that macroprudential policy currently 
presents ground-breaking challenges to central banks, particularly because 
central banks have very little, if any, practical experience with the various 
suggested macroprudential policy tools.  
 
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
In view of the above research problem, several research objectives present 
themselves, which will form the basis of this study. 
The first objective is to explore the causes of, and key lessons learnt from the 
2007-2009 global financial crisis and understand why macroprudential policy and 
financial stability was the missing pillar in the policy frameworks of central banks.     
Secondly, the research intends to investigate the aims and salient features of 
macroprudential policy as well as explore the nature of systemic risk, which 
includes how it emerges and its different dimensions.  
The third objective is to identify the various macroprudential instruments 
suggested in the literature and to discuss their likely effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness with specific reference to their interaction with monetary policy.  
By pursuing these three objectives, the study seeks to contribute towards the 
solution of the research problem as consisting of the challenges posed by the 
imminent need for central banks to implement macroprudential policies while 
having very little experience as to the effect on their economies. 
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1.4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The theoretical foundation of financial stability and macroprudential policy will be 
explored by means of a qualitative study on the relevant literature. The study will 
focus on various studies and views (for example, the IMF, BIS, G20, FSB, central 
bank experiences, and economists), on how they view the effectiveness of 
macroprudential policy and financial stability in achieving its objectives. Inferences 
for South Africa will be also be drawn. 
In addition, a quantitative analysis using South African data will be done to 
determine the effectiveness of the credit-GDP gap in (a) detecting the build-up of 
excessive credit growth and (b) suggesting the point at which banks should build 
up or release a countercyclical capital buffer, as one of the key macroprudential 
instruments. A simple version of the one-sided Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter will be 
used to determine the trend in the time series of the credit-GDP ratio between Q1 
1994 and Q3 2015. 
 
1.5. STUDY SCOPE AND DELIMITATION 
Most central banks are still in the process of designing their policy frameworks and 
macroprudential toolkits. As a result, there is limited empirical evidence on the 
effectiveness of macroprudential policy tools. In this regard, the author will only be 
able to draw on existing work done and progress made thus far with regard to 
policy reform in financial regulation. In addition, this study does not focus in detail 
on all forms of Basel III regulation and fiscal policy responses by the international 
community. 
 
1.6 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
Chapter two will present a description of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis and 
the key causes thereof. 
Chapter three will discuss the lessons learnt from the crisis and the objectives and 
salient features of macroprudential policy to be considered in the design of 
financial stability frameworks.  
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Chapter four identifies key macroprudential instruments and surveillance 
techniques being used by central banks globally in the monitoring of systemic 
financial risk. The challenges emanating from the interaction between 
macroprudential policy and monetary policy will also be explored. 
Chapter five consists of a quantitative study to establish the deviation of credit 
from trend, which, according to the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision 
(BCBS, 2010b), should be used as the main indicator of systemic risk in the 
banking sector signalling that banks should build up and release countercyclical 
capital buffers. This chapter also identifies additional early warning indicators of 
systemic risk used by the SARB and other jurisdictions to identify systemic risk in 
financial systems. 
Chapter six finishes with a summary of conclusions and recommendations for 
further research.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE 2007-2009 GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS – DESCRIPTION AND CAUSES 
 
2.1        INTRODUCTION 
 
Prior to the 2007-2009  global financial crisis, there were weaknesses that were 
building up in financial systems, largely owing to an extended period of abnormally 
low interest rates, a loosening in credit conditions and excessive increases in 
asset prices, low volatility in financial markets, rapid financial innovation and 
favourable liquidity conditions (Trichet 2009). These sources of financial instability 
were largely ignored by banks and regulators on a global level. 
 
The IMF (2009b) further argued that during the pre-crisis years of high economic 
growth, central banks focused too much on price stability, and failed to take into 
account the build-up of systemic risk associated with the growing macroeconomic 
imbalances of a rapid rise in house prices and higher levels of leveraging. It 
became clear that central banks lacked the diagnostic tools, decisive mandates 
and crisis-management measures to regulate banks and non-banking institutions 
and that their policies were insufficiently consistent and co-ordinated on a global 
level.  
 
The following sections describe some of the key shortcomings of monetary policy 
frameworks adopted in the years prior to the crisis as well as the key causes of 
the crisis. 
 
2.2 SHORTCOMINGS OF PRE-CRISIS POLICY FRAMEWORKS  
 
Since the 1970s, most central banks globally adopted monetary policy frameworks 
where stable and low inflation was seen as the primary and exclusive mandate of 
central banks (Wellink, 2009). The main instrument used to achieve this objective 
was the policy interest rate, i.e. the short-term interest rate that a central bank 
could directly control via appropriate accommodation policies. Since the 1990s, 
many central banks started adopting inflation targets of around two per cent.  The 
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European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of Japan (BoJ) and the Bank of 
England‟s (BoE) adopted an inflation targeting framework making price stability 
their main policy objective, while the Fed had a dual mandate to achieve 
maximum employment and price stability. In its pursuit of price stability, the ECB 
adopted a two-pillar approach that included an explicit focus on monetary and 
credit developments. 
  
Financial markets were perceived to be efficient and monetary policy actions were 
seen as effectively transmitting the policy rate through to longer-term rates, asset 
prices and inflation expectations. These monetary policy frameworks during the 
1990s and early 2000s reflected success in maintaining low and stable inflation 
and generally well-anchored inflation expectations. Monetary policy was seen as 
playing an important role in contributing towards an exceptionally long period of 
stable economic growth (Mishkin, 2011).  
 
After the dot.com bubble burst in 2000 until 2007, growth in some key economies 
such as the US, China, India and Japan continued to accelerate (Figure 2.1) as 
monetary policy became accommodative. This was seen as a key contributor to 
financial instability via the build-up of asset price bubbles due to increased 
availability of credit amid low interest rates. Policymakers assumed that 
maintaining low and stable inflation was a sufficient condition for achieving 
financial stability or minimising financial system instability arising from 
macroeconomic imbalances (IMF, 2009b). 
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Figure 2.1 Real GDP growth in key advanced and emerging market 
economies* 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Update, January 2016. 
*Latest available data 
 
However, despite the relative success that these pre-crisis monetary policy 
frameworks achieved with stable inflation and high economic growth, monetary 
policy tended to focus too much on price stability and too little on financial system 
stability. Financial regulation and supervision were done predominantly from a 
microprudential perspective, that is, focusing on the solvency of individual firms 
rather than assessing risks on a macro-financial level through macroprudential 
supervision (IMF, 2010.)   
 
Furthermore, central banks did not have reliable tools to analyse asset price 
movements properly and, consequently, could not identify potential risks 
associated with asset price bubbles which are the main source of financial 
instability. Thus, systemic risk that emerged from linkages within the financial 
system and through its interaction with the real economy was not properly 
understood and financial stability was not incorporated into pre-crisis monetary 
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policy frameworks. It became clear that financial stability and macroprudential 
policy needed to be strengthened to ensure proper regulation and supervision of 
the financial system as a whole (Caruana, 2010b). 
 
2.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE CRISIS  
 
After the bursting of the dotcom bubble in early 2000 and the US September 2001 
terrorist attacks, global central banks feared the possibility of a global economic 
recession and hence responded by reducing their interest rates to stimulate their 
economies (Truman, 2009). The Fed, for example, lowered its federal funds rate 
target to 1,75 per cent  in January 2002 (the lowest since 1961) and its discount 
rate to 1,25 per cent (lowest since 1948) (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 
2002), while other central banks followed suite. 
 
Low global interest rates led to the “search for yield”, that is, they encouraged 
investors to seek higher returns through riskier investments. In addition, mortgage 
providers also engaged in greater risk-taking by approving subprime mortgage 
loans to borrowers with impaired or non-existing credit histories confident in the 
belief that the houses themselves always provide good collateral in case of 
delinquency. These type of customers did not qualify for prime market rates due to 
blemished or limited credit history (SARB, 2007). During the pre-crisis years, 
house prices and commercial property prices in the US and most advanced and 
emerging market economies began to rise substantially. As these asset prices 
rose, so did the value of collateral, which provided further impetus to  credit 
demand, resulting in further rises in asset prices and rising leverage ratios of 
lenders (Justiniano et al. 2014). 
 
The low levels of interest rates also encouraged rapid financial innovations such 
as complex derivative instruments and structured finance products created 
through the process of securitisation. Examples of these instruments include 
collateralised mortgage obligations (CMOs), collateralised debt obligations 
(CDOs) and credit default swaps (CDS). CMO‟s are derived from mortgage 
backed securities (MBSs) and are issued by a third party that is involved in 
residential mortgages (Schmidt, 2013). Typically, a CMO issuer would take a 
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residential mortgage and repackage it as a securitised loan which can be used as 
collateral for issuing another set of collateralised securities. These new securitised 
loans are sold to investors. The debt service payments that the issuer of the CMO 
receives from the residential mortgages are distributed to investors who took up 
the new securitised loans. In return, the issuer of the CMO receives a fee.  
 
CMOs offer banks the benefit of reduced interest rates, hence lower default risk, 
largely because the debt is transferred to investors in its repackaged form. With a 
CMO, an investor has the opportunity to choose how much reinvestment risk he is 
willing to accommodate in a CMO. CMOs have a high sensitivity to interest rates 
changes and are therefore subject to repayment risk, which include the risk of 
default, early repayment and refinancing risks (US Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2015). 
 
CDOs (which include auto loans, credit card debt, mortgages or corporate debt) 
are unregulated repackaged collateralised individual loans that banks sell to 
investors on the secondary market. The repayments of these loans are the 
collateral that gives the CDOs value. Similar to CMO‟s, CDO‟s are split into 
different tranches, that is senior, mezzanine and equity tranches, with the senior 
tranches typically receiving AAA rating while mezzanine tranches usually fetch a 
rating between AA and BB. When losses are made, it is dealt with in reverse order 
of seniority, whereby junior tranches would offer higher coupons or interest rates 
as a way of compensating for default risk.   
 
The key difference between a CMO and CDO is that the cash flow from a CMO 
comes from a pool of residential mortgages only, while the cash flow from a CDO 
includes more products such as automobile, credit card loans as well as 
residential mortgage loans (Schmidt, 2013). This difference explains why the CDO 
market was more exposed than the CMO market to the bursting of the credit 
bubble in 2007, due to higher exposure and sensitivity to changes in interest rates 
for all its products and not just residential mortgages.  
 
Generally speaking, the issuer of the CDO hedges its risk by selling an insurance-
like credit protection in the form of a credit default swap (CDS). Both parties on the 
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hedging transaction become the sellers of credit risk to the investor, with the CDO 
issuer acting as the intermediary (Gibson, 2007). In addition, both parties (buyer 
and seller) are permitted to trade their CDS contracts with others.  CDS contracts 
are mostly entered into by banks, hedge funds, and other securitisation institutions 
that need protection against financial risk or wish to profit on speculation that the 
underlying CDO would default (Kaminski, 2008). 
 
This type of risk was evident in the most recent crisis, for example, when Bear 
Sterns reported substantial losses owing to a sharp decline in value of its CDO 
holdings backed by subprime loans. A similar type of phenomenon was witnessed 
in the difficulties experienced by Lehman Brothers and AIG who were involved in a 
large number of CDS transactions.  
 
Prior to the crisis, the size of the CDS market was estimated at about USD45 
trillion (SARB, 2007). CDSs are therefore highly sensitive to default risk and 
insolvency rates. The higher the insolvency rates, the higher the payment 
obligations under the CDS contracts. Jarrow (2011) argued that these structured 
finance instruments were a major contributing factor to the global financial crisis. 
 
 
The Group of Thirty (G30, 2015) identified four critical stages of the 2007 global 
financial crisis. The first stage of the crisis was in 2005, when US house prices 
began to decline rapidly, with an almost simultaneous increase in delinquency 
rates on subprime mortgages. During this phase, the Fed had already started 
raising interest rates in the US. From 2004 to 2006 US interest rates rose from 1,0 
per cent to 5,35 per cent, which resulted in falling house prices. Sub-prime 
borrowers, in particular, took strain in repaying their mortgage loans while 
investors also suffered losses, making them reluctant to take on more CDOs. In 
early 2007, the US officially announced the sharpest declines in house prices 
since the 1930s. This led to widespread fears of losses on subprime loans and 
securitisation products, as collateral values started to fall below the loan values.  
 
The second stage of the crisis was characterised by a widening in credit spreads 
on unregulated securitisation products. Credit spreads represent a difference in 
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yield between two bonds that characterise a similar maturity but have different 
credit quality, that is, the difference between the quoted rates of return on two 
different investments of credit quality. 
 
In February 2007 the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) 
announced that it would no longer purchase the most risky subprime mortgages 
and mortgage-related securities. A few months later in April 2007, leading 
subprime mortgage lender, New Century Financial Corporation, filed for 
bankruptcy protection. Standard and Poor‟s and Moody‟s subsequently 
downgraded more than 100 bonds backed by second-lien subprime mortgages in 
June 2007. In July 2007, Standard and Poor‟s placed 612 securities backed by 
subprime residential mortgages on a credit watch. In July 2007, Bear Stearns 
liquidated two hedge funds that invested in several types of MBSs.1  
 
Conditions deteriorated further in August 2007 after quite a few European 
investment funds suspended redemptions of liabilities as there was uncertainty 
around how to accurately value these funds. It was at this point in time that the 
market for securitised products and commercial paper began to collapse and 
financial markets began to panic. In September 2007, panic heightened after 
United Kingdom (UK) bank Northern Rock needed an emergency bailout from the 
BoE in its capacity as "lender of last resort". This incident triggered the first run on 
a bank for more than a century. Northern Rock was nationalised for a temporary 
period.  
 
Meanwhile, in September 2008, US authorities had to bail out the country‟s two 
largest mortgage lenders, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, who were 
owners/guarantors of USD5 trillion worth of home loans. The US Treasury 
Department purchased about USD100 billion in their preferred stock and MBSs, 
resulting in both organisations being placed in conservatorship by the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency. In total, it cost around USD187 billion over time to keep 
both organisations alive. This bailout qualified as the largest ever in the US. 
                                                 
Timeline of the 2007 global financial crisis was accessed on the website of the St Louis Federal 
Reserve Bank and the Telegraph.  
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 US investment bank Bear Stearns also experienced financial difficulties and had 
to be merged with JPMorgan Chase, while Merrill Lynch was taken over by the 
Bank of America. 
 
Banks became reluctant to lend to each other on fear of counterparty risks which 
resulted in a spike in interest rate spreads on commercial paper and commercial 
bonds over government bonds (especially for institutions with lower credit ratings), 
a shortening of maturities as well as wide-spread losses across most asset 
classes (Juhara, 2009).  
 
Figure 2.2 The LIBOR-OIS spread during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund database
2
 
 
Interbank lending in most markets of major currencies froze causing severe 
liquidity problems throughout the US banking system. Money-market rates rose 
sharply, reflected in the widening spread between the 3-month London Interbank 
Rate (LIBOR) and the 3-month Overnight Index Swap (OIS) (Figure 2.2). The OIS 
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measures market expectations of the US federal funds rate over the 3-month 
period comparable to 3-month LIBOR. The spread between OIS and LIBOR 
measures factors other than interest rate expectations, such as counterparty risk 
and liquidity effects (Taylor, 2008). The spike in the spread was an indication of 
heightened counterparty risks and liquidity squeezes in interbank markets in the 
US.  
 
The spread remained high for the next few months and central banks and 
international organisations had to come up with co-ordinated measures to stabilise 
markets and ensure financial stability. These measures will be discussed in 
section below on policy responses to the crisis.  
 
The third stage of the crisis started in September 2008. In the preceding months, 
European markets particularly in the UK experienced high levels of volatility as 
banks ceased lending to each other due to panic over their exposure to US sub-
prime mortgages and structured finance packages. A number of European banks 
which were dependent on US money market mutual funds for the continual roll-
over of their short-term dollar funding, faced further liquidity problems and were 
consequently forced to sell their assets at fire-sale prices3. The credit crunch and 
liquidity crisis thus spread to Europe.  
  
Market conditions intensified after Lehman Brothers failed in September 2008, 
followed by a number of other large banks in the US, UK and eurozone, which 
also required government bail-outs. These developments triggered concerns that 
the fundamental issue could be one of solvency instead of liquidity.4 The Lehman 
Brothers failure was deemed a solvency crisis as the institution‟s debt obligations 
exceeded its portfolio of assets. The organisation became insolvent despite a 
temporary bailout from the Fed. It was proven that even if a financial institution did 
have access to liquidity lines from a central bank, it did not necessarily imply that 
                                                 
3
 Fire-sale prices are discounted prices (much lower than the fair market value) at which insolvent 
or bankrupt organisations liquidate their assets in order to achieve a rapid sale to avert a financial 
crisis or to pay off debt. 
4
 A liquidity crisis occurs when there is insufficient immediate funding but liabilities can still be met 
with asset sales. However, a solvency crisis means a country or firm cannot meet its debt 
obligations even through the sale of assets, which is deemed more serious. 
21 
 
liquidity assistance could prevent solvency problems in the longer run (Pettinger, 
2012). 
 
Financial markets in advanced economies began suffering even more substantive 
losses on fears of a solvency crisis as well contagion effects. There was 
heightened risk aversion as money markets collapsed, equity prices plummeted 
and credit spreads spiked. The banking system was in need of additional 
government-provided equity to absorb losses due to further credit write-downs as 
conditions deteriorated (IMF, 2009c).  
 
The fourth stage of the crisis began in late 2008 when there were spillover effects 
from financial markets in advanced economies to the real sector (G30, 2015) and 
(Mohanty, 2009). Banks began experiencing problems in accessing capital, with 
tighter credit conditions leading to slower demand for credit and hence slower 
private sector credit growth and lower spending. During that period, the IMF 
(2009c) estimated that US and European private sector credit could contract by 
4,0 per cent (quarter-on-quarter annualised) and there would be further 
deleveraging by banks in the form of sale of assets to public sector entities or to 
nonbanks, and the maturing of other assets. Many advanced economies (such as 
US, eurozone, UK, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand) had fallen into 
economic recession and faced deteriorating conditions in 2009. Real GDP growth 
in advanced economies slowed from 2,7 per cent in 2007 to 0,2 per cent in 2008 
before contracting by 3,4 per cent in 2009.  
 
Although banking systems in emerging markets had limited exposure to sub-prime 
loans and securitisation products in the US and Europe, economic activity in 
emerging markets slowed markedly as the crisis spread from the US to emerging 
markets through financial and trade linkages. The economic recession in the US 
resulted in declining US imports from its major trading partners. The resulting 
decline in export sales led to slower growth in emerging markets. In 2009, 
emerging market GDP growth slowed sharply and fell to 2,8 per cent (from 6,1 per 
cent in 2008). Consequently, there was also a reversal in capital flows. After 
reaching a peak of 5,0 per cent of GDP in 2007, net private flows to emerging 
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markets slowed sharply in 2008 and 2009 (IMF, 2009c) and currencies were also 
negatively affected. 
 
Between the end of 2008 and 2010, there were also other key developments 
across the US and Europe that exacerbated conditions in the global financial 
system. To name a few, in October 2008, the Icelandic government nationalised 
the country's second largest bank, Landsbanki, as well as the third-largest bank, 
Glitnir, after both institutions experienced short-term funding problems because 
they had financed themselves through repurchase agreements (repos) on the US 
money market and these repos could not be rolled over when the US money 
market was suspended. A month later, the IMF approved a USD2,1 billion loan to 
support Iceland‟s banking sector.  
 
In October 2008, the UK government announced a £37 billion rescue package for 
Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB and Halifax Bank of Scotland. In January 
2009, the Irish government announced its nationalisation of Anglo Irish Bank. 
Meanwhile, the US government injected another USD20 billion into the Bank of 
America from its USD700 billion financial rescue fund to assist with losses 
incurred when it purchased Merrill Lynch. In February 2009, Ireland announced 
that it would inject €7 billion into Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Bank in return for 
guarantees on lending, executive pay and mortgage arrears. The government 
received a 25 per cent indirect stake in both banks. Conditions took a turn for the 
worse in May 2010, after Greece received bailout funds worth €110 billion (£93 
billion) from eurozone countries and the IMF. Later that year, Irish Finance 
Minister Brian Lenihan recommended that government formally request a bailout 
package from the European Union (EU), ECB and IMF. 
 
2.4 POLICY RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS 
 
In light of the troubles and bankruptcies experienced by banks, various measures 
were taken by policymakers to support  financial stability in the global financial 
system.  
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2.4.1 Interest rate reductions by the major central banks  
 
The Fed began implementing aggressive policy measures in response to the 
crisis.  After reducing the discount rate in August 2007 (that is, the rate at which 
the Fed lends to depository institutions), the Fed began its monetary policy easing 
phase in September 2007 (see Figure 2.3), reducing the target for the federal 
funds rate by a cumulative 325 basis points by the spring of 2008 to support 
employment and income growth as well as price stability (Bernanke, 2009c). 
However, economic conditions in the US deteriorated, forcing the Fed to reduce 
the target federal funds rate by an additional 100 basis points until the end of 
October 2008.  
 
Figure 2.3 Policy rates of major central banks  
 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund
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On 8 October 2008, in an unprecedented move, six central banks (Fed, ECB, 
BoE, Bank of Canada, Riksbank, Swiss National Bank) took co-ordinated action to 
reduce their respective policy rates. A few months later in December 2008, the 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Fed further implemented a zero 
lower bound by reducing its target for the federal funds rate close to zero and 
setting a range of 0 to 25 basis points. On 16 December 2015, the Fed increased 
the federal funds rate target by 25 basis points to a range of 0,25 per cent to 0,50 
per cent, on improving economic and inflation prospects.  
 
By early 2008, all the major central banks had begun reducing their policy rates, 
with the exception of the ECB, which was still concerned about rising inflation. 
Prior to the crisis, the ECB had raised its policy rate and on improving growth 
prospects and expectations of higher inflation did so again in 2011. However, 
these moves were short-lived as the Greek crisis and the wider eurozone crisis 
threatened financial stability in the region. The ECB embarked on monetary policy 
easing in March 2014 by introducing a negative (penalty) interest rate on reserves 
held by commercial banks with the central banks in the euro system, in a move to 
encourage more commercial bank lending and to limit the appreciation of the euro 
(G30, 2015). Elsewhere in Europe, the BoE reduced its base lending rate by 50 
basis points on 8 October 2008 in a global-coordinated move with the FOMC, 
ECB and other major central banks. 
 
The BoJ undertook policy action from September 2008 by reducing policy rates 
twice and also adjusting its monetary policy framework to ensure financial stability 
in markets. (Vollmer and Bebenroth, 2012). Furthermore, to improve liquidity 
conditions and ease the pressure of short-term rates in the US money market after 
the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the BoJ signed a bilateral 
currency liquidity agreement or swap facility with the US Fed, permitting the BoJ to 
access US Dollars from the Fed and lend US dollars to domestic banks.  
 
Other measures from the BoJ included lowering the target rate for the 
uncollateralised overnight call rate twice by 20 basis points to 0,3 per cent on 31 
October 2008 and to 0,1 per cent on 19 December 2008. The basic loan rate and 
the basic discount rate were also lowered to 0,3 per cent and 0,1 per cent, on the 
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respective dates. In addition, the BoJ introduced a complementary deposit facility, 
whereby the interest rate paid by BoJ was fixed at 0,1 per cent, permitting 
domestic banks to receive interest payments on excess balances with the BoJ. 
These measures were intended to improve liquidity conditions in Japan and 
prevent the uncollateralised overnight call rate from falling significantly below the 
target rate (Vollmer and Bebenroth, 2012). 
 
2.4.2 Forward guidance 
 
Generally speaking, central banks were increasingly becoming more transparent 
on the future course of monetary policy, particularly after the adoption of zero 
lower bound interest rates in response to the crisis. This phenomenon is known as 
forward guidance and has been adopted by four major central banks, with the 
objective of enhancing the effectiveness of monetary policy at the zero lower 
bound. 
 
Cœuré (2013) defines forward guidance as explicit statements by a central bank 
on the likely path of future policy rates. In other words, a central bank would use 
forward guidance to influence interest rates by trying to influence the financial 
decisions of consumers, businesses and investors. Forward guidance requires 
transparency and commitment from a central bank that it will deliver on its 
guidance on future monetary policy to prevent surprise decisions that might have 
a disruptive effect on markets causing them to become volatile.  
 
The central bank‟s intention with forward guidance is to influence investors to 
increase their investments at present to achieve higher returns in the future, by 
convincing markets that it will adopt a low-interest policy now to foster a faster 
economic recovery in the future (The Economist, 2014). Since the onset of the 
most recent financial crisis, the US Fed, ECB, BoE and BoJ have adopted forward 
guidance, with the aim of enhancing the effectiveness of monetary policy at the 
zero lower bound (BIS, 2014a).  
 
The Fed first introduced forward guidance in 2003-2004, after it reduced its policy 
rate to its record low level of 1,0 per cent in June 2003. In its policy statement in 
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August 2003, the Fed indicated its intention to keep interest rates low for an 
extended period of time to support economic growth and influence longer-term 
Treasury yields (Shirai, 2013).  
 
Since December 2008, at the peak of the recent crisis, when the US Fed reduced 
its policy rate to its lower bound, it started to adopt forward guidance again by 
using a few verbal expressions to convince investors that its policy rate would 
remain low for longer. For example, the US Fed has used terminology such as 
“patient,” “considerable time” and “extended period,” to provide guidance to 
investors on just how long it is likely to keep policy rates at low levels. In certain 
instances, the US Fed even went so far as to provide dates and economic 
variables (such as unemployment rates and inflation projections) which would 
cause the Fed to change its stance (Da Costa, 2015). In 2011, the US Fed moved 
towards a calendar-based forward guidance by stating that disappointing 
economic conditions would justify that interest rates would remain low for at least 
the following two years.  
 
 From December 2012, the Fed shifted to threshold-based forward guidance, 
advocating that an adjustment in its policy rate would be considered once there 
was evidence that the US unemployment rate would decrease to less than 6,5 per 
cent and inflation would increase above the inflation target of 2,0 per cent (BIS, 
2014). Consequently, the US Fed did raise its federal funds rate in December 
2015 (for the first time since 2006) by 25 basis points to a target range of 0,25 per 
cent to 0,50 per cent (from the previous target of 0 per cent to 0,25 per cent). This 
was as a result of a strong improvement in labour market growth, which resulted in 
the unemployment rate declining below 6,5 per cent (Appelbaum, 2015). Despite 
the US inflation rate not increasing above the 2,0 per cent target in December 
2015, the US Fed decided to raise its policy rate anyway as the generally strong 
economic data in 2015 convinced them that inflation would rise about the US 
Fed‟s target in the near future.  
 
The ECB adopted forward guidance in July 2013 when it stated that policy rates 
would remain at present levels or even be lowered for an extended period of time 
(ECB, 2013c). This practice differed from previous communiques from the ECB, 
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which never commented on monetary policy expectations beyond the following 
meeting.  In November 2013, the ECB reduced its policy rate and thereafter 
reiterated its view that future policy decisions would depend on the outlook for 
inflation, taking into consideration the economic performance of the region.  
 
The BoE adopted threshold-based forward guidance in the middle of 2013, by 
commenting that its prevailing low interest rate would be linked to a quantitative 
threshold for the UK‟s unemployment rate (greater than 7,0 per cent). This 
quantitative threshold was linked to three other “knock-out” criteria, which included 
a quantitative threshold for an 18 to 24 month view of inflation projections (less 
than 2,5 per cent), anchored medium-term inflation expectations and the absence 
of financial instability risks (BIS, 2014). If any of these criteria were not met, the 
BoE would discontinue forward guidance.  
 
The BoJ first introduced forward guidance in 1999-2000, two months after its 
adoption of the zero interest rate policy.  At that stage the BoJ linked the 
continuation of its zero interest rate policy to prevailing deflationary concerns. In 
other words, the longer deflation persisted, the more likely the BoJ would maintain 
its zero interest rate policy stance. The BoJ‟s second round of forward guidance 
was done between 2001 to 2006, after QE was implemented in March 2001 and 
the policy rate was reduced to an average of around 0,15 per cent (Shirai, 2013). 
At that stage, the BoJ changed the main operating target for money market 
operations from the uncollateralised overnight call rate to the reserve balances 
held by domestic banks at the BoJ. In doing so, the BoJ adopted a state-
contingent guidance, that is, it linked the zero interest rate policy to QE.  
 
In October 2003, the BoJ provided more clarification about its state-contingence 
guidance, stating that the core inflation rate should be zero per cent or higher and, 
if achieved, its QE policy would be terminated. After core inflation rose to register 
a positive reading in November 2005, as promised, the BoJ terminated the QE 
programme in March 2006 by reintroducing the uncollateralised overnight call rate 
as a money market operations operating target. 
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The BoJ introduced its third round of forward guidance in October 2010 by 
adopting a threshold-based forward guidance linked to the inflation rate in the 
context of its Comprehensive Monetary Easing programme. Its zero interest rate 
policy would remain intact until the BoJ‟s price stability goal was achieved and no 
further significant risks in the financial system emerged. In April 2013, the BoJ 
implemented the Quantitative and Qualitative Easing programme, which had 
characteristics of both threshold- and calendar-based forward guidance. This did 
not include explicit forward guidance on the policy rate (BIS, 2014). At this time, 
the BoJ replaced the uncollateralised overnight rate with the monetary base as its 
operating target of money market operations. These changes were implemented 
with the objective of achieving a 2,0 per cent  price stability target within a time 
period of two years via large-scale asset purchases and monetary base 
expansion.  
 
2.4.3 Unconventional measures (capital injections, quantitative easing and 
balance sheet management 
 
Despite the many interventions by the major central banks to reduce policy rates 
to stimulate economic growth and ease liquidity strains in money markets, central 
banks were somewhat unsuccessful as consumers were still experiencing debt 
overhang and economies were still plagued by high levels of unemployment, low 
growth and lack of fiscal reform. As a result, the major central banks began 
implementing QE (Gallo, 2015).  
 
QE is an unconventional monetary policy tool that is traditionally used by a central 
bank when short-term interest rates are close to or at zero and scope for fiscal 
stimulation has run out. Essentially, a central bank moves from targeting interest 
rates to targeting the amount of excess reserves held by banks. Central banks 
purchase financial assets in exchange for reserves. Hence, the level of purchases, 
not the interest rate becomes the policy target instrument of the central bank 
(Fawley and Juvenal, 2012). Central banks buy government securities or other 
securities from the market, with the objective of lowering long-term interest rates 
and increasing the cash reserves of banks and ultimately the money supply.  
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A typical feature of QE is also that central banks start paying interest on banks‟ 
excess cash reserves at a rate equivalent to their policy rate. In that way, the 
interest rate is prevented from being driven down to zero by the superabundance 
of cash reserves (assuming the policy rate is still above zero per cent). When the 
central bank buys assets from banks, only the cash reserves of banks and not the 
money stock increases. But when the central bank buys assets from non-banks 
(pension funds, etc) both the cash reserves of banks and the money stock 
increases.  
 
US Fed 
 
The Fed began the first round of QE (QE1) in November 2008 by proposing to 
purchase USD100 billion of agency debt and USD500 billion of mortgage-backed 
securities. In March 2009, the Fed purchased another USD850 billion of 
mortgage-backed securities and debt as well as USD300 billion of longer-dated 
Treasuries (Forbes.com, 2015). In addition to adding cash reserves to the banking 
system, the intention of QE1 was also to remove toxic assets from the financial 
system. 
 
The Fed implemented the second round (QE2) in November 2010 by announcing 
its intention to purchase USD600 billion worth of US Treasuries over a period of 
eight months (effective in the middle of 2011) at about USD75 billion of Treasuries 
per month. The Treasuries being purchased were longer-dated (mostly five- and 
10-year) maturities as the Fed sought to lower long-term interest rates in particular 
as these were regarded as the rates which had the greatest influence on lending 
(Hennessey, 2011). A few months later in September 2011, the Fed introduced a 
new maturity extension programme, known as Operation Twist, with the objective 
of increasing the average maturity of its Treasury portfolio. In this regard, the Fed 
bought USD400 billion of Treasuries with between 72 and 360 months maturities, 
and sold an equal amount of Treasuries between 3 and 36 month maturities, 
again with the objective of lowering long-term yields. 
 
 In September 2012, the Fed announced QE3, purchasing about USD40 billion 
per month in mortgage-backed securities. Combined with Operation Twist, the 
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Fed would purchase USD85 billion worth of long-term bonds. In December 2013, 
the Fed hinted at the possibly tapering off of QE, by reducing purchases of 
securities by USD10 billion per month. Eventually in October 2014, the Fed 
announced that its QE3 programme had ended.  
 
Since the end of 2007, the Fed also implemented a number of unconventional 
measures in the form of new credit facilities. In December 2007, the Fed 
introduced the Term Auction Facility (TAF) to allow US banks to have more 
access to credit at the Fed‟s discount window. Banks were allowed to bid for funds 
at auctions held every two weeks for either 28 days or 84 days (Litan, 2011). In 
March 2008, the Fed decided to introduce another two credit facilities named the 
“Term Securities Lending Facility” (TSLF) and the “Primary Dealer Credit Facility” 
(PDCF) to eligible primary dealers that were not classified as banks. Under these 
programmes, primary dealers were allowed to borrow funds at the discount 
window on the full range of collateral permitted by the Fed.  A few months later, in 
May 2008, the Fed again embarked on extending the TSLF to accept high-rated 
asset backed securities (ABSs) as collateral (Friedman and Kuttner, 2011), while 
in October that year it introduced more credit facility measures by way of a 
“Commercial Paper Funding Facility” and a “Money Market Investor Funding 
Facility.” 
 
European Central Bank 
 
From October 2008, the ECB implemented non-standard measures to support 
bank liquidity and funding in the eurozone. These measures included fixed-rate full 
allotments, the extension of supplementary liquidity provision at longer maturities, 
and currency swap agreements (Cour-Thimann and Winkle 2013). The fixed-rate 
full allotments were complemented by the 6-month and 12-month operations and 
were applicable to all refinancing operations, such as the main refinancing 
operations and long-term refinancing operations, providing eligible banks with 
unlimited access to liquidity at the ECB at the refinancing rate. These measures 
were intended to reduce funding risk of banks.  
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The ECB extended the maturity of its supplementary liquidity provisions of longer 
term reverse repos to banks by 12 months in June 2009 to enable banks to 
refinance a larger portion of their balance sheets. The ECB also had liquidity-
providing currency swap agreements put in place in the initial stages of the crisis 
with the Fed to permit the provision of US dollars to counterparties in the 
Eurosystem whose banks has borrowed heavily in the US money market and 
could not roll over their short-term debt. Liquidity-providing swap lines between 
central banks were intended to prevent the widespread failure of European banks 
with large dollar debts and so to limit negative spillover effects to the real economy 
in the eurozone (ECB, 2013).  
 
The ECB conducted a limited amount of currency swaps with the Fed at the end of 
the end of 2007, when markets were beginning to experience liquidity strains. The 
amount of currency swaps done between both jurisdictions was increased 
substantially after the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, while the 
ECB also conducted a swap agreement with the Swiss National Bank (SNB) to 
provide Swiss francs to Eurosystem counterparties which could not roll over their 
Swiss franc debt. In 2011, the ECB was one of the major banks in conjunction with 
the US Fed, BoE, BoJ, SNB and Bank of Canada (BoC) that introduced bilateral 
swap lines to allow each jurisdiction to provide foreign currency to domestic 
counterparties, if required.  
 
The ECB introduced more unconventional measures at the time of the European 
sovereign debt crisis in 2010, where there were expectations that Greece could 
default on its debt obligations which would have spillover effects to other 
peripheral countries in the region such as Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain as well 
as affect economic growth in the core European economies and overall growth in 
the region. The ECB established its Securities Market Programme (SMP) in May 
2010 and Covered Bonds Purchase Programme (CBPP) which was put in place to 
purchase government bonds and covered bank bonds from eurozone countries 
that were experiencing liquidity problems (Claeys, 2014).  
 
Under the SMP, the ECB purchased about €220 billion of Greek, Irish, 
Portuguese, Italian and Spanish government bonds. In 2010, the ECB bought its 
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first round of covered bonds of €60 billion, while a year later in November 2011, it 
adopted the second round worth about €40 billion. Finally, the ECB introduced the 
Outright Monetary Transactions Programme, whereby it could buy unlimited 
amounts of government bonds from members states. So far, the ECB has not 
deemed it necessary to use this measure (González-Páramo, JM. 2012).  
 
Bank of England 
 
In March 2009, the BoE first announced its intention to adopt QE to boost lending 
to firms and households. The first round of QE was actually done in January 2010 
and consisted of £200 billion of purchases, largely medium- and long-term 
government securities (gilts) from the non-bank private sector. The second round 
of QE (QE2) was done between October 2011 and June 2012, whereby the BoE 
bought  £175 billion of gilts on fears that the eurozone sovereign debt crisis might 
spillover to the UK and cause UK CPI to fall below its 2,0 per cent target (Churm 
et al., 2015). This took the total amount of QE in the UK to £375 billion, where it 
has remained into 2016.  
 
Bank of Japan  
 
The BoJ first implemented QE in 2001 in an attempt to boost economic growth 
and effectively prop up prices, due to long periods of deflation in the years prior to 
that. The first round of QE lasted for five years and was deemed unsuccessful as 
Japan continued to suffer from deflation (Allen, 2015).  
 
During the crisis, Japanese banks experienced small losses compared to their US 
and European counterparts, owing to limited exposure to subprime and 
securitisation products in these regions. However, the Japanese economy 
suffered greater losses than the two regions, largely due to substantial declines in 
the nation‟s exports. Quarterly real GDP decreased by 3,0 per cent (11,6 per cent 
at an annual rate) and 4,8 per cent (18,0 per cent) in the third and the fourth 
quarters of 2008, respectively (Litan, 2011). Subsequently, the Japanese yen 
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registered a sharp appreciation against the USD and the Japanese equity market 
collapsed, largely owing to large declines in the share prices of export companies. 
 
In response to the crisis, the BoJ introduced a number of measures.  In October 
2008, the BoJ made a decision to suspend the purchase of equities from banks on 
the stock exchange, but purchases resumed in February 2009. These temporary 
measures were intended to stabilise the equity market as well as to mitigate 
market risk associated with stockholding. 
 
In 2008, the BoJ expanded its Securities Lending Facility (SLF), permitting it to 
sell Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) with repurchase Agreements, while also 
reducing the minimum fee rate from 1,0 to 0,5 per cent. The objective of the SLF 
was to inject liquidity into financial markets. Soon thereafter, the BoJ embarked on 
the expansion of the SLF by the introduction of floating-rate JGBs, inflation-
indexed JGBs and 30-year government bonds for eligible banks to the list of the 
eligible collateral for its repo operations. The market was suffering from a lack of 
liquidity and these measures were intended to add more liquidity and further 
enhance financial stability. In this regard, the BoJ reduced the minimum fee rates 
for the SLF from 1,0 per cent to 0,5 per cent (Vollmer and Bebenroth, 2012).  
 
In December 2009, the BoJ decided to reinstate its QE policy (that is, its outright 
purchases of JGBs) from early 2000, as there was little room to manoeuver, given 
that its policy interest rate (the uncollateralised overnight call rate) was already 
close to the lower zero bound at 0,1 per cent.  The BoJ expanded the range of 
JGBs accepted in these outright purchases to include floating-rate JGBs, inflation-
indexed JGBs and 30-years government bonds. In January 2009, the BoJ also 
announced outright purchases of corporate bonds to boost liquidity and support 
the corporate financing market. The outright purchase of both CP and corporate 
bonds expired at the end of 2009. 
 
In the aftermath of the crisis (April 2013), the BoJ announced a massive QE 
programme worth USD1,44 trillion, where there was a commitment to purchase ¥7 
trillion of government bonds each month. However, the country could still not 
break the deflationary spiral in which it was caught and embarked on more QE 
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purchases of mainly JGBs in October 2014 by increasing them to ¥80 trillion a 
year, from ¥60 - ¥70 trillion a year previously (Allen, 2015).  
 
The implementation of QE since most recent crisis has led to a sharp expansion in 
the size and composition of balance sheets of the central banks in the major 
advanced economies (Figure 2.4). With the exception of the BoJ which was 
already building up a large balance sheet since 2001, the Fed, ECB and BoE 
experienced sizeable expansions in their respective balance sheets since the 
second half of 20096.  
 
The US Fed‟s holdings of securities ballooned from USD850 billion in mid-2007 to 
around USD 4,0 trillion at the end of 2013, while the other major central banks 
also expanded their balance sheets quite considerably. 
 
Figure 2.4 Central Bank Balance Sheets – Total Assets (USD)7 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund database
8
 
                                                 
6
 Japan‟s unconventional monetary policy began in March 2001, after the economy experienced 
deflation of around 1,0 per cent. 
Latest available data. Japan‟s balance sheet is shown as a percentage of GDP on the right hand   
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The crisis response measures undertaken by the major central banks highlight the 
important role that central banks play in containing financial crises and mitigating 
their effects on the real economy. However, central banks were singularly 
unsuccessful in reading the signs and taking timely steps to prevent it from 
happening in the disastrous way that it did, which is what macroprudential 
supervision is all about. It is critical that, when trying to come up with policy 
frameworks to mitigate systemic risk in the financial system and prevent outright 
crisis, policymakers have a clear understanding of the underlying causes of crises. 
The next section deals with the main causes of the 2007-2009 global financial 
crisis. 
 
2.5 MAIN CAUSES OF THE CRISIS  
 
2.5.1 Long periods of low interest rates 
 
It has often been argued that low inflation and excessive expansionary monetary 
policy was responsible for the global financial crisis. Taylor (2007) strongly 
believed that the US Fed had set the policy rate below the correct level, resulting 
in excessively low interest rates and borrowing costs and led to overleveraging by 
banks in the search for higher returns. Bernanke (2005a), however, disagreed with 
this view, stating that US interest rates were not excessively low and that it was in 
fact, global imbalances that led to lower interest rates globally. 
 
The bursting of the dot-com bubble in the US in March 2000 contributed towards 
the start of the Fed‟s adoption of low interest rate policy. The dot-com bubble 
emanated from a sharp rise in asset (equity) prices which was fuelled by 
excessively high levels of investment in internet-based companies in 1995. 
Investors had channelled large amounts of funds into internet start-up companies 
in the hope that these companies would one day generate super profits (Wellink, 
2009). These companies came to be known as “dot-coms,” after the “.com” in 
many web addresses.  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
8
 Data can be accessed from http://data.imf.org 
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Between the period 1995 and 2000,  the value of equity markets grew 
substantially, with the technology-dominated Nasdaq index increasing from under 
1 000 index points in 1995 to about 5 000 index points in 2000. The market 
capitalisation of the Nasdaq stock exchange was about USD6,7 trillion, which was 
in bubble territory (Geier, 2015).  The dot-com bubble burst within that year, with 
sharp declines experienced in equity prices and resultant declines in business 
spending and consumer confidence, which in turn led to the failure of many dot-
com and technology companies. 
 
Economic conditions deteriorated further after there was an increase in 
outsourcing of projects that resulted in high unemployment among computer 
developers and programmers. Thereafter, the US economy suffered a further 
major setback in the wake of the terrorist attacks in 2001. As a result of the above-
mentioned developments, the Fed implemented aggressive easing of monetary 
policy to avoid a deep economic recession, reducing its policy rate to one per cent 
in June 2003, a cumulative reduction of 550 basis points between 2001 and 2003. 
Interest rates remained low for the next year with other central banks such as the 
ECB and the BoE following suit.  
 
During this period of low interest rates, there was increased demand for credit, 
which led to higher consumption and investment as well as to the build-up of asset 
price bubbles, particularly of property. In addition, there was a flood of investment 
mostly into US government securities from countries such as Japan and China 
which sought higher returns in a relatively risky environment. According to 
Bernanke (2009a), the net inflow of foreign saving to the US increased 
substantially from 1,5 per cent of GDP in 1995 to around 6,0 per cent in 2006. 
These high levels of foreign savings in the US helped keep US mortgage interest 
rates low and bank lending standards were very relaxed.  
 
Eventually, investors began taking more risks by investing in US mortgage-backed 
securities (MBSs) which offered higher returns on seemingly low-risk assets and 
were highly recommended (AAA ratings) by the major rating agencies (Moody‟s, 
Standard & Poor‟s and Fitch). Borio and Disyatat (2011), in contrast, argue that 
there is no evident correlation between the global savings rate and real interest 
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rates. Their study indicated that irrespective of the trends in the global savings, 
real long-term interest rates continued to decline since the 1990s, as also noted  
by Taylor (2007).   
 
Holt (2009) argued that low short-term US interest rates due to a low interest-rate 
policy by the Fed were largely responsible for the build-up of the US property 
bubble in two critical ways. Firstly, low rates encouraged consumers to make use 
of adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) and Alternative A – paper (Alt-A) mortgages 
in the US subprime market. According to the Wikipedia definition, ARMs are 
mortgage loans with periodically-adjusted, variable interest rates, reflecting the 
cost of credit, and are therefore similar to the most common form of housing 
bonds in South Africa.  ARMs are used in instances where it is difficult to get 
access to loans during periods of unpredictable interest rates. When interest rates 
fall, the borrower benefits from lower repayments as compared to fixed-rate 
mortgages. However, the borrower is at a disadvantage when interest rates rise.  
An Alt-A mortgage is a mortgage loan that is deemed riskier than a prime loan but 
less risky than a subprime loan. In this instance, borrowers have less favourable 
credit scores, higher loan-to-value ratios and do not possess all the qualifying 
documentation for a prime loan.  
 
Historically, US mortgages were largely held at fixed rates. However, this trend 
changed during the housing boom years as ARMs became popular in the 
subprime segment of the mortgage market. These loans gave buyers the option of 
initially lower monthly payments as short-term interest rates were lower than long-
term interest rates.  During these years, subprime ARMs and “Alt-A” mortgages 
comprised more than 40 per cent of total mortgages issued as at the end of 2006 
(Baker, 2008: p76). Furthermore, of the approximately USD1,4 trillion total 
exposure to subprime mortgages, around half of the potential losses were incurred 
by US leveraged financial institutions, such as commercial  banks, securities 
broker-dealers (investment banks) and hedge funds.  
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Table 2.1 Total exposure to losses from subprime mortgages  
Source: Greenlaw et al. (2008) 
 
Between the fourth quarter of 2002 and the fourth quarter of 2006, US real house 
prices rose by more than 32 per cent, peaking in the second quarter of 2006. 
These strong gains in house prices resulted in the construction of more houses, 
as seen in US housing starts data which peaked at over two million new units in 
2005, more than 50 per cent higher than levels seen prior to the housing bubble. 
Consumption was also strong, with the savings rate falling to less than 1,0 per 
cent between 2005 and 2007.   
 
When the housing bubble eventually burst in 2007 after an oversupply of houses 
in the US property market, partly as a result of forced sales to pay off failed 
mortgage loans (particularly subprime loans) led to sharp declines in property 
prices. The S&P Case-Schiller Home Price Index9 declined by almost 40 per cent 
from its 2006 peak to mid-2009 (Bloomberg data).  The rise in mortgage defaults 
encouraged banks to tighten their lending standards and demand larger deposits 
from prospective homeowners, who could not afford these houses as the sharp 
decline in property prices had destroyed large portions of their equity and made 
refinancing impossible.  
 
                                                 
9
 The S&P Case-Shiller home-price index is a national (20-city composite) home price index that 
covers Boston, Chicago, Denver, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San Diego, San 
Francisco, Washington, DC, Atlanta, Charlotte, Cleveland, Dallas, Detroit, Minneapolis, Phoenix,  
Portland (Oregon), Seattle and Tampa. 
 Total reported subprime 
exposure (USD billion) 
% of reported 
exposure 
Investment banks 75 5% 
Commercial banks 418 31% 
Government-sponsored enterprises (GSE‟s) 112 8% 
Hedge funds 291 21% 
Insurance companies 319 23% 
Finance companies 95 7% 
Mutual and pension  funds 57 4% 
   
Leveraged sector 896 66% 
Unleveraged sector 472 34% 
   
Total 1368 100% 
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The value of securities with exposure to the US housing market plunged, which 
had negative spillover effects on financial institutions on a global level as many of 
them had bought subprime related US structured investment products. Equity 
markets also suffered massive losses as market liquidity dried up and fears 
heightened surrounding the solvency of large and reputable financial institutions 
(including highly leveraged banks) who struggled to roll over their short-term 
financing or obtain cash in the interbank market. Against this backdrop, it became 
widely accepted that the bursting of the US housing bubble in 2007 was largely 
due to lax monetary policy between 2000 and 2004 and a lack of focus on the 
build-up of systemic risk and vulnerabilities in the financial system. 
 
2.5.2 Wide global current-account imbalances 
 
Global current-account imbalances have been identified as one of the key causes 
the global financial crisis. By definition, a current-account balance is equal to the 
difference between savings and investment. Therefore when one refers to global 
imbalances, it simply means distortions between savings and investment.  A 
widely held view is that excess savings over investment in emerging market 
countries (such as China) led to current account surpluses. Investors channelled 
these excess funds to deficit countries such as the US, which led to a loosening in 
credit conditions, thereby resulting in lower global interest rates which created the 
credit boom in the US in the run up to the crisis (Skidelsky, 2010).  
 
Bernanke (2009a) states that it is impossible to understand this crisis without 
reference to the global imbalances in trade and capital flows that began in the 
latter half of the 1990s. The statement of the November 2008 G20 summit also 
suggested that global imbalances played a major role in the run-up to the global 
financial crisis through a lack of consistency and co-ordination in macroeconomic 
policies and inadequate structural reforms, which led to unsustainable global  
macroeconomic imbalances which ultimately resulted in severe market disruptions 
and financial system instability. 
 
During the early 2000s, the global economic and financial landscape was 
seemingly healthy, with most economies recording generally strong economic 
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growth, benign inflation and healthy financial flows (particularly trade flows). The 
US current-account deficit reached around 2,4 per cent of GDP at the time of the 
Asian debt crisis in 1998, before climbing to 4,8 per cent in 2003 and peaking at 
close to 6,0 per cent  of GDP in 2006, largely owing to high levels of investment 
and a low national savings rate (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009).  
 
Pettinger (2007) identifies two other factors that caused the US current account 
deficit, namely, (i) a loss of competitiveness in the US and; (ii) a relatively strong 
US dollar for a country with a high current account deficit. The US was losing 
competitiveness, largely owing to US higher wage costs in comparison to US 
manufactured goods have been losing comparative advantage to Asian 
economies. The primary reason was that wage costs in US were much higher 
than their Asian counterparts. In particular, China‟s trade surplus with the US 
widened rapidly due to its low labour costs.  
 
The US current account deficit was also affected by a strong US dollar relative to 
the current account deficit. Over the years, the US dollar benefited as investors in 
surplus countries poured funds into high-yielding risky US assets during the credit 
boom years. Once again, China, in particular, invested large amounts of funds in 
US government securities. As of the end of 2006, China held about USD699,0 
billion of US securities, behind Japan at USD1,11 trillion (US Treasury).  At the 
end of 2009, China reached its peak, owning about USD1,46 trillion worth of US 
government securities, the highest in the world and surpassing Japan at USD1,27 
trillion.  
 
These massive increases in holdings propped up the US dollar and encouraged 
the purchase of cheaper imports, thereby contributing to an imbalance between 
imports and exports, hence the wider current account deficit in the US (Mann, 
1999). A number of other countries, such as Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece 
also ran large current-account deficits. Some of the main current account surplus 
countries included China and Germany (Figure 2.5).  
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Figure 2.5 Current account balances of selected countries  
 
Source: International Monetary Fund database
10 
 
China‟s high economic growth in the three decades prior to the crisis, was largely 
due its high savings rate (Ma and Yi, 2010). Gross national saving as a 
percentage of GDP increased from about 35 per cent in the 1980s, to about 41 
per cent in the 1990s and to record levels of 53 per cent in 2007, overtaking 
Japan, South Korea, and other East Asian countries to be amongst the highest on 
a global level. The high savings rate was seen to be a major contributor to the 
global saving glut, caused by the country‟s national saving exceeding total 
investment, resulting in a large current account surplus (Yang et al. 2011). 
 
China was often criticised for intervening in foreign exchange markets to limit the 
appreciation of the renminbi against the US dollar and other currencies, in order to 
maintain its competitive export advantage (Morrison and Labonte, 2013). China‟s 
foreign exchange policy led many to believe that the renminbi was undervalued 
                                                 
10
 Data can be accessed from http://data.imf.org 
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against the US dollar and was a major contributor to the substantial US current 
account deficit in pre-crisis years.  
 
Whilst the above-mentioned reasons do provide compelling arguments as to why 
the global savings glut possibly contributed to global imbalances as a key cause of 
the crisis, there are opposing views on the topic. Borio and Disyatat (2011) 
challenge the views of Bernanke (2005) and others. They argue that the “excess 
saving” view provides little distinction between saving (which is associated with a 
country‟s national account) and financing (which is associated with cash flows). 
Hence there is too much focus on net capital flows instead of gross capital flows, 
which effectively distorts the calculation of the natural rate of interest.  
 
They concluded that the “excess saving” view did not sufficiently explain the 
trends witnessed during the US credit boom years. Borio and Disyatat (2011) also 
highlighted inconsistencies on a few key points relating to global imbalances. 
Their study examined the behaviour of longer-term interest rates versus the US 
current account deficit from 2005. They argued that the correlation between 
current account balances and longer-term policy rates is weak, as there did not 
appear to be a narrowing in the US current account deficit nor capital outflows 
from surplus countries when US dollar long-term interest rates increased between 
2005 and 2007. 
  
The second inconsistency that was highlighted by Borio and Disyatat (2011) was 
the weak relationship between the US dollar and US asset prices. In their study, 
they also argue that in theory, the US dollar should have exhibited an appreciating 
trend as foreign investors purchased US assets. This appreciating trend was not 
evident in the pre-crisis years. The third point of note was that there was also a 
weak correlation between global savings and the US current account deficit.  As 
the US deficit began to narrow in the early 1990s, the global savings rate declined 
up until 2003, against a backdrop of rising saving rates in emerging markets. 
 
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009) agree that although global imbalances 
played its part in exacerbating economic conditions during the crisis, it was not the 
key cause of the crisis. They argue that the problem was more of a safe-assets 
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structural deficiency. Safe assets are generally viewed as relatively low risk, but 
highly liquid in that there are buyers and sellers who are willing to enter into 
contracts. A structural deficiency or imbalance can occur when a market that has 
already gained from safe-haven investments gets flooded with more money in the 
event of more turmoil.  
 
In this regard, global investors‟ quest for safe-haven assets placed enormous 
pressure on the US financial system, which buckled under the pressure when the 
subprime crisis emerged. The safe-assets deficiency worsened even after the US 
housing bubble burst as investors ran for cover into US government securities. 
Therefore they believe that the real challenge is how to address the structural 
problem of bridging of the safe-asset gap without making the global financial 
sector exposed to systemic risk. 
 
 2.5.3 Failure of financial regulation 
 
The IMF (2009) stated that regulators failed to identify the build-up of systemic risk 
following rapid financial innovation and increased leverage and did not do much to 
mitigate these risks. They were too preoccupied with the formal banking sector 
and were consequently not sufficiently vigilant about the risks accumulating in the 
shadow banking system. 
 
Financial innovation evolved since the 1970‟s as financial markets became 
deregulated and globalisation led to more cross-border trade and the creation of 
large and complex institutions. As discussed in 2.2, low interest rates and excess 
market liquidity led to global investors‟ search for high yield, which resulted in 
rapid expansion of financial innovative and complex products in the form of 
shadow banking securitisations such as MBSs, CDOs and CDSs. Investors 
initially welcomed these products as they were assumed to be low risk in nature 
while at the same time providing high nominal returns. Greenspan (2005) was also 
supportive of these innovations, stating that subprime growth in particular, had 
encouraged other forms of innovation that responded to market demand and 
benefited consumers.  
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The unregulated “shadow banking” system was identified as a key cause of the 
crisis. The Financial Stability Board (2011:1) describes shadow banking as “credit 
intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular banking system". 
These banks provide the benefit of alternative sources of funding and liquidity to 
the financial system. However, their activities are largely unregulated and an 
important source of systemic risk, as the crisis has borne out. Shadow banks 
include investment banks, hedge funds and mortgage originators and are not 
subject to prudential capital requirements.   
 
Kodres (2013) pointed out that the term “shadow bank” was invented by Paul 
McCulley who referred to these types of banks as non-bank financial institutions 
involved in maturity transformation, similar to commercial banks, where they use 
short-term deposits to fund longer-term loans. Shadow banks facilitate credit 
provision through a broad range of securitisation and secured funding instruments 
such as asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), ABSs, CDOs and repurchase 
agreements (Sanches, 2014). The difference between the activities of traditional 
commercial banks and shadow banks is that the latter are largely unregulated and 
not subject to traditional bank regulation. Hence, shadow banks are not permitted 
to access credit lines from a central bank, as they do not have traditional 
depositors who can provide insurance to them to cover losses (Pozsar et al. 
2014). 
 
According to estimates of the Financial Stability Board (2011), the shadow 
banking system, on a global level, increased from USD27 trillion in 2002 to USD60 
trillion in 2010, representing about 25 per cent to 30 per cent of the total global 
financial system and about 50 per cent of global bank assets. Shadow banks were 
highly exposed during the recent global financial crisis, after investors, particularly 
mutual money market funds, began to panic and withdraw funds from shadow 
banks when Lehman Brothers failed. To meet their repayment obligations to 
investors, these shadow banks were forced to do fire sales on their assets, which 
exacerbated asset price declines and eventually resulted in losses.  
 
Traditional banks were negatively impacted due to their interconnectedness with 
shadow banks via the provision of sources of funding (Kodres, 2013). In other 
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words, traditional banks also incurred substantial losses as they had sold 
commercial paper and other short-term debt to shadow banks that repackaged 
these loans as derivative products and sold them to investors. The unregulated 
nature of these shadow banks was also characterised by a lack of disclosure on 
the value of their assets, thereby increasing the threat of bankruptcy.  Panic arose 
during the crisis when traditional banks and shadow banks were unsure of who 
owed what to whom due to limited information on each other‟s asset values.  
 
Additionally, banks were allowed to move substantial amounts of assets and 
liabilities off-balance sheet into complex legal entities called structured investment 
vehicles (SIV). This effectively meant that the parent bank could appear to be less 
leveraged and obtain loans at lower interest rates.  When subprime loans began 
to default in 2007 and these SIVs began to experience severe financial difficulties, 
banks were still under contractual obligation to provide credit lines to the SIVs and 
their investors. As a result, banks‟ ability to lend was constrained and this led to a 
market liquidity squeeze as banks became reluctant to lend to the public as well 
as to each other. 
 
There are different types of risk involved in derivatives trading, namely 
counterparty risk, market risk, liquidity risk and interconnected risk. Counterparty 
risk arises if one of the parties in the derivatives trade defaults on his obligations. 
The parties involved are the buyer, seller and dealer. Kiff et al. (2009) note that 
counterparty risk is systemic in nature because the failure of a big systemically 
important bank could have knock-on-effects on other banks that are 
interconnected to it and possibly lead to default amongst all the banks. The failure 
of a large bank could also cause a liquidity crisis as a large number of its 
counterparties would simultaneously want contracts to be replaced. This would 
affect interbank lending and trading volumes due to uncertainty about each other‟s 
exposure to securitisation products (Gregory, 2010). 
 
Banks and investors generally purchase CDS protection from these “dealer” banks 
to hedge their assets or when giving an investment view. When these bonds go 
bad, the protection sellers of the CDS are expected to pay-out to the buyers of this 
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insurance. Counterparty risk was evident when Lehman Brothers failed as all the 
counterparties made losses. 
 
Market risk refers to the general risk in any investment. Investors make decisions 
and take positions based on assumptions, technical analysis or other factors that 
lead them to certain conclusions about how an investment is likely to perform. An 
important part of investment analysis is determining the probability of an 
investment being profitable and assessing the risk/reward ratio of potential losses 
against potential gains. Market risk is often characterised by a financial loss that 
an institution incurs when the value of an investment decreases due to change in 
market factors.  
 
The Fed (2016) identifies the following market factors as affecting the value of 
investments, namely (i) the institution‟s sensitivity of earnings and the value of 
capital to changes in interest rates, adverse movements in foreign exchanges 
rates, commodity prices, or equity prices; (ii) how an institution manages its 
exposure to market risk, taking into consideration its size, complexity and risk 
profile, (iii)  the nature of the institution‟s interest rate exposure arising from non-
trading positions and; (iv) the nature of market risk exposure arising from trading 
and foreign operations. 
 
The third type of risk arising out of securitisation trading is liquidity risk. Pederson 
(2008) identifies two types of liquidity risk, namely (i) market liquidity risk, that is 
the risk that there is deterioration in the ease and speed with which assets can be 
sold in that market without adversely affecting the price, and; (ii) funding liquidity 
risk, that is, the risk that a trader is forced to close out his position ahead of the 
maturity of the instrument due to a sudden falling away of funding for that position.  
The two forms of liquidity risk are linked and have spillover effects in stressed 
market conditions, as poor funding can result in thin trade, thereby reducing 
market liquidity and exacerbating low trading volumes, thereby having a spiral 
effect.  
 
The fourth type of risk is interconnection risk. This refers to how the 
interconnectedness between derivative instruments could impact on a derivatives 
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trade. This type of risk was also evident in the Lehman Brothers failure as the 
bank that performed a dealer function had spillover effects on its counterparties. 
During the crisis, the risks arising from these derivative products were largely 
hidden. Hence, it became difficult for institutions to price these instruments in the 
face of debt defaults (Lartey, 2012). 
 
The financial system had also developed into a more market-based and 
interconnected system that not only consisted of securitised bank lending and the 
expansion of derivatives, but also of fair value accounting.  According to the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB, 2006), fair-value accounting (FVA) 
refers to the accounting practice of valuing an asset at the price for which it could 
be exchanged in a current transaction between knowledgeable and willing parties. 
Market prices are used to calculate fair value, hence, FVA is also referred to as 
mark-to-market accounting.  
 
William Isaac, the chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
from 1978 to 1985, commented that FVA was one of the causes of the global 
financial crisis (Katz, 2008).  He argued that subprime losses in the US comprised 
about 20 per cent in 2006, while federally insured US banks had recorded close to 
USD60 billion of losses in that market. The problem, however, was that the banks 
reported about USD150 billion in after-tax earnings and had USD1,4 trillion of 
capital. In this regard, FVA was regarded as a regulatory failure as banks were 
forced to reprice their illiquid assets down to extremely low fire-sale prices, which 
led to billions of dollars in accounting losses (but not cash losses), which caused a 
substantially reduced lending capacity of banks. It was felt that the quality of these 
assets was not always such that it merited the fire sale price, bearing in mind that 
many CDOs, and other structured products, still contained a large proportion of 
good-quality loans. 
 
There were, however, studies done that indicate that FVA was not really to blame 
for the crisis. For example, a study by the US Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC, 2008), mandated by Section 133 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act of 2008, concluded that FVA was not responsible for bank failures during 
2008. Instead, losses incurred by banks were largely due to higher credit losses, 
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concerns about asset quality, as well as eroding business and investor 
confidence. This SEC study examined the FVA balance sheet activities of fifty 
financial institutions, where the combined assets of these institutions represented 
a minimum of 75 per cent of financial institutions' assets in the United States 
(Scott, 2010). 
 
Laux and Leu (2009) also concluded that there was little evidence to suggest that 
FVA was a contributing factor to bank losses during the crisis. Their assessment 
was that FVA played a small role in institutions‟ income statements and regulatory 
capital ratios, except for institutions with large trading positions, where investors 
use their own discretion and judgment based on exposure to subprime loans. The 
study also concluded that there was limited evidence indicating that asset prices 
were inaccurate as a result of fire-sales or that institutions were obliged to do 
excessive write-downs.  
 
2.5.4 Mispricing of assets by credit rating agencies 
 
Weak risk assessment practices were identified as another key cause of the crisis. 
There was widespread agreement that credit rating agencies (CRAs) mispriced 
the value of complex structured and derivative products by deploying models that 
were inadequately designed to deal with such products.  
 
In April 2011, a US congressional report concluded that Moody's and Standard 
and Poor's were responsible for triggering the 2007 financial crisis after they 
forcefully downgraded the previously inflated ratings they assigned to complex 
MBS products (Younglai and Lynch, 2011). Documents obtained from CRAs 
proved that they were aware of the risks facing the US subprime market before it 
collapsed, and nonetheless still failed to price these assets accordingly and reflect 
this in their ratings. Between 2004 and 2006, the amount of requests for the rating 
of structured financed products increased substantially (Bahena, 2010). This was 
largely due the fact that investors themselves had limited knowledge at their 
disposal pertaining to these complex products and consequently relied heavily on 
CRAs to carry risk assessments.  
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Amadou (2009) agreed that CRAs played a key role in causing the crisis after the 
unexpected credit rating downgrades on these complex structured finance 
products led to substantial bank losses and a resulting liquidity squeeze in the 
global financial system. It became clear that CRAs themselves lacked a clear 
understanding of the dynamics and underlying risks facing these complex 
structured and derivative products. The methodology behind these ratings was 
clearly flawed in design, resulting in CRAs assigning excessively high ratings 
(AAA ratings) to CDOs, MBSs, Alt-A mortgages and subprime mortgages.   
 
Once CRAs began implementing rapid downgrades of these derivative products, 
ratings of ABSs for example dropped from AAA to non-investment grade, including 
default. Panic ensued in markets after market prices became unavailable or 
inaccurate for many securities, included those that were AAA-rated (Crouhy, 
2009).  
 
2.5.5 Compensation-driven incentives encouraged risk taking 
  
Large executive-compensation driven incentives were seen as a factor that 
encouraged excessive risk-taking and greed in financial markets in return for 
higher remuneration. As a result, executives of large banks were blinded by greed 
and failed to consider longer-term risks and the build-up of financial imbalances in 
the system.  
 
Excessive risk-taking is described as actions that could possibly provide short-
term benefits to investors, but create systemic risks to the financial system as a 
whole (Sharma, 2012). Generally speaking, performance incentives, which include 
asset accumulation, sales targets, share prices and short-term profit generation, 
do have the tendency to encourage executives to take excessively high risks to 
generate short-term profit and receive high remuneration in return. 
 
Studies done by Sharma (2012) looked at whether risky policy decision was 
influenced by the salaries of senior executives in financial institutions. Their 
findings indicate that there was indeed strong evidence showing that bank 
executives who received higher pay packages tended to have a higher appetite for 
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risk-taking. Drasic and Velinova (2011) also came to the conclusion that incentive 
pay in bull markets are excessively high, therefore encouraging managers of 
poorly managed funds to take on excessive risk to outperform their peers and 
receive higher pay incentives.  
 
To discourage excessive risk-taking behaviour by executives, the FSB in 2009 
introduced guiding principles for effective executive compensation, with the 
intention of aligning risks with payments. The Implementation Standards outlined 
specific proposals on compensation governance, structure and disclosure to 
strengthen compliance with the FSB Principles for Sound Compensation Practices 
(FSB, 2009b). These proposals included (i) oversight of pay policies and 
practices; (ii) linking pay packages to the overall performance of the organisation, 
(iii) reviewing pay and risk alignment, vesting and clawback arrangements; (iv) 
placing limits on guaranteed bonuses; (v) ensuring greater public disclosure of 
salaries; and (vi) ensuring appropriate oversight of pay incentives and putting 
corrective measures in place.  
 
2.6 THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE  
 
Prior to the most recent crisis, the South African economy was performing 
relatively well, recording GDP growth of around 5,0 per cent between 2004 and 
2007 (Table 2.2). By 2007, growth was approaching the government‟s targeted 
6,0 per cent level needed to halve poverty and unemployment by 2014 while GDP 
per capita had risen by 22 per cent since 1999, fixed capital investment gained 10 
per cent and more than 1,5 million jobs had been added to the economy (SARB, 
2007). 
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Table 2.2 Performance of selected macroeconomic indicators in South 
Africa 
  
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Real GDP growth (%) 5,4 5,1 3,7 -1,8 2,9 3,5 2,5 1,9 1,5 n/a* 
Headline CPI (%) 4,7 7,2 11,5 7,1 4,3 5,0 5,6 5,7 6,1 n/a 
Money supply growth (%) 22,5 23,6 14,8 1,6 6,9 8,3 5,2 5,9 7,3 n/a 
repo rate (year-end) 9,0 11,0 11,5 7,0 5,5 5,5 5,0 5,0 5,75 6,75 
Budget balance  
 debt (% of GDP) 
-0,4 1,7 -1,0 -6,7 -4,6 -4,4 -3,7 -3,8 -3,6 n/a 
Current account 
 balance (% of GDP) 
-6,5 -7,3 -7,1 -4,0 -2,8 -3,4 -5,2 -5,8 -5,4 n/a 
Government expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
26,3 29,3 30,8 34,1 32,2 32,1 32,1 33,3 32,0 n/a 
Government revenue (% 
of GDP) 
25,9 31,0 29,7 26,8 27,6 27,7 28,1 29,4 28,4 n/a 
Rand/USD  (year-end) R6,99 R6,86 R9,4 R7,4 R6,6 R8,1 R8,8 R10,5 R11,6 R15,5 
Ten-year government 
 bond yield (at year end) 
7,85 8,55 7,22 9,04 8,14 8,11 6,78 8,23 7,96 9,76 
JSE all-share index (%) 37,7 16,2 -25,7 28,6 16,1 -0,4 22,2 17,8 7,6 1,9 
 Source: South African Reserve Bank 
*Final statistics for 2015 not published  
 
Furthermore, the country adopted prudent fiscal and monetary policy and had a 
flexible exchange rate which acted as a buffer during times of excessive market 
volatility and disorderly portfolio outflows. South Africa‟s fiscal position was 
relatively healthy, with both  the size of its debt relative to GDP and the primary 
budget deficit being markedly lower than most core European countries, the US 
and Japan. 
 
When the global financial crisis emerged in 2007, the South African financial 
sector was relatively immune to global developments, largely owing to the country 
adopting a sound framework for financial regulation and implementing 
conservative yet strong risk management practices at financial institutions, which 
ensured limited trading of derivatives and securitisation products and limited 
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exposure to foreign assets, compared to advanced economies such as the US 
and eurozone (National Treasury, 2013).  
 
In addition, there was an increased focus on reducing household vulnerability 
which resulted in the implementation of the National Credit Act which protected 
consumers against reckless lending practices (such as subprime lending) by 
banks. The country‟s sophisticated and well-regulated financial sector limited any 
risk of systemic bank failures or liquidity crises. At no stage, during or after crisis, 
was the SARB required to provide additional liquidity lines to the financial system.  
 
However, as the financial crisis worsened and spread to other parts of the globe, 
South Africa‟s real economy and financial markets could not escape the spill-over 
from the crisis, given South Africa‟s strong interconnectedness with the global 
economy, particularly with its largest trading partners, the eurozone, US and 
China.  
 
By 2009, spill-over effects from the global economy into the domestic economy via 
trade and financial flows and a decline in consumer demand and private 
investment, resulted in GDP growth contracting by 7,4 per cent and 2,8 per cent in 
the first two quarters of 2009 and by 1,8 per cent for the full year (see Table 1). 
This marked South Africa‟s first economic recession in almost 17 years.   
 
As mentioned earlier, South African banks were largely insulated from the direct 
effects of the global financial crisis. However, banks were indirectly impacted 
through higher non-performing loans due to job losses among its borrowers 
caused by a decline in economic growth. The country‟s unemployment rate rose to 
24,3 per cent in 2009 with a loss of 870 000 jobs (The National Treasury, 2010). In 
order to cushion the domestic economy from adverse global conditions, the SARB 
reduced the policy rate by 350 basis points to 8,5 per cent in April 2009 as 
inflation fears eased and the economic situation deteriorated. On the fiscal side, 
the crisis led to a sharp decline in domestic tax revenue, thereby requiring 
increased government spending to support growth. The impact of global 
developments was also visible in South Africa‟s financial markets, particularly 
equity, foreign exchange and bond markets, owing to heightened volatility. 
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2.7 CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, many key factors contributed to the evolution of the financial crisis. 
Widening global imbalances, particularly between the US and China since the 
early 2000‟s, was a key factor attributed towards lax monetary policy in the US and 
a build-up of hidden vulnerabilities in the financial system. Lower interest rates 
attracted vast amounts of capital from global investors, thereby creating ample 
liquidity in the financial system, spurring investors to take excessive risks in the 
search for higher yield in the US property market which was booming at the time. 
Simultaneously financial innovation advanced, while banks and regulators had 
limited knowledge of the underlying risks posed by these instruments as well as 
the system-wide impact in the event of a crisis.  
 
In the initial stages of the crisis not all countries were seriously impacted, owing to 
prudent macroeconomic policies and well managed fiscal and monetary policy. 
Others did not have deep linkages with the US and Europe so were little impacted 
by the effects of the subprime crisis and distressed markets. However, as the 
crisis worsened, almost every country in the world became affected through 
second round effects, via a decline in consumer confidence which negatively 
impacted world trade. As a result, many countries globally experienced economic 
downturns or recessions, triggering unconventional and aggressive policy actions 
by regulators. Policymakers adopted QE while fiscal policymakers embarked on 
increased government spending and reducing taxes to support economic growth. 
 
The main debate globally was the role of monetary policy and the fact that whilst 
flexible inflation targeting was the most appropriate way to achieve monetary 
policy objectives in the past, this was no longer the case. There was wide 
consensus that central banks should adopt a set of multiple objectives, namely; (i) 
to maintain price stability; (ii) to support long-term economic growth and stable 
employment while still preserving the medium term price stability objective; and (iii) 
to promote financial stability in the financial system. Many key central banks such 
as the ECB, BoE, Fed, BoJ and others have made important progress in putting 
some of these systems in place. Looking ahead, the challenge is for central banks 
to come up with better ways to achieve these dual objectives of price stability and 
financial stability. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE CRISIS AND SALIENT FEATURES OF 
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY  
 
 
3.1        INTRODUCTION 
 
The 2007-2009 global financial crisis highlighted the stand-off between challenges 
of advanced economies facing dislocated financial systems and central bank 
efforts to provide stimulus to stabilise markets and boost economic growth. 
Furthermore, the emergence of the European sovereign debt crisis in 2010 was a 
major setback for the global economic recovery, particularly for emerging market 
economies that were fairly insulated from the US subprime crisis given their low 
exposure to those markets.  
 
At many stages during the crisis, questions were raised about the roles and duties 
of central banks, policy response outcomes as well as intended or unintended 
consequences of the crisis. The following sections will discuss the lessons learnt 
from the crisis as well as a description of macroprudential policy and financial 
stability which were identified as the missing pillars in the design of central bank 
frameworks.  
 
3.2       KEY LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE 2007-2009  FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
3.2.1 Financial stability should be an additional objective of central banks 
 
The global financial crisis raised questions about the effectiveness of monetary 
policy with a single objective of price stability, using the interest rate as a single 
instrument. Monetary policy since the 1990s was relatively successful at ensuring 
low stable inflation and strong economic growth. However, the most recent crisis 
has taught us that price stability was not a pre-condition for financial stability (IMF, 
2013a).  
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Interestingly, prior to the 2007 financial crisis, there were some key emerging 
market central banks that had financial stability as part of their policy frameworks 
(Mohanty, 2010). For example, China, India and Russia used a range of 
macroprudential tools such as the reserve requirement (RR) ratio to slow down 
credit. Other central banks such as Indonesia and Korea used credit ceilings to 
limit bank credit extension and/or provide credit lines to small and medium 
enterprises. Other tools used by emerging market central banks included loan-loss 
provisioning requirements as well as loan-to-value (LTV) ceilings on mortgage 
loans, to be discussed further in chapter four.  
 
The challenge facing central banks in the post-crisis period was how to design and 
implement a governance framework to take into account financial stability 
(Acharya, 2015). Some key issues for consideration were: (i) whether to include 
financial stability as an objective of monetary policy or as a separate target (i.e.  
institute a dual mandate); (ii) how to co-ordinate macroprudential policies with 
monetary and fiscal policy to achieve the objectives of financial stability and price 
stability without compromising the effectiveness of the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism; (iii) what types of macroprudential tools should be the 
most effective to measure systemic risk; (iv) how to promote international co-
ordination with other central banks, given spillover effects from the bursting of 
credit and  asset price bubbles abroad and; (v) who should be accountable for the 
governance of financial stability (government or central bank) for the setting of the 
target and controlling of the target.  
 
According to the IMF (2009b), macroeconomic policies did not target systemic risk 
prior to the crisis and as a result monetary policy failed to respond to the build-up 
of systemic risk due to credit-driven asset price bubbles. Hence, there is strong 
justification for central banks to expand the mandate of monetary policy to include 
financial as well as price stability. 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
3.2.2 The failure of mainstream macroeconomics to understand monetary policy 
and financial stability 
 
A key lesson learnt from the crisis was that mainstream macroeconomics failed to 
understand financial stability and incorrectly assumed that interest rates and the 
determinants of money creation reflected a sufficient analysis of financial 
variables. Regulators had a mandate to change money supply and interest rates, 
which mainstream economic theory, alongside central bank theory, viewed as 
sufficient to stimulate economic growth (Stoop, 2010:21).The traditional banking 
system consists of commercial banks and a central bank, whereby a central bank 
provides liquidity (money) to commercial banks, which act as financial 
intermediaries to provide loans to investors. Hence, a central bank has the power 
to increase the supply of money in the financial system (Mankiw 2010). Short-term 
loans are made by private agents against collateral, which consists of central bank 
reserves.  
In a recent policy paper by the Bank of England (2016:38), it was acknowledged 
that mainstream monetary policy was erroneous for many decades prior to the 
2008 financial crisis. Whilst the traditional banking model consists of banks that 
play an intermediary role in facilitating pre-existing loanable funds between 
depositors and borrowers, in reality, these pre-existing loans or banks that provide 
these loans, do not exist. Instead, banks actively manage their balance sheets by 
providing new loans via the matching of loan and deposit entries on their balance 
sheets. The paper further concluded that in the current environment, the deposit 
multiplier mechanism (that is, when a bank‟s reserve requirement ratio determines 
how much loans can be extended, and hence the amount of created deposits) is 
non-existant. This conclusion was based on the premise that it is not just 
quantitative restrictions (reserve requirement ratio) that influences a bank‟s ability 
to create money, but instead, it is also a bank‟s assessment of future profitability 
and solvency issues that determines money creation.  
Rasmus (2016:1) was in agreement that mainstream economics tended to focus 
too much on real variables (such as money, changes in technology, cost of capital 
and expected rates of return on investment), and too less on financial variables 
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(such as the distinction between money and credit, the growth of non-money 
forms of credit and the emergence of the shadow banking system. Hence, they 
largely ignored financial vulnerabilities that were building up in the financial system 
and offsetting the effects of interest rates on real investment and economic 
growth.  
 
3.2.3 Reaching the zero interest lower bound is not the end of expansionary 
monetary policy 
 
Prior to the 2007 financial crisis, monetary policy was generally viewed as an 
effective tool to ensure price stability and short-term macroeconomic stabilisation 
(IMF, 2015b). Sovereign debt crises were believed to be a characteristic of 
emerging markets and a remote possibility in advanced economies.   
 
An important issue that arose out of the crisis was whether price stability was in 
fact an efficient primary objective of central banks globally. At the onset of the 
crisis when aggregate demand in most countries declined sharply, central banks 
in the US, eurozone, UK, Switzerland, Canada and Sweden responded by 
reducing nominal policy interest rates to close to zero. This was referred to as the 
zero interest lower bound.  
 
As the crisis worsened, central banks could not reduce policy rates further. This 
led to central banks shifting their focus to other policies such as targeting longer-
term interest rates or monetary expansion by purchasing large amounts of long-
term assets (QE by the US Fed) or targeting higher inflation to prevent 
deflationary expectations (ECB, BoJ, BoE). Although central banks were forced to 
adopt QE, they also had to rely on fiscal policy when economic conditions 
deteriorated further. Most advanced economies resorted to injecting fiscal stimulus 
in their economies to support growth (Stark, 2009) as well as bailing out troubled 
banks, resulting in heavy fiscal burdens on countries‟ finances.  
 
The role of fiscal policy in promoting the economic recovery became more 
prominent during the peak of the 2007 global financial crisis and also highlighted 
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the importance of having enough fiscal room to stimulate the economy through 
deficit spending. Fiscal policy was constraining for some advanced economies, 
such as the US and Japan which already had high levels of debt. Some peripheral 
European countries like Portugal, Italy, and Greece prior to the crisis, had 
excessive public debt and fiscal deficits which were driven largely by high levels of 
civil servant wages and the resultant high levels of consumption. During the crisis, 
fiscal policies became procyclical due to the obligation of governments to reduce 
spending and increase taxes in order to contain sovereign debt levels. Procyclical 
fiscal policy refers to instances when governments resort to increasing public 
spending and reducing taxes during good economic times, and reducing spending 
and increasing taxes during economic recessions (Alesina and Tabellini, 2005). 
 
3.2.4 Efficient financial systems are a necessity 
 
During the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, most advanced economies such as 
the US, eurozone, UK and Japan were more severely impacted by the crisis than 
was the case in emerging markets, largely due to weaker financial systems and a 
lack of adequate regulatory controls. According to Fischer (2011), a financial 
system is robust and efficient when the monetary policy transmission mechanism 
functions smoothly, meaning that a change in policy rates translates into a change 
in consumer spending. The crisis revealed that, despite effective monetary policy 
transmission mechanisms and efficient allocation of resources through free cross-
border flows of capital between countries and regions (thereby promoting 
economic growth), financial systems can also be complicated by these cross-
border flows in times of crisis, given the strong interconnectedness between 
domestic and international financial systems as well as the real economy.   
 
One of the major challenges facing global financial markets is the upside risk 
associated with massive amounts of foreign investment in US government 
securities. A sharp sell-off in US Treasury bonds would have negative 
consequences for the value of the US dollar, given its status as the reserve 
currency of the world and the fact that currencies pegged to the US dollar are 
subject to any type of currency intervention, depending on country-specific 
circumstances (Morrison and Labonte, 2013).  
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A sell-off would also have negative consequences for large holders of US 
government securities, such as China and Japan, as it implies that their currencies 
would appreciate against a depreciating US dollar, thereby eroding their exports. 
Furthermore, as evidenced by recent crises, capital outflows can result in weaker 
exchange rates as well as have disruptive consequences for the balance of 
payments. In order to be prepared for future financial crises, it is imperative that 
policymakers adopt sound macroeconomic policies and ensure that appropriate 
financial regulation and supervisory practices are in place. 
 
3.2.5 More flexibility is needed in exchange rate policy to temper global 
imbalances 
 
The build-up of global imbalances has been largely attributed to advanced 
economies adopting monetary-expansion fuelled growth models and emerging 
markets following export-oriented growth models, which led to huge divergences 
between savings and investment (Mohanty, 2011). Prior to the crisis, current 
account imbalances comprised about five per cent of global GDP in 2008, with the 
US having the largest deficit and countries such as Germany, Japan, China and 
oil exporters dominating the world‟s surplus (Padoan, 2014). However, in the  
aftermath of the crisis, global imbalances have narrowed significantly, largely 
owing to slower monetary growth in the US and a decline in oil prices. China‟s 
current account surplus narrowed from its pre-crisis peak of 11,0 per cent of GDP 
to about 2,3 per cent in 2012, while the US current account deficit narrowed from 
its pre-crisis peak of 6,0 per cent to 2,7 per cent in 2012.  
 
Despite these positive developments, there were concerns that a new set of 
imbalances could emerge, given that advanced economies and emerging markets 
are at different stages of economic recovery and have conflicting monetary policy 
objectives. As advanced economies embark on gradually withdrawing stimulus 
from markets, emerging markets such as China, Indonesia, Turkey and India on 
the other hand, began tightening monetary policy to alleviate inflationary 
pressures. In light of these developments, wider interest rate differentials were a 
key factor leading to large capital inflows into emerging markets. 
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Over the past few decades, some emerging Asian economies, particularly China, 
which adopted rigid exchange rate policies against the US dollar, have been 
contributing factors to global imbalances. Looking ahead, it is important that 
greater exchange rate flexibility is applied to contribute to a more orderly 
unwinding of global imbalances. There also needs to be co-ordination amongst 
key advanced economies and emerging economies in managing exchange rates 
and capital flows. In this regard, more flexibility in China‟s exchange rate is 
needed to ensure rebalancing of growth on a global level and to limit the risk of a 
build-up of global imbalances. 
 
3.2.6 The important distinction between a liquidity crisis and a solvency crisis for 
the lender of the last resort 
 
A lesson learnt from the crisis was that the distinction between a liquidity problem 
and a solvency problem was not well understood (Fischer, 2015). This distinction 
is quite important as it has monetary policy implications during times of a financial 
crisis, with regard to the role of a central bank as a lender of last resort, In 
addition, the crisis questioned the extent to which central banks should intervene 
in the market to inject liquidity or purchase non-performing assets of bankrupt 
banks.   
 
History indicates that in recent financial market crises, central banks have played 
the role as a lender of last resort by injecting liquidity into markets when there is a 
“liquidity crisis”. A liquidity crisis occurs when financial institutions are in financial 
distress and cannot get cash to pay for expenses in the short term. Therefore 
there is a shortage of liquidity in the financial system which causes panic in 
markets and erodes confidence.  
 
In contrast, a "solvency crisis", occurs when the net worth of financial institutions 
has become negative, often because they were overly leveraged and a relatively 
small loss in assets values has caused equity to become negative. During the 
crisis, there was uncertainty over the role of the central bank in the event of a 
solvency crisis. The challenge faced by a central bank in a solvency crisis is that 
when a financial institution is insolvent, any intervention measures by the 
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government such as providing emergency liquidity or recapitalising it, could lead to 
long-term costs for the public sector. This is largely owing to the fact that all profits 
of a central bank are transferred to the government and any intervention to 
stabilise markets and ensure financial stability could negatively impact central 
bank profits and, as such, spendable government income. 
  
A liquidity crisis, on the other hand, is deemed as being less complicated than a 
solvency crisis as there are no long-term cost implications for the public sector in 
the event of central bank intervention to rescue a financial institution or the 
financial system itself. It is thus important for a central bank to distinguish between 
a liquidity crisis and a solvency crisis to enable it to know when to intervene in the 
financial system to assist financially-distressed institutions and prevent systemic 
failure of other institutions. 
 
3.2.7 The moral hazard in “too big to fail” should be reduced  
    
The failure of a large bank is likely to pose a risk to the solvency of other 
institutions, due to the interconnectedness of these institutions through mutual 
obligations. As witnessed during the crisis, liquidity froze after banks became 
reluctant to lend to each other when subprime loans began to default.  In this 
regard, a key lesson learnt was that it is a necessity for governments to provide 
insurance to uninsured creditors at big banks to protect them against losses in the 
case of a bank failure as well as prevent losses from spreading to other banks in 
the financial system (Fischer, 2015).  
 
An example of this type of insurance is federal deposit insurance in the US, which 
guarantees the deposits of bank creditors up to a certain amount in the event of 
bank failure. However, this type of deposit insurance could have an unintended 
consequence of creating a moral hazard problem. Big banks would be 
encouraged to take excessive risks, with the knowledge that the central bank and 
the government would bail them out with additional liquidity and capital in the 
event of financial difficulties.  
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This would result in even more risk-taking and misallocation of resources, thereby 
threatening financial stability. In essence, the more extensive the deposit 
insurance offered to uninsured creditors, the bigger the moral hazard problem 
(Stern and Feldman, 2004). The challenge for central banks lies in designing a 
regulatory and legal framework in which a big bank can be deemed to be 
insolvent, allowed to fail and be wound down in an orderly manner that does not 
pose systemic risks to the stability of the financial system. The only way to do that 
is to have smaller banks. 
 
3.2.8 Procyclicality in the financial system should be minimised 
 
Landau (2009) argues further that procyclicality not only implies fluctuations 
around the trend, but also signals changes in the trend itself as well as possible 
cumulative deviations from its equilibrium value. Period of  financial distress often 
follow boom periods of strong credit and asset price growth due to accommodative 
monetary policy and low-risk environments. This leads to over-leveraging and 
heightened risk-taking by investors (CFGS, 2010). During these boom times, 
banks generally do not build up sufficient capital buffers to protect themselves 
against future market distress or financial crises.  
 
This was evident in the pre-crisis years, where procyclicality in the financial 
system ultimately contributed to higher systemic risk and spillover effects to the 
real economy during the financial crisis. The banking sector is susceptible to 
procyclicality, largely owing to high leverage and inflexible risk management 
systems and capital requirements which result in a tightening in credit standards 
during times of an economic slowdown (IMF, 2013a). 
 
A lesson learnt from the crisis was that regulators should increase the amount of 
capital requirements of banks during economic upswings, and thereby create a 
buffer of additional reserves on which banks can draw during an economic 
slowdown. Regulators should also from time to time assess compensation 
structures to ensure that they do not create incentives for excessive risk-taking 
(Brunnermeier, 2009).  
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From an asset allocation perspective, institutional investors generally take long-
term views on asset performance which enables them to sit out short-term 
volatility in asset prices. However, procyclicality can hurt asset prices and 
economic growth if investors collectively take action (referred to as “herd 
behaviour”), thereby leading to higher volatility in asset prices and instability of the 
financial system.  
3.2.9 Financial intermediation matters 
 
Financial intermediation refers to the allocation of capital by banks to businesses 
to promote growth and expansion. Capital allocation can be done via direct and 
indirect financing. Direct financing is when savers and borrowers interact directly 
with each other in the market while indirect finance refers to the use of financial 
intermediaries. Generally speaking, the traditional model of financial 
intermediation requires a bank to accept retail deposits from households and 
lending out the proceeds to borrowers such as firms or other households (Adrian 
and Shin, 2010). 
 
The rapid advancement of growth in the financial sector as well as financial 
innovation and ultimate collapse of subprime mortgages led to a disruption in 
financial intermediation in the US, following the failure of Lehman Brothers. Banks 
were highly reliant on the wholesale funding market, which was less stable by the 
traditional retail deposit base as neither financial institutions nor regulators 
understood the complexity of the wholesale funding market or the systemic-wide 
risks that accompanied it.  
 
Thus, when Lehman Brothers went into financial difficulty, investors began to 
panic and withdrew funds from banks, causing more panic amongst other 
investors and banks. As a result, there was a loss in confidence and interbank 
markets in the US and Europe became dysfunctional. Money-market rates were 
no longer linked through arbitrage and central bank policy rates became 
ineffective. An important lesson learnt is that financial intermediation does matter 
and that it is critical for regulators and investors to have a deep understanding of 
the functioning of the financial sector and the role of indirect financing (Woodford, 
2010).  
64 
 
The lack of focus on macroprudential policy and financial stability on the part of 
central banks has been identified as one of the key causes of the crisis (G30, 
2015). Since the early 2000s and particularly after the 2007-2009 global financial 
crisis, macroprudential policy and financial stability has been gaining more 
prominence, becoming one of the most frequent discussion points in global central 
banks, with many central banks, including South Africa‟s, adopting financial 
stability as an additional objective. The objectives of monetary and microprudential 
policy mostly been more clearly understood. However, there has been less clarity 
in the case of financial stability and macroprudential policy, particularly with regard 
to the interaction between macroprudential policy and microprudential policy. This 
section is intended to discuss the definition, objectives and salient features of 
macroprudential policy. 
 
3.3 DEFINITION AND SALIENT FEATURES OF MACROPRUDENTIAL  
POLICY 
 
Definition of macroprudential policy 
 
The term “macroprudential” was coined in June 1979 at a meeting of the Cooke 
Committee, which was the precursor for the present Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision. According to Clement (2010), at the time, macroprudential policy 
represented a type of systemic positioning of regulation and supervision 
connected to the general macroeconomy. As time went by, the macroprudential 
theme started to become an important point of discussion in institutions such as 
the BIS as a tool to promote the stability of the financial system.  
 
There have been various definitions of macroprudential policy. According to the 
G20 (2011) and the IMF (2013c), macroprudential policy is viewed as the 
deployment of prudential tools to limit systemic risk and minimise disruptions or 
market distress in the financial system that could have adverse consequences for 
the real economy. The important concepts in this definition are “systemic risk” and 
“market distress”. “Systemic risk” refers to the risk that a shock will cause damage 
to the financial system in its entirety, (as opposed to damage to an individual 
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institution) and that there might be spillover effects to the real economy. 
Microprudential regulation is responsible for mitigating idiosyncratic risk at the 
individual institution level (De Nicolo and Kwast, 2001.) “Market distress" is a 
situation in which the financial system cannot function properly on account of 
impaired trading conditions and a dry-up in liquidity conditions (Crockett, 2001).  In 
this regard, the aim of macroprudential policy is to prevent financial instability.   
 
Mishkin (1999) describes financial instability as a situation where a shock 
negatively affects information flows in a financial system to the extent that the 
financial system finds it difficult to facilitate the flow of funds from surplus units to 
deficit units with productive investment opportunities. If the impairment to the 
financial system is severe enough, it can result in a dysfunctional market, which 
can be regarded as a financial crisis. Similarly, the SARB (2015d) states that 
financial instability ultimately becomes visible through systemic risk, banking 
failures, extreme asset-price volatility, interest and exchange rate volatility, and a 
collapse of market liquidity.  Accordingly, this manifests into a disruption of the 
payment and settlement system.  
 
Some of the adverse consequences for the financial system as a whole and their 
spill-over into the real economy can be mitigated by early detection. Claessens 
and Ghosh (2013) are of the opinion that macroprudential policy should aim to 
detect financial crises early enough to prevent vulnerability in the financial system 
and contractions in the real economy. This can be achieved by focusing on the 
financial system as a whole, rather than individual institutions. Similarly, Caruana 
(2010b) describes the objective of macroprudential policy as the mitigating of 
systemic risk by identifying common exposures and addressing the interlinkages 
amongst all financial institutions, and well as dealing with procyclicality in the 
financial system.   
 
The next section provides an understanding of systemic risk and other salient 
features of macroprudential policy. 
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Systemic risk and other salient features of macroprudential policy 
Visco (2011) advocates that systemic risk poses a number of challenges to 
policymakers, largely due to the fact that it is difficult to measure and also difficult 
to detect. These challenges have important implications for the design and 
implementation of macroprudential policy. 
The IMF et al. (2009a) view systemic risk as being caused by an impairment of 
key components of the financial system. These components are made up of 
financial intermediaries, financial markets and the infrastructural platform which 
consists of payment, settlement and trading systems. In the event of a large 
market shock, the failure of large and interconnected institutions as well as the 
build-up of imbalances in the financial system, systemic risk can be disruptive to 
the financial system. The disruptions can be transmitted through the channels of 
employment, wages and prices to the real economy (Trichet, 2009). 
 
Eijffinger and Masciandaro (2012) highlight that systemic risk reflects a loss in 
confidence and increased uncertainty about the functioning of the financial system 
and its interconnected parts. Contagion effects are inherent in systemic risk and 
arise when an economic shock to markets, countries, or institutions, spills over 
into other markets, countries, or institutions. Contagion involves an initial 
economic shock, and its subsequent spread over virtually all financial institutions 
and markets, both locally and internationally. 
 
Pritsker (2000) identified four types of contagion channels, namely; (i) correlated 
information channel; (ii) common financial institution (FI) channel; (iii) cross-
market rebalancing of hedging channel; and (iv) wealth shock channel. 
 
The correlated information channel is characterised by a set of common 
macroeconomic factors that determine assets values in multiple countries due to 
the real interlinkages between asset classes and financial markets. The correlated 
information channel is not easily detected as it can be influenced by herd 
behaviour or economic shocks which can result in institutions failing to exercise 
sound judgment between good and bad assets (Dijkman, 2010).  
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The FI channel is where an economic shock in one country affects the capital 
position of an international bank that provides loans to that country. Because the 
same international bank could also provide loans to other countries, risks spread 
to these countries. It is important for an international bank to make adjustments to 
its loan portfolio from time to time, depending on a country‟s economic 
circumstances (Claessens and Forbes, 2013). 
 
The cross-market rebalancing or hedging channel is where contagion can take 
place between two countries that are uncorrelated, due a third country having 
linkages with both countries. In these instances, investors tend to cross-hedge 
macroeconomic risks by adjusting their portfolios in response to economic shocks 
between the countries (Vester, 2006). 
 
Finally, the wealth shock channel arises if an investor experiences a sudden loss 
of wealth and chooses to adjust his portfolio holdings. This typically happens in 
periods of a reduction in risk aversion, where investors can channel their holdings 
from risky to safe-haven investments as their wealth declines. This behaviour, 
however, could reinforce the correlated liquidity shock and be influenced by herd 
behaviour (Lizarazo, 2005). 
 
The IMF (2011b) highlights that when defining the boundaries of macroprudential 
policy, it is important to note that other public policies also impact on financial 
stability (Figure 3.1). 
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Figure 3.1 Financial stability framework and macroprudential policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IMF, 2011b 
 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the common responsibilities that other policies have in 
achieving financial stability through the mitigation of systemic risk. The primary 
responsibility for ensuring financial stability lies with macroprudential policy. 
However, it is also important that other policies such microprudential policy 
(monetary policy), crisis management policies and fiscal policy be complementary 
to macroprudential policy in the achievement of its objectives in identifying and 
mitigating systemic risks that arise. 
  
Borio (2003) suggests that systemic risk has two key dimensions, namely, a time 
dimension and a cross-sectional dimension. 
 
The time dimension indicates the build-up of systemic risk during cyclical 
upswings when agents underestimate the risks they are taking, which thus refers 
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to its procyclicality. Procyclicality arises when mutually reinforcing interactions 
between the financial and the real sectors of the economy have the effect of 
amplifying financial cycle fluctuations, thereby causing financial instability 
(Financial Stability Forum, 2009:8). In this regard, asset price shocks have an 
immediate effect on the net worth of investors who hold these assets in a mark-to-
market accounting system. The amplifying effect comes into play, among other 
things, when financial institutions use borrowing to leverage their exposure to risky 
assets, resulting in spillover effects to those who make claims on those holding 
the assets. Landau (2009:2) argues that an over-leveraged firm faces high levels 
of risk when there are asset price shocks as its equity capital could diminish 
quickly.  
Similarly, Allen and Carletti (2011:39) state that when a financial system is over-
leveraged, it is vulnerable to external shocks such as disorderly reversals in 
capital flows or rapid changes in asset prices. If equity buffers are not large 
enough to absorb the resultant losses, institutions may be forced to deleverage 
and create sharp declines in the supply of external financing to the real economy.  
 
Alternatively, a negative shock could erode depositors‟ confidence and make an 
institution vulnerable to the risk of bank runs, thereby creating liquidity shortages 
and forcing institutions to hoard liquidity or dispose of financial assets at low 
market prices to meet depositor‟s withdrawals. In instances like these, negative 
externalities related to firesales can materialise, with a sell-off in financial assets 
causing sharp declines in asset prices, resulting in an impairment of balance 
sheets of intermediaries. The subsequent deleveraging impacts the real economy 
through a reduction in credit availability.   
 
During the financial crisis, European banks had large exposures to the weaker 
sovereign bonds and as the European debt crisis worsened, bank and sovereign 
risk began to destabilise the financial system by promoting herd behaviour while 
also placing governments under immense pressure to simultaneously deal with 
troubled banks and a dysfunctional government bond market. Herd behaviour is 
when the individual and collective behaviour of investors creates the tendency for 
the entire financial system to act in a certain way (IMF, 2013a). Individual 
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reactions by investors can cause panic and amplify losses in the financial sector. 
Procyclicality is caused by herd behaviour.  
 
The cross-sectional dimension reflects common (correlated) exposures which can 
cause a specific shock to spread and become systemic at any given moment in 
time. Common exposures arise when institutions have direct exposure to the 
same or similar asset classes or they have indirect exposures via counterparty 
relationships (Borio, 2009). The objective of macroprudential tools, in this 
instance, would be to customise them in accordance with the individual influence 
on systemic risk as opposed to a microprudential approach, which applies 
common standards for all institutions that are regulated.  
 
Systemic risk is therefore implicit in the definition of macroprudential policy 
because it requires macroprudential regulatory intervention. A lack of information 
is more often than not the main cause of uncertainty in the financial system as the 
impact of an institution‟s behaviour on other institutions in the financial system 
becomes unknown.  
 
Other forms of systemic risk include (i) systemic risk due to “asymmetric” 
information and (ii) systemic risk due to uncertainty about interest rate policy. 
 
Systemic risk due to ―asymmetric‖ information: A lack of accurate information is a 
key cause of uncertainty, which impacts institutional behaviour in a financial 
system. Asymmetric information describes situations in which one party to a 
transaction has better information about the conditions of that transaction than the 
other party. This often results in the party with superior information taking on 
riskier projects at the expense of the party with inferior information. From a 
banking perspective, Marlor (1997:18) states that although institutions have 
satisfactory information about the business cycle to make rational decisions on the 
provision of loans, they may not have sufficient information on the behaviour of 
borrowers. As a result, asymmetric can result in adverse selection and moral 
hazard. 
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Adverse selection takes place when high credit risk or lower-quality borrowers are 
prepared to pay high interest rates for the granting of a loan because they know 
they might not pay back the loan. These borrowers who are most willing to take up 
a loan are the most risky ones who are most likely to be selected and provide 
undesirable or adverse outcomes (Mishkin, 2001). 
 
Moral hazard, on the other hand, takes place after the loan transaction has taken 
place. The same borrower tends to take on more risk in search for higher profits 
as he knows he only risks losing a portion of the business that he finances himself 
as opposed to the loan provider who takes on the bigger loss. Hence, the lender is 
subjected to the hazard that the borrower might have unethical incentives and 
might not pay back the loan. Such incentives include undertaking high-risk 
projects, where the loan provider would bear losses if the project does not 
succeed. The borrower might also misuse funds, make unfavourable investment 
decisions or not work hard as he knows that the loan provider would bear losses.  
 
Kirabaeva (2010) states that central bank and government bailouts during 
financial crises, could also create a moral hazard problem with institutions. Banks 
are encouraged to take on more risky investments if they anticipate the provision 
of bailouts if they experience financial stress, thereby threatening financial stability 
when loans go bad in the event of an economic shock or liquidity crisis.  
 
Mishkin (1990) argues that a possible solution for reducing both adverse selection 
and moral hazard is to necessitate collateral for the loan, thereby ensuring that the 
borrower would bear higher costs in the event of him defaulting on a loan. In this 
way, when collateral is sold, it can minimize or recover losses. It can be argued 
that in the crisis, securitisation was responsible for bringing asymmetries to 
financial markets due to their complex nature and lack of transparency which 
made it difficult for investors to evaluate risks. As a result, as soon as doubts 
about the safety of the securitised assets arose, these risks became systemic in 
nature leading to dysfunctional interbank markets as financial institutions lost 
confidence in each other. Central banks intervened by providing banks with 
liquidity on extraordinary terms and at longer maturities and also provided liquidity 
to selected credit markets to stabilise secondary markets.  
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Systemic risk due to uncertainty about interest rate policy: Uncertainty about 
monetary policy and inflation prospects creates uncertainty about an institution's 
projected returns due to the difficulty in interpreting information about future 
developments in consumer prices and interest rates.  Altubas et al (2011) state 
that monetary policy affects bank risk through a number of key ways such as 
valuations, incomes, cash flows and increased search for yield. Valuations risk 
refers to the level of uncertainty that financial institutions have about the returns 
on a specific asset, particularly when the asset is complex and difficult to evaluate. 
Such assets include subprime loans and structured finance products. 
 
If financial institutions expect a lowering in interest rates, they would possibly relax 
their credit standards and increase their interest rate exposure, which would result 
in an increase in the prices and collateral values of their balance sheet assets and 
accompanied decline in volatility, which would typically reduce the probability of 
default of those assets. The use of collateral, again, is important to reduce 
asymmetric information because a borrower would not want to take excessive 
risks as he could lose his collateral (Marlor, 1997). It is important that 
communication policies of central banks are open and transparent so that financial 
institutions‟ perceptions of inflation expectations and interest rate outcomes lower 
the expectations of large downside risks. 
 
Monetary policy also influences investors‟ search for yield. Expectations of lower 
interest rates can result in financial institutions taking on more risk. Investors 
typically use short-term returns as a way of assessing institutions‟ competence 
levels by encouraging them to shift risks and increase their exposure to high 
yielding assets during periods of low interest rates.  This can have negative 
implications for institutions when conditions deteriorate and result in herd 
behaviour.  
 
 
Hence, the key objective of macroprudential policy is to maintain the stability of 
the financial system as a whole, by mitigating systemic risk. The focus should be 
on the financial system in its entirety, rather than individual institutions and 
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idiosyncratic risks, which are the focus of attention of microprudential policy. It is 
important that regulators apply their knowledge of the origins of systemic risk and 
the possible implications for the wider financial system and real economy when 
designing macroprudential policy and governance frameworks (Trichet, 2009).   
 
 
3.4 KEY PROPERTIES IN THE DESIGN OF A MACROPRUDENTIAL   
POLICY FRAMEWORK 
 
The IMF (2011b) and Farrell (2015) suggest that a macroprudential policy 
framework should be designed according to key elements. These include: (i) 
having a clear policy mandate; (ii) having processes in place to identify systemic 
risk in the financial system; (iii) having adequate control over a macroprudential 
toolkit to mitigate risks and prevent them from becoming systemic in nature and; 
(iv) having a macroprudential policy institutional design that takes into 
accountability, governance and co-ordination between different policy objectives. 
These elements will be discussed in order. 
3.4.1 A clear mandate 
 
A macroprudential supervisor should have a clear financial stability mandate, that 
is, the institution‟s macroprudential objectives and responsibilities as well as its 
functions and authority should be clearly outlined. In addition, the objectives must 
be concise, precise, attainable and measurable (Banque de France, 2014). The 
mandate should serve to ensure that the supervisor has a sound understanding of 
the processes to identify, monitor and mitigate systemic risk in the financial 
system by using an appropriate set macroprudential tools (Ingves, 2011). The 
mandate must also ensure that the supervisor acts in an independent and 
transparent manner and is held accountable for the decisions made.  
 
The SARB, for example, has a clear financial stability mandate, which is to assess 
system-wide financial stability risks, share risk assessments with other agencies 
and the wider public, contribute towards the development of a macroprudential 
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toolkit to  mitigate risks and recognise that different time horizons warrant different 
policy decisions when responding to financial stability crises (SARB, 2015d). 
 
The major central banks around the world have also made good progress towards 
adopting macroprudential mandates (Table 3.1). The Fed, for example, has a 
primary financial stability mandate set by the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC) to identify financial stability risks, promote market discipline, and respond 
to emerging threats to the stability of the US financial system (SEC, 2015).   
 
Table 3.1 Macroprudential mandates of key global central banks 
 
Country Financial stability mandate 
United States  Identify and respond to emerging threats to financial stability. 
 Promote market discipline, eliminate bailout expectations. 
European Union  Prevent or mitigate systemic risks to the EU financial system. 
 Contribute to smooth functioning of the internal market and 
sustainable financial sector growth. 
United Kingdom  Protect and enhance the resilience of the UK financial system. 
 Subject to this, support the government‟s economic objectives, 
including growth and employment. 
 Cannot take actions that would be detrimental to medium-to-long-
term growth. 
Germany  Consideration of decisive issues for financial stability 
 Strengthening co-operation in a crisis between institutions‟ 
represented on the Financial Stability Commission. 
France  Maintain the stability of the financial system and guaranteeing 
that the financial sector makes a sustainable contribution to 
economic growth. 
 Ensure co-operation and exchange of information amongst its 
members. 
Switzerland  Increase the resilience of the banking sector and the overall 
economy against risks posed by excessive credit growth. 
 Counter excessive credit growth and price rises. 
Sweden  Discuss both authorities‟ assessments of systemic risks, 
appropriate prevention measures and issues relating to the 
development of macroprudential policy in general. 
Source: Bundesbank (2013) 
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3.4.2 Information and analytical skills 
 
Landau (2009) states that systemic risk can be more easily identified if regulators 
have a good understanding of institutions‟ on- and off-balance sheet exposures as 
well as of the nature of lending and borrowing activities. It is therefore of critical 
importance that a macroprudential supervisor has access to relevant information 
that is needed to identify systemic risk. Of equal importance is the need for 
regulators to have sound analytical skills to assess when and how to utilise these 
tools in response to the identified risks. In this regard, it would be necessary to 
combine microeconomic data with aggregate financial system data, particularly 
from large and complex intermediaries and key markets. For example, 
macroprudential supervisors should constantly be on the lookout for early-warning 
signals in current market data.  
 
Large banks in a financial system are susceptible to creating more systemic risk 
than smaller banks as they typically have lower capital, less stable sources of 
funding and their activities are mostly market-based. It becomes challenging to 
identify and measure procyclicality, correlation risk, and concentration risk 
(Laevan et al. 2014). The 2007 global financial crisis was a good example, where 
there were a number of triggers that had systemic implications but were not 
identified by regulators. Such triggers included the change in behaviour of 
systemically important insurance companies, the build-up of the housing bubble in 
the US housing market as well as a lack of understanding about the European 
sovereign debt market.   
 
 
3.4.3 Adequate control over macroprudential instruments  
 
In order to achieve its macroprudential/financial stability mandate, a 
macroprudential supervisor should develop and have adequate control over its 
macroprudential toolkit to reduce systemic risk. These tools need to be broad in 
scope and be able to operate in the time and cross-sectional dimensions of 
systemic risk. Mechanisms need to be put in place to deal with the use of these 
tools, where tensions exist between their use from different policy perspectives. 
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Therefore, tools should be monitored actively to ascertain their appropriateness. 
High levels of flexibility are needed to ensure that optimal choices of 
macroprudential tools are made for country- and context-specifics and that the 
benefits of using such tools outweigh the costs (Farrell, 2015). 
 
3.4.5 Governance and accountability arrangements and co-ordination of policies 
 
The Banque de France (2014) advocates that the rules of governance, whether 
established internally or by law, are key factors in determining the success of 
macroprudential policy in meeting its objectives. In this regard, a macroprudential 
supervisor has to exhibit characteristics of being independent or autonomous, 
particularly during periods of economic or financial market stress. A challenge 
faced in the institutional design of a macroprudential framework is to establish 
accountability, particularly when there are no easy measures of success (FSB et 
al., 2011).  
 
The urgent need for macroprudential policy has emerged from a backdrop of only 
limited experience (Visco, 2011). The difficulties faced in measuring systemic risk 
has implications for the practical implementation of macroprudential policy as well 
as the governance and accountability functions of a central bank‟s 
macroprudential authority. Accountability and good governance can be 
strengthened by transparency and clear communication of policy decisions, 
particularly during times of financial or economic crises.  
 
In this context, the co-ordination of macroprudential and microprudential policies is 
important, given that most macroprudential tools are microprudential in nature, 
with the main focus being on individual institutions.  If the same tool is used for 
both micro- and macroprudential purposes, they could be in conflict with each 
other. Regulators should carefully take into account the impact of these tools as 
well as the overlaps between the different policy objectives when designing an 
institutional framework. 
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3.5      CONCLUSION 
 
The crisis highlighted the urgent need for the reform of the financial system, given 
the big build-up of leverage and liquidity mismatches that rendered the financial 
system vulnerable to economic and financial shocks. Macroprudential policy was 
seen to be the missing factor in pre-crisis policy frameworks. It has been widely 
accepted that the most recent crisis might have been less costly had financial 
stability been a clear financial stability mandate in central banks globally. 
Macroprudential policy is aimed at identifying and mitigating systemic risk in a 
financial system by preventing the formation of financial imbalances and 
procyclical phenomena. 
 
In this regard, the implementation of a successful macroprudential framework 
would entail proper governance through a clear mandate, selection of appropriate 
tools to mitigate systemic risk as well as a sound understanding of the economy‟s 
transmission mechanism to understand the interaction between the different policy 
objectives of a central bank, notably macroprudential policy and microprudential 
policy.  These factors have been identified as the key elements in the design of a 
central bank‟s macroprudential framework to mitigate systemic risk and preserve 
financial system stability.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
DIFFERENT TYPES OF MACROPRUDENTIAL INSTRUMENTS AND THE 
INTERACTION BETWEEN MONETARY POLICY AND FINANCIAL STABILITY 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
 
One of the key lessons learnt from the crisis was that macroprudential policies are 
needed to lessen the build-up of systemic risk so as to prevent financial instability. 
Although microprudential policy can contribute to financial stability, it cannot alone 
guarantee it.  Macroprudential policy is needed to expand the existing prudential 
framework to enhance financial system stability through the application of 
macroprudential instruments (MPIs). MPIs are meant to respond to developments 
in the financial cycle to either mitigate the financial cycle or improve the 
economy‟s resilience to it. In general terms, the objective of macroprudential 
policy is to establish a more robust and less procyclical financial system that 
promotes balanced and sustainable economic growth (FSB, 2009a). 
 
Because there is no single instrument that influences the behaviour of all financial 
institution‟s consistently, a range of MPIs is needed. Such MPIs vary from cyclical 
capital adequacy requirements, loan-to-value caps, taxes/levies to constraints on 
the composition of assets and liabilities of financial institutions. Some of these 
instruments were used for monetary policy objectives (in previous financial crises), 
mainly by central banks in advanced economies. Emerging markets had already 
been proactive since the 1990s, having used some of these instruments for 
macroprudential purposes too, particularly dynamic loan provisioning and reserve 
requirements (Tovar et al. 2012).  
 
Hence, MPIs could be used to address the threats of financial imbalances that 
conventional monetary policy (that is, interest rate policy) on its own could not 
achieve. It is critical that both these policies complement each other and interact in 
a way that enhances macroeconomic stability and not weaken the effectiveness of 
each other‟s objectives. 
79 
 
This chapter aims to provide a review of different types of MPIs as well as cross-
country experiences in choosing and applying these instruments. The interaction 
between monetary policy and macroprudential policy and the implications for 
central bank policy are also discussed. Finally, the institutional design of the 
SARB will be examined, taking into consideration the dual mandates of price 
stability and financial stability.  
  
4.2 TYPES OF MACROPRUDENTIAL INSTRUMENTS AND COUNTRY 
EXPERIENCES   
 
The IMF (2011a: p8) distinguishes between three categories of measures, 
namely, credit-related measures, liquidity-related measures and capital-related 
measures. The various MPIs resorting under each of these three categories are 
discussed below. 
 
4.2.1 Credit-related measures  
 
(a) Loan-to-value (LTV), loan-to-income (LTI) and debt-to-income (DTI) ratios 
  
LTV, LTI and DTI ratios are collectively known as sustainability-related MPIs, 
which are typically aimed at putting ceilings on mortgage lending. The LTV ceiling 
does so by setting a limit on the proportion of the value of the property which 
households can finance with debt, which means that it requires households to pay 
a minimum deposit relative to the value of the property. The LTI ceiling restricts 
mortgage lending to a multiple of the borrower‟s gross income before tax and 
other deductions. Similarly, the DTI ceiling restricts mortgage lending by setting a 
limit on the proportion of the borrower‟s monthly income that can be devoted to 
debt servicing payments on all his or her debts. A lower LTV assists in limiting the 
risk for banks. LTI and DTI caps are intended to reduce the risk of default by 
borrowers as well as ensure that borrowers can afford to service their debt on a 
sustainable basis. These measures are important because mortgage lending 
makes up an important part of total bank lending, particularly in South Africa. 
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The objective of LTV limits is to protect lending banks against a sharp decline in 
property prices by reducing the losses in the event of a loan default and the 
resultant forced sale of the property. According to the Central Bank of Ireland 
(2014), restrictions on LTV ratios may not have prevented the housing bubble in 
Ireland but would have mitigated it by reducing the demand for housing and hence 
lowering house price increases and the potential profits for home developers. This 
would have resulted in fewer houses being built and a smaller inventory of unsold 
properties when the housing price crash materialised.  
 
However, a shortcoming of LTV ratios is that they do not entirely eliminate 
procyclicality, because the capped loan values also increase as property prices 
rise. LTV caps are considered more effective when used in combination with 
ceilings on LTI ratios. LTI ratios place a ceiling on the size of a mortgage loan 
relative to a borrower‟s gross income, thereby protecting a borrower against 
excessive repayment burdens and increases in household debt. However, a 
disadvantage of LTIs is that they are not an accurate measure of average income 
over the life of the mortgage or of the risk of unemployment and could result in 
borrowers taking on more secured and unsecured debt than what is prudent. This 
problem is somewhat mitigated by applying an additional ceiling on households‟ 
total debt, namely that imposed by the DTI ratio. This ratio ensures that all types 
of debt are taken into account when borrowers apply for a mortgage loan.  
 
Therefore a combination of LTV, LTI and DTI ratios should go a long way in 
addressing procyclicality in the property sector, particularly when household 
indebtedness rises faster than personal incomes as a result of housing prices 
rising faster than GDP. In short, LTV ratios address the potential loss to a lending 
bank when a borrower defaults on a loan, while LTI and DTI ratios deal with the 
affordability level of borrowers. 
 
Table 4.1 reflects the countries that use LTV and DTI ratios to restrict the granting 
of mortgage loans. 
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Table 4.1  Countries that use LTV and DTI ratios to restrict the granting of 
mortgage loans 
 
 
 
Source: IMF (2013b) 
 
In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, many advanced economies 
and emerging market countries such as Hungary and Norway started adopting 
LTV and DTI measures. However, these measures had already been in use for 
some time prior to the subprime crisis by countries such as Hong Kong (LTV and 
DTI caps since the 1990s), Korea (caps on LTVs in 2002 and DTIs in 2005) and 
Singapore (LTV caps in 1996) which instituted them in reaction to the East Asian 
crisis of the late 1990s. 
 
(b) Margins and haircuts on repurchase lending and collateralised securities 
lending  
 
A repurchase (repo) agreement involves the selling of securities together with an 
agreement to repurchase the securities, at a specified price at a later date. If the 
event of a seller defaulting, the purchaser can sell the asset to a third party to 
compensate him or her for the loss. In this regard, the asset serves as collateral 
and plays the role of mitigating the credit risk for the purchaser of the asset 
(Adrian et al., 2013). The main market players on the seller‟s side are the broker-
dealers and leveraged investors such as hedge funds while purchasers of these 
securities are typically risk-averse in nature and looking for secure investments, 
for example, central banks, money-mutual funds and international financial 
institutions.  
 
MPI Advanced economies Emerging market economies 
Caps on LTV ratio Canada (2008), Finland 
(2010), Hong Kong (1991), 
Israel (2012), Korea (2002), 
Norway (2010), Netherlands 
(2011), Singapore (1996), 
Sweden (2010) 
Bulgaria (2004), Chile (2009), China 
(2001), India (2010), Indonesia (2012), 
Latvia (2007), Lebanon (2008), 
Malaysia (2010), Hungary (2010), 
Poland (2011), Romania (2004), Serbia 
(2004), Thailand (2003), Turkey (2011) 
Caps on DTI ratio Canada (2008), Hong Kong 
(2010), Netherlands (2007), 
Norway (2010), Singapore 
(2013) 
Columbia (1999), Hungary (2010), 
Latvia (2007), Malaysia (2011), Poland 
(2010), Romania (2004), Serbia (2004), 
Thailand (2004) 
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Collateralised securities lending is a collateralised loan of a security between two 
parties, subject to a pre-specified loan term, which could typically be a business 
day, a week, a month, or even open. An open loan, which is the most common, is 
ongoing until one of the parties decides to discontinue it.  This type of lending 
generally involves a fund which lends to broker-dealers, who ultimately lend again 
to hedge funds and other market participants for investment strategies (SEC, 
2014). This entails a legal written agreement between the fund and the borrower, 
which can be terminated by either party at any time. Collateral is provided by the 
borrower to the fund for protection against the risk of default. Termination of the 
loan requires the fund to return the collateral to the borrower, who thereafter must 
return the borrowed securities to the fund. The fund generates its income via 
borrower‟s fees or from reinvestment of the cash given in collateral by the 
borrower.  
 
Borrowers of collateralised securities include prime brokerage units, bank or 
broker/dealer proprietary trading desks and hedge funds. Lenders typically consist 
of mutual funds and investment companies, insurance companies, endowments 
and foundations, sovereign wealth funds well as corporate and government 
pensions. Repo lending and collateralised securities lending are very similar in 
nature except that securities lending transactions do not necessarily have to 
always involve an exchange of cash, while repo transactions are limited to cash 
only (Keane, 2013).  
 
In essence, margins and haircuts could be used to set limits on margining 
requirements by specifying time-varying mandatory minimum margins or haircuts 
on secured financing and derivative transactions. A haircut refers to the difference 
between the value of an asset that is used to secure a loan and the actual amount 
of the secured loan. In other words, a haircut reflects losses on financial 
instruments, irrespective of the cause thereof. As such, it is similar to the LTV ratio 
in mortgage lending. A haircut thus represents the part of the securities which the 
borrower cannot finance through repos or securities borrowing, and therefore 
forces it to seek alternative finance – either out of its own resources (equity) or by 
borrowing from elsewhere. The objective of a haircut is to provide risk cover for a 
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lender against a fall in the value of the collateral when a borrower is forced to sell 
the collateral in the event of borrower default.  
 
A margin is somewhat similar to a haircut in that it over-collateralises the lender in 
a repo or securities lending transaction, or the exposed party in a collateralised 
derivatives position. However, a key difference between a haircut and margin is 
that a margin need not necessarily be the cause or measure of a loss and is 
applicable more to securities lending transactions.  
 
At the time of the failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008, the deterioration in market 
conditions was exacerbated by large, rapid rises in required margins as lenders 
panicked in reaction to adverse developments. With rising margins, securities 
holders had to seek additional finance in order to repay their maturing repos. With 
alternative finance not available at any reasonable price, they were then forced to 
offload massive amounts of their securities, which led to fire sales. These fire 
sales resulted in securities prices being lowered further, which then led to lenders 
demanding even higher margins and haircuts and resulting in more fire sales 
(Elliot, 2011). That is how market liquidity and funding liquidity for securities 
holders dried up very rapidly during the recent crisis, causing them to become 
both illiquid and insolvent. Kashyap et al. (2011) believed that spikes in haircuts 
resulting from fire sales could have been avoided if minimum levels were set for 
haircuts during boom periods.  
 
Regulators have similarly been concerned that changes in haircuts can result in 
procyclicality (Directorate General for Internal Policies, 2013). The argument made 
is that, in periods of economic boom and high economic confidence, rising asset 
prices and healthy competition may encourage financial institutions to narrow 
haircuts on collateral for new repos. This could result in higher collateral values 
and larger amounts borrowed, which would eventually lead to unduly high levels of 
credit extension, thereby creating risks in the financial system. The opposite is 
also true; during times of an economic downturn, there is a tendency for asset 
prices to fall as risk aversion rises. Lending financial institutions would then be 
induced into widening haircuts, thereby resulting in reductions in the amounts lent 
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and a tightening in credit conditions with the subsequent effect of compromising 
both the liquidity and the solvency of borrowing institutions. 
 
Already prior to the recent subprime crisis, one of the measures adopted by the 
US Fed was to set limits on the amount of secured lending by securities brokers to 
their clients, whereby the brokers were only permitted to lend a certain specified 
percentage of the value of the stock submitted as collateral by their clients. In the 
event that the stock price declined too much, securities brokers could make a 
margin call, requesting more collateral.  
 
Haircuts are designed to limit potential pro-cyclical behaviour, with the objective of 
slowing down sharp declines in credit lines in relatively subdued market conditions 
and, conversely, mitigating sharp increases in credit lines in volatile market 
conditions. In this regard, haircuts should achieve a high level of confidence (at 
least at a 95th percentile, one-tailed confidence interval) and the maximum 
expected decline in the market price of the collateral asset (FSB, 2012) over the 
prescribed period of liquidation before the transaction closes out. The CGFS 
(2010) also argued that if haircuts can achieve stability during periods of market 
distress, they can go a long way towards addressing procyclicality in the financial 
system, by providing more credit loss protection cover in the event of a liquidation 
of collateral assets.  
 
4.2.2 Liquidity-related measures   
 
(a) Reserve requirements  
 
Many countries, particularly emerging markets, use reserve requirements as a 
macroprudential tool to address systemic risk in two ways; firstly, to dampen 
excessive credit growth or the results of capital inflows; and secondly, to provide a 
liquidity cushion to mitigate a systemic liquidity crisis when needed. Reserve 
requirements are for banks to hold a certain minimum percentage of their deposits 
as reserves at a central bank. Examples of countries that used reserve 
requirements extensively over the years include China, Brazil, Indonesia, India 
and Korea (Lim et al., 2011). 
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Federico et al. (2012) conducted a study on 52 countries from 1970 to 2012 and 
concluded that reserve requirements could easily replace monetary policy as a 
countercyclical tool, given that about 74 per cent of emerging economies use this 
instrument as a countercyclical tool compared with just 38 per cent in advanced 
economies. They further argued that reserve requirements are used extensively 
by emerging markets in place of monetary (interest rate) policy, owing to 
hesitation on their part to reduce interest rates in stressful economic conditions (in 
case the currency weakens sharply) or to raise interest rates and attract high 
levels of capital flows. 
 
Since 2011, China increased its reserve requirements eleven times to curb 
domestic credit growth and house price growth. In January 2010, Brazil also 
increased its reserve requirements to reduce credit growth and also introduced a 
60 per cent unremunerated reserve requirement on banks‟ short foreign exchange 
positions for spot transactions.  
 
(b) Capital controls and constraints on currency mismatches 
 
In the early 2000s and in the run-up to the crisis, capital flows to emerging 
markets spiralled from USD 139 billion in 2002 to USD 1,2 trillion in 2007 (Ayasan 
et al. 2014). However, after the US subprime crisis spread into a sovereign debt 
crisis in Europe and negatively impacted global markets and economies, capital 
flows to emerging markets fell sharply and were highly volatile, declining to almost 
half to  USD679 billion (See Figure 4.1). The dramatic reversal of capital inflows 
into emerging markets in the course of 2010 is evidently due to the QE policies of 
old-world central banks, whereby newly created liquidity spilled over into emerging 
markets where interest rates were higher. The fall in inflows since the end of 2013 
seems a reflection of the tapering off of US QE operations and their eventual 
ending in 2014.   
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Figure 4.1 Net private capital flows to emerging markets  
 
Source: Institute of International Finance, Capital Markets Monitor, February 2016. 
 
Capital in- and outflows have a tendency to be strongly procyclical. In this regard, 
many countries have implemented capital controls as a macroprudential tool to 
limit systemic risk and protect their financial systems against capital account 
disruptions. A capital control is a policy that is applied by the resident country and 
targeted at all non-residents of a country. 
 
Free mobility of capital gives rise to the following difficulties (Haberer and Nowak, 
2012): 
 
1.  Fear of currency appreciation. When investors expect a currency to appreciate, 
investment is channelled towards that currency, which exerts more upward 
pressure on the exchange value of the currency. The stronger a currency, the less 
competitive domestic manufacturers become in global markets, therefore 
negatively impacting the real side of the economy. 
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2.  Fear of hot money.  Hot money refers to capital flows that move swiftly to 
countries with higher interest rates or expected currency appreciation as investors 
gain from short-term higher yields, but move just as swiftly out of countries whose 
interest rates or exchange rates have fallen and are expected to fall further. In this 
type of scenario, slight changes to policy rates can have a large impact on 
exchange rate movements. This is particularly relevant in countries that have 
deep, liquid markets as money can be easily transferred across accounts and 
countries. South Africa would be a case in point.  
 
3.  Fear of large inflows. The rapid injection of large funds into small markets can 
cause domestic market dislocations (that is, the build-up of asset price bubbles), 
undue risk-taking practices amongst domestic cash-flush institutions and further 
currency appreciation, which would hurt domestic manufacturers‟ exports. The 
other risk of easy capital mobility is that when investor sentiment turns negative 
towards these countries with high interest rate differentials and high-yielding 
currencies, market inefficiencies can also arise due to a sudden withdrawal of 
funds by investors, leading to rapid currency depreciation and higher volatility. 
This phenomenon is also true for the fear of hot money. 
 
4. Fear of loss of monetary autonomy. More often than not, the views of global 
investors and domestic monetary authorities are not always in alignment with 
regard to issues such as the exchange rate regime, monetary policy autonomy, 
and the openness of capital markets. Although having flexible monetary policies 
would be the desired option to allow market forces to determine prices, it is difficult 
for central banks to give up their autonomy. Hence central banks would wish to 
maintain some form of control over capital in- and outflows to stabilise markets 
due to excessive exchange rate pressures and well as stemming large monetary 
expansion due to capital inflows. Similarly, regulators would also be looking to 
impose capital controls to reduce capital flight, particularly caused by investors 
seeking safe-haven countries during periods of high volatility and uncertainty. 
 
In light of the above-mentioned challenges of capital mobility, it is imperative that 
capital controls be used as a macroprudential tool to limit excessive capital in- and 
outflows into and out of a country, as well as to alter the configuration of capital 
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flows more toward longer maturities and alleviate pressure on real exchange 
rates.  From a country experience perspective, Brazil and Korea are prominent 
examples of countries that impose capital controls to promote stability.  
 
In Brazil, capital controls have been a key policy initiative to deal with large and 
volatile capital inflows, in mitigating financial stability risks. Measures deployed by 
Brazil included higher LTV ratios on foreign-currency denominated loans, a 
financial transaction tax (a “Tobin tax”) on certain types of capital inflows as well 
as on short US dollar positions held in futures markets, higher reserve 
requirements on banks‟ short foreign exchange positions for spot transactions, 
and foreign-exchange intervention through foreign-exchange swaps. These 
macroprudential measures were viewed as achieving some success in slowing 
consumer credit expansion and reducing portfolio inflows and short term 
borrowing (Tombini, 2013). 
 
During the most recent crisis and the East Asian crisis of the late 1990s, South 
Korea has been particularly vulnerable to abrupt and disorderly reversals in capital 
flows. This vulnerability stemmed from a rapid build-up of short-term external debt 
in prior years, as a result of higher demand for currency forward contracts by the 
corporate banks who expected currency appreciation (IMF, 2014a). During the 
recent crisis, four months after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, South 
Korea experienced sharp capital outflows (nearly USD70 billion) and volatility was 
amongst the highest in emerging markets. In August 2011, the country imposed a 
macroprudential stability levy on banks‟ non-deposit foreign currency liabilities 
(with higher penalties on shorter maturities) to further limit large swings in capital 
flows. Other measures adopted by South Korea included the imposition of limits 
on foreign currency bank loans and prudential regulations to manage foreign 
exchange risk in banks. The IMF (2014a) is of the view that the adoption of these 
macroprudential measures by Korea was somewhat successful in reducing pro-
cyclical cross-border lending/borrowing amongst banks. 
 
Many banks have large exposure to foreign currency-denominated lending or 
borrowing, and face the risk of a currency mismatch when they themselves or their 
borrowers are unable to repay their debt during periods of sharp depreciations of 
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the local or relevant foreign currencies. To mitigate this type of risk, countries 
deploy macroprudential measures such as direct caps on foreign currency 
exposures, DTI caps by currency, targeted restrictions on foreign currency 
lending/borrowing and outright bans – to limit growth in unhedged foreign currency 
lending/borrowing as well as to provide capital buffers during stressful economic 
conditions. Other measures include LTV caps, higher risk weights and higher 
capital provisions against foreign loans (IMF, 2011). Hungary and Ukraine are 
examples of countries that have adopted such measures. However, these 
countries still have large net outstanding foreign exchange obligations. 
 
c) Liquidity and funding ratios 
 
These include: (1) the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR); and (2) the net stable funding 
ratio (NSFR) (Bundesbank, 2013). This section will also discuss South Africa‟s 
experiences and challenges in this regard. 
 
1. The liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) 
 
The objective of the LCR is to ensure that banks have sufficient levels of high-
quality liquid assets (HQLA) to absorb short-term liquidity inefficiencies in the 
financial system, the interbank market in particular. Basel III regulation requires 
banks to hold adequate HQLA or other assets such as Treasury bonds that can be 
converted into cash at short notice (at the central bank or at fellow banks), to 
cover their net cash needs over a 30-day period under stressed conditions (BIS, 
2013).  
 
The LCR is calculated as: Stock of HQLA/Total net cash outflows over the next 30 
calendar days x 100 per cent. 
  
In other words, if the LCR is set at 100 per cent, it requires that banks have 
sufficient HQLA to cover their cash needs over the next 30 days under a stress 
scenario prescribed by Basel III regulation. For these assets to qualify as HQLA in 
stress conditions, they should be liquid during times of market stress and eligible 
as collateral for a central bank.  
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The LCR was implemented fairly quickly, with reporting having started on 1 
January 2015 and full compliance required by 1 January 2019 (see Appendix 1 for 
implementation deadlines for Basel III regulation).  Between 1 January 2015 and 1 
January 2019, banks have been required to do stress tests to ascertain liquidity 
levels that must be held above the minimum requirements. The minimum 
requirement was set at 60 per cent on 1 January 2015, with 10 per cent annual 
increases to achieve 100 per cent compliance by 1 January 2019 (SARB, 2013b)  
 
The LCR requires banks to hold an adequate amount of unencumbered HQLA 
that can be converted easily and immediately into cash. Under Basel III 
requirements, banks are required to demonstrate that their daily LCR ratio, (that is 
HQLA divided by total net cash outflows over a specified 30-day period under a 
prescribed stress scenario), is always greater than the minimum requirement 
(starting at 60 per cent in 2015 and increasing by 10 per cent increments to 100 
per cent in 2019).  
 
The LCR divides eligible assets into Level 1, Level 2A and Level 2B, a new bucket 
that includes various assets not previously eligible for Level 2, including certain 
residential mortgage backed securities (RMB), lower rated corporate debt 
securities (including commercial paper), and common equity. 
 
Level 1 assets, which are of the highest quality and the most liquid, consist of 
vault cash, reserves held as deposits with the central bank, and certain 
marketable securities backed by sovereigns and central banks. Banks are not 
limited in the extent to which they can hold these assets to meet the LCR. Level 
2A assets consist of lower rated government securities, covered bonds and 
corporate debt securities, while Level 2B assets comprise lower-rated corporate 
bonds, residential MBSs and equities that meet specific conditions. On a total 
aggregate level, Level 2A assets are not permitted to account for more than 40 
per cent of a bank‟s total of HQLA, while Level 2B assets are not permitted to 
account for more than 15 per cent of a bank‟s total amount of HQLA. 
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Banks should be in a position to alert regulators on factors that contribute to their 
LCR falling below 100 per cent and what measures it intends to implement to 
cover any shortfalls. During periods of stressed market conditions, however, 
banks are allowed to use their HQLA, with the result that their LCR ratio falls 
below the minimum level of 100 per cent.  
 
(2) Net stable funding ratio (NSFR) 
 
The crisis highlighted major liquidity problems in the global banking system. As a 
result, liquidity requirements were prescribed by the BCBS (2014b) to focus on the 
30-day LCR and the NSFR, which had a longer-term liquidity impact. Contrary to 
the LCR which was implemented fairly quickly on 1 January 2015, the NSFR has 
proven to be more difficult for the international banking community achieve. The 
NSFR requirements were first outlined in discussion documents released by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in December 2009. After 
aligning definitions between the two requirements, the final version of NSFR was 
released in October 2014 and will become a minimum standard by January 2018. 
 
The BCBS (2014b) states that a key objective of the NSFR is to complement the 
LCR by encouraging banks to choose asset and liability structures that are stable 
and have financially sound risk management practices. The NSFR is intended to 
ensure that a bank holds a minimum acceptable amount of stable funding relative 
to the liquidity features of its assets and other liabilities over a year. It is imperative 
that a bank captures balance sheet and off-balance sheet items and funds them 
with more stable sources. In essence, under the NSFR, a bank must reduce its 
reliance on short-term wholesale funding in favour of more stable deposit funding, 
thereby minimising the risk of sudden termination of roll-overs and providing 
support to the banks as a going concern for at least one year if funding pressures 
arise in the financial system.   
 
Formally, the NSFR is defined as the ratio of a bank‟s available stable funding 
(capital and liabilities) to the required stable funding (calculated as a weighted 
sum of asset and off-balance sheet exposures of the bank) over a one-year 
period. 
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The NSFR is calculated as: (Available stable funding /Required stable funding) ≥ 
100 per cent 
 
According to BCBS (2014b), the NSFR must be standardised to reflect the stability 
of liabilities across the following two key measurements: 
 
1. Funding tenor. The NSFR assumes that longer-term liabilities are more 
stable than short-term liabilities; and 
 
2. Funding type and counterparty. The NSFR is designed under the 
assumption that short-term deposits (maturing in less than one year) are 
relatively more stable than short-term wholesale funding, the assumption 
being that the proportion of the public‟s total money holdings which it 
desires to keep as bank deposits remains fairly stable over time, although 
the public may still shift its deposits from one bank to another.   
 
The Available Stable Funding (ASF), the numerator in the above formula, is the 
amount of funding a bank can consider relatively stable, based on the source of 
funding, its contractual maturity and assumptions about the behaviour of different 
funding providers. ASF is the portion of a bank‟s funding structure that is reliable 
over a one year time horizon. ASF is calculated by assigning the carrying value of 
capital and liabilities to one of five categories and then multiplying it by the ASF 
factor (ranging between 100 per cent and 0 per cent). The total ASF amount is 
therefore a weighted average of the amounts in each category. A higher ASF 
weight is attached to more stable funding. 
 
Required Stable Funding (RSF), the denominator in the above formula, is the 
amount of stable funding required for on- and off-balance sheet exposures, based 
on supervisory assumptions about the liquidity risk profile of the assets. The RSF 
is calculated by assigning the carrying values of various assets into one of eight 
categories, multiplying by an appropriate RSF factor (ranging between 100 per 
cent and 0 per cent), and arriving at a weighted average. Liquid assets receive 
lower RSF factors, while illiquid assets are assigned higher RSF factors.  
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The actions that banks need to take to meet the NSFR requirements are 
potentially on both sides of the balance sheet, although the focus post-crisis has 
shifted to the capital and liability side. While the BCBS (2014b) acknowledges that 
banks‟ primary economic roles are liquidity and maturity transformation, the NSFR 
ultimately aims to reduce transformation risk.  
 
The IMF (2014b) pointed out a few concerns about the impact of the NSFR. The 
NSFR could prove to be too stringent on banks and result in a slowdown in long-
term lending and negatively impact economic growth. As banks compete for 
funding, it could make deposits less stable, causing risks for the financial system. 
In addition, the NSFR could channel maturity transformation activities to the 
unregulated shadow banking sector where systemic risk is more difficult to 
monitor. These risks are more prevalent in emerging market economies which 
have less developed capital markets, resulting in a greater reliance on banks for 
long-term financing. 
 
The NSFR requirements have significant consequences for the credit markets 
through the impact on banks‟ balance sheets. The combined effect of these rules 
is likely to be a significantly higher level of debt issuance by local banks with an 
incentive to issue longer-dated instruments. Banks holdings‟ of longer term debt is 
considered a HQLA asset for collateral purposes. 
 
South Africa‟s experiences with Basel III regulation (LCR and NSFR) 
 
South African banks are mostly well-positioned to comply with the Basel III 
requirements for more and better quality capital.  However, due to the fact that 
South Africa has a less liquid corporate bond market and limited access to 
government debt securities, compliance with the LCR and NFSR has proven to be 
somewhat challenging (Mminele, 2014).  
 
Table 4.2 lists the liquid assets (Level 1) accepted by the SARB as collateral from 
South African domestic banks. In terms of Basel III requirements, South Africa has 
a limited pool of Level 1 assets, and virtually no Level 2 assets.   
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Table 4.2 Available pool of liquid assets accepted by the SARB (Level 1) 
Source: South African Reserve Bank 
 
In light of the above-mentioned challenges, the SARB implemented a 
collateralised Committed Liquidity Facility (CLF) in January 2013, two years before 
the Basel III implementation date, to assist domestic banks to meet some of the 
requirements of the LCR ahead of full compliance of the LCR on 1 January 2019 
(SARB, 2013b).  The CLF requires that banks meet the Level 1 requirement of the 
LCR individually. Hence, the CLF should only be used to substitute Level 2 assets 
and is capped at 40 per cent of the total amount of HQLA that a bank must hold in 
domestic currency (rand-denominated) terms.  
 
In the South African banking sector, there are structural constraints that make it 
difficult for banks to meet the new liquidity requirements. About 60 per cent of 
bank deposits are traditionally wholesale funding from non-bank financial 
institutions and South Africa has a small retail deposit base (IMF, 2015b). 
Furthermore, the average funding maturity of assets has been reduced in recent 
years, providing an even bigger challenge for South African banks to meet the 
requirements of the NSFR, which requires more retail funding with maturity in 
excess of one year.  
 
Since South African banks rely more on wholesale funding than retail deposits, the 
availability of HQLA is expected to pose a challenge for these banks to meet 
Basel III liquidity requirements, particularly the NSFR. This is largely owing to the 
fact that the NSFR requires banks to reduce their reliance on short-term (unstable) 
wholesale funding in favour of more stable deposit funding (discussed earlier), 
with the objective of providing assistance to banks as a going concern for at least 
one year in the event of funding pressures in the financial system.   
 
Government bonds (Rand denominated) 
Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal of Securities (STRIPS) 
South African Reserve Bank debentures 
Treasury bills 
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The challenges facing South Africa to comply with the LCR and NSFR can be 
summarised as follows: 
 
The deposit scarcity. The NFSR rules emphasise deposits, but South Africa 
suffers from a longstanding lack of adequate household savings. 
 
The reliance on wholesale funding. The use of wholesale funding is actively 
discouraged by the NSFR rules. Banks are therefore forced to compete for retail 
and non-financial corporate term deposits as well as operational deposits. The 
NSFR is likely to have a significant negative impact on banking in countries that 
have concentrated financial industries and underdeveloped capital markets such 
as South Africa. One positive impact the rules might have is to accelerate the 
development of the local capital market. For example, covered bonds might be 
back on the local regulatory agenda. 
 
Availability of assets. The availability of high quality liquid assets will continue to 
be challenging for a while because of structural constraints mentioned above. 
 
4.2.3 Capital-related measures  
 
(a) Countercyclical capital buffers, leverage ratios and capital add-ons for 
global systemically important banks (SIBs). 
 
Subsequent to the financial crisis, global policymakers were forced to step up their 
efforts towards adopting a macroprudential approach to financial stability for 
mitigating systemic risk and increasing the ability of SIBs to absorb financial 
losses. Out of these efforts, the Basel III framework was born in December 2010, 
with the introduction of the countercyclical capital buffer (CCB), the leverage ratio 
(LR) and capital add-ons for global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), all of 
which aimed to build up capital buffers in periods of good economic times to be 
used in times of stressful market conditions or economic downturns. The Riksbank 
(2012) states that, to the extent that systemic risks change over time, it also 
becomes necessary for capital requirements to vary over time.  
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Countercyclical capital buffer 
 
The intention of the CCB is to protect banks against procyclicality by containing 
excessive credit growth and the build-up of asset price bubbles during the upturn. 
In the event that the bubble bursts during the downturn, banks would be in fairly 
good standing to withstand capital shocks and avert a credit crunch. According to 
Basel III regulations (BCBS, 2010), the CCB is made up of common equity Tier 1 
capital11 and the additional buffer ranges from 0 to 2,5 per cent of risk-weighted 
assets. However, regulators are permitted to implement a buffer in excess of 2,5 
per cent in line with national policy. The CCB regime is to be phased in between 1 
January 2016 and 31 December 2018, and become fully effective on 1 January 
2019.  
 
Borio and Lowe (2002a) are of the view that the credit gap is one of the most 
effective early warning signals for banking crises. If the credit gap is calculated as 
a large positive ratio, it implies that credit extension at that point in time is well 
above its long-term trend and could have risen excessively relative to the 
country‟s GDP.  
 
One way of increasing the CCB and allowing a bank to absorb losses during an 
economic downturn is to assign risk weights to individual asset classes, thereby 
varying the capital buffer required for these assets. An increase in risk weights 
results in an increase in interest rates on loans such as mortgage loans, secured 
consumer credit, unsecured consumer credit, and corporate loans. Whilst the 
marginal cost of funding can rise as sectoral risk weights are assigned to different 
asset classes, there is also the potential to limit exposure for these asset classes, 
thereby limiting system risk and promoting financial stability (Elliot, 2011). 
 
The IMF (2013b) cites two examples of countries that have implemented the CCB, 
namely, the United Kingdom and Switzerland. In the United Kingdom, the 
Financial Policy Committee (FPC) has been assigned with the responsibility of 
                                                 
11
 Tier 1 capital measures the financial strength of banks, because it is the capital that absorbs 
losses. Tier 1 capital consists of core capital that is defined by common stock and disclosed 
reserves (or retained earnings), and also includes non-redeemable, non-cumulative preferred 
stock. 
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applying the CCB to banks. The FPC has to review the country‟s core MPIs as 
well as decide on when to use the CCB and other MPIs. Some of the United 
Kingdom‟s core MPIs include the capital ratio, the leverage ratio, the credit-to-
GDP ratio and the credit/GDP trend gap.  
 
Switzerland is another example of a country that recently implemented a CCB in 
February 2013, owing to concerns about the risk of imbalances in its residential 
property market. The CCB in Switzerland is required to take the form of common 
equity Tier 1 capital consisting of a maximum of 2,5 per cent of the risk weighted 
assets in Switzerland. Banks are also expected to adhere to the additional capital 
requirement of 1,0 per cent of risk-weighted direct and indirect mortgage-backed 
positions secured by residential property. The Swiss National Bank does regular 
assessments on property markets to determine whether the CCB should be 
activated, adjusted or released as well as the implementation period of the CCB.  
 
Leverage ratio  
 
Another measure aimed at mitigating systemic risks in the broader financial 
system is the leverage ratio (LR). LR is calculated as the ratio of Tier 1 capital to 
the sum of all on and off-balance sheet asset items. The objective of LR is to 
place a limit on the maximum extent to which a bank can leverage its equity to 
contain the risk of a build-up of excessive debt in the financial system (IMF, 
2011a). 
 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the Basel III framework introduced a 
non-risk based leverage ratio to complement current risk-based capital 
requirements and safeguard the capturing of both on- and off-balance sheet 
sources of banks‟ leverage (BCBS, 2014). The objective of the leverage ratio is 
two-fold, firstly, to limit the build-up of leverage in the banking sector as a way of 
preventing the subsequent deleveraging from destabilising the financial system 
and broader economy and, secondly, to support the risk-based requirements with 
a simple, transparent non-risk based “backstop” measure. 
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The Basel III LR is calculated as the capital measure (the numerator) divided by 
the exposure measure (the denominator), with this ratio expressed as a 
percentage: 
 
LR = capital measure/exposure measure x 100 per cent 
 
where,  
 
(i) the capital measure used for the LR is the total regulatory capital that is 
applying at that time under the risk-based framework and; 
 
(ii) the exposure measure for the LR is the accounting value of assets, including 
on-balance sheet and non-derivative exposures net of specific provisions or 
accounting valuation adjustments (Office of the Superintendent of Financial 
Institutions,  2014).  
 
The implementation of the Basel III leverage ratio requirement began on 1 
January 2013, where banks reported to national regulators on the LR and its 
components. The BCBS will continue to monitor country progress, by testing the 
minimum requirement of 3 per cent for the leverage ratio until 1 January 2017. 
Final calibration of the LR and any further adjustments are expected to be 
completed by 2017, with a view to moving over to Pillar 1 (that is, the minimum 
capital requirement) on 1 January 2018. Countries that have started using 
leverage ratios include the United States, Canada and Switzerland (World Bank, 
2009). 
 
Capital add-ons for globally systemically important banks 
 
In November 2014, the FSB tabled a proposal for capital add-ons or additional 
loss-absorbing capacity (ALAC) for G-SIBs in order to protect taxpayers against 
having to cover bank losses in the case of bank failure (G20, 2014). ALAC for G-
SIBS required that banks‟ total loss absorbency capital (TLAC) (Pillar 1) should 
increase significantly above the minimums set by Basel III regulation (that is, 
within 16 per cent to 20 per cent of risk-weighted assets) and at a minimum of 
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twice the Basel III leverage requirement. In other words, G-SIBs were required to 
hold at least twice the minimum Basel III total regulatory capital ratio of 8 per cent 
and at least twice the global Basel III leverage ratio of 3 per cent. An important 
aspect of his tool is that it addresses the cross-sectional aspect of systemic risk 
whereas previous MPIs addressed the time-varying (procyclicality) aspect of it. 
 
Another requirement imposed was that TLAC also include a subjective component 
(called “Pillar 2”) which would be based on qualitative bank-specific risks that 
specifically take a bank‟s recovery and resolution plans as well as its risk profile 
into account. Each bank would be individually assessed on these criteria (Price 
Waterhouse Coopers, 2014).  
 
From a South African point of view, the FSBs proposals relating to G-SIBs are 
quite relevant, given that two of the five major banks in South Africa are directly 
affected.  Barclays Plc and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) are 
recognised as G-SIBs. Barclays Plc is the parent of ABSA/Barclays and ICBC has 
a significant shareholding in Standard Bank. Essentially, G-SIB regulations 
ultimately become rules for domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs). 
South Africa is likely to start applying these rules by 1 January 2019. 
 
b) Dynamic loan loss provisioning 
 
Dynamic provisioning is identified as a macroprudential instrument that can be 
used to promote bank soundness by mitigating procyclicality in the financial 
system (Wezel et al., 2012). In simple terms, dynamic loan provisioning is a 
measure to ensure that financial institutions are not negatively affected by rising 
losses at the very time that banks are required to support weak economic growth 
through their lending standards. Given that there is a higher default rate on loans 
during periods of slow credit growth than rapid credit growth, it is important that 
banks increase their loan loss provisioning during times of rapid credit growth so 
that they can absorb the loan losses during times of slow credit growth.   
 
During the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, there was limited focus on the role of 
loan loss provisioning as a way to address procyclicality of capital requirements 
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and this was seen as a major source of financial system instability. According to 
Fillat and Montoriol-Garriga (2010), this neglect was quite surprising given the 
important role that loan loss provisioning plays in covering expected losses and 
the role of capital in providing an adequate buffer for unexpected losses. However, 
there were some countries that proactively adopted dynamic provisioning in the 
run up to and during the crisis. One such country that took the lead with dynamic 
provisioning was Spain, while others such as Uruguay, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, 
Mexico and Chile followed suite.  
 
Dynamic provisioning in the Spanish banking sector was first implemented by the 
Banco de España in July 2000, owing to strong procyclicality in bank lending. 
Against a backdrop of strong competition in the Spanish banking sector, low levels 
of non-performing loans and volatile asset price swings, banks eased their credit 
criteria during the boom of the 1990s. Credit growth in Spain grew rapidly in the 
1990s which resulted in a rapid rise in credit risk on the balance sheet of banks. 
This contributed to the build-up of financial imbalances in Spain‟s non-financial 
sector, which neither monetary policy nor the nominal exchange rate could 
resolve. In this context, Spain adopted a macroprudential tool called dynamic 
(statistical) provisions to limit credit growth by increasing the cost of new credit 
granted and to prevent Spanish banks from incurring further losses and 
undermining the system as a whole.  
 
In a normal provisioning system, provisions are a function of the incidence of non-
performing loans (De Lis and Herrero, 2009). As per Basel I regulation, non-
performing loans refer to loans that are overdue for 90 days (SARB, 2011).  As 
credit growth increases during cyclical upturns, GDP growth also increases and 
debtors can afford to service their debt. Debt provisions are thus low, which 
results in lower risk aversion feeding back into higher credit and GDP growth. The 
opposite is also true. As credit growth stagnates during the cyclical downturn, non-
performing loans spike causing banks to make higher provisioning which feeds 
back into lower credit extension and GDP growth, thereby reinforcing the 
downturn resulting in a pro-cyclical pattern of normal provisions as reflected in 
Figure 4.2.  
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Figure 4.2 Normal Loan Provisioning 
Per cent 
 
Source: De Lis and Herrero (2009) 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Dynamic loan provisioning 
Per cent 
Source: De Lis and Herrero (2009) 
 
Provisions
NPL
Credit
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Dynamic provisioning aims to show provisions with a smoothed pro-cyclical 
pattern along the cycle, thereby avoiding the pro-cyclical effect of normal 
provisioning (Figure 4.3).   
 
The introduction of dynamic provisioning led to a slight decrease in credit 
provision between 1999 and 2001 and a continued declining trend thereafter, in 
line with GDP growth in Spain. However, procyclicality was not eliminated totally 
but nonetheless reduced credit growth somewhat during the cyclical upturn.  De 
Lis and Herrero (2009) argued that the lengthened business cycle made it 
challenging to determine long-run expected losses which were also not 
systemically tested by the statistical provisioning method. This could possibly 
explain why dynamic provisioning was unsuccessful at preventing a housing 
bubble in Spain and at saving Spanish banks from failure in the most recent crisis.  
 
Domestic banks were still able to provide large quantities of loans to risky sectors 
of the economy (Wezel et al. 2012).  In this regard, dynamic provisioning was 
unsuccessful at taking corrective action and eliminating procyclicality and was 
viewed as being a reactive measure in stabilising bank profits in an economic 
downturn and maintaining capital above the required level. 
 
 
4.3 POLICY APPROACHES AND STRATEGIES IN THE SELECTION OF 
MACROPRUDENTIAL INSTRUMENTS 
 
According to the BIS (2012), one of the biggest challenges facing policymakers is 
deciding on how to choose and apply MPIs. The choice of macroprudential 
instruments is dependent on a country‟s institutional arrangements, its financial 
and economic conditions, prevailing law and market practices as well as the types 
of systemic risks that exist in the financial system. 
 
The G30 (2010) states that regulators mostly rely on identifying the stage of a 
financial cycle to determine whether or not to deploy MPIs.  The Committee on 
Global Financial System (CGFS, 2010) proposed a three-step approach for 
regulators to adopt when selecting and applying MPIs (Table 4.3).  
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Table 4.3 Steps in the selection of macroprudential instruments 
 
Step 1 Determine the following in respect of the MPI: 
 applicability to the MPI; 
 ease of data availability and 
 ability to easily communicate and replicate. 
Step 2 Strictly assess the reliability of possible indicators to guide the build-up or 
activation of specific MPIs. 
Step 3 Determine whether the stage of the financial cycle is a mere downturn or the 
precursor to a crisis, which will determine whether to activate a gradual or 
quick release of MPIs. 
Source: G30 (2010) 
 
According to Kama and Adigun (2013), an effective MPI relies on the observation 
of some sort of trend prior to a crisis, which provides an early warning signal about 
the build-up of financial imbalances. The relevant diagnostic tool or indicator 
should also provide guidance on when to implement the relevant MPI, depending 
on the stage of the financial cycle, that is, whether it concerns a relatively 
harmless economic downturn or an impending crisis.  
 
Similarly, the BIS (2012) argues that the ability to identify and measure systemic 
risks and vulnerabilities is a key factor for successfully implementing MPIs, 
because if MPIs are applied at the wrong time, it can result in failure to achieve 
macroprudential objectives, which affects the costs associated with the activation 
of these MPIs. A delayed activation of MPIs can result in them having less impact 
because there might not be enough time to achieve the desired results. 
  
The IMF (2011a) states that whilst “no size fits all”, there are some MPI strategies 
that are inherently more advantageous than others. For example, using multiple 
MPIs is inherently more effective in addressing different aspects of the same risk 
than using just one MPI.  In many instances, it is also intrinsically more beneficial 
to target specific risks than broad risks as it becomes easier to differentiate 
between different types of transactions within a targeted risk.  
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Quagliariello and Libertucci (2010) state that the activation or deactivation of 
MPIs, (particularly countercyclical tools such as capital buffers) can be rules-
based or follow a discretionary approach. Under a rules-based approach, MPIs 
must contain forward-looking information on an actual risk situation that is linked 
to the dynamics of predefined macroeconomic or financial variables. In other 
words, policy reaction would depend on how regulators identify micro and 
macroeconomic objectives. Under a discretion-based approach, regulators would 
want banks to build-up buffers during periods of economic booms. Under this 
approach, regulators should be able to confidently declare that an economic boom 
is taking place and is the cause of excessive risk-taking. On a case-by-case 
assessment, regulators would use their discretion to impose capital savings on 
banks for them to use during tough economic times via the release of capital 
buffers.  
 
According to Elliot (2011), the choice of MPIs is also influenced by the nature of 
the systemic threat as well as the degree of its uncertainty. The IMF (2011) 
supports the above-mentioned view and articulates that the more information 
there is about a systemic risk, the easier it is for regulators to identify the most 
effective instrument to address potential problems. For example, in order to gain 
an understanding of aggregate risk in the financial system, it is important for 
regulators to investigate total credit, liquidity, and market risk, as well as to look at 
the sectors in which these risks are concentrated, for example, the real-estate 
sector or consumer household sector.  
 
Parker (2012) suggests that the following questions be considered when 
examining systemic risk concentration. Is the risk held mainly by households and 
is it adequately priced?  How exposed is consumer demand to price deterioration 
in different assets or asset classes? What is the probability of private losses 
becoming public liabilities and how exposed will households be in this regard?  
 
From an international perspective, it is critical that there is cross-border co-
ordination of the use of MPIs amongst countries that are interconnected, as 
credit booms and the build-up of asset price bubbles can be fed by the 
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provision of international credit lines. Cross-border co-ordination is also 
necessary in order to control regulatory arbitrage (Kincaid & Watson, 2014)12.  
 
Regulatory arbitrage becomes more prominent when there is a single currency 
financial market with limited exchange rate risks. Financial institutions 
(including their branches) are regulated by their home regulators while host 
countries regulate their domestic financial institutions (including subsidiaries of 
foreign financial institutions). As a result, MPIs that are applied by a host 
country would not necessarily apply to local branches of foreign banks and 
institutions and households could access credit directly from these branches.  
 
The BCBS (2010a) tried to alleviate this problem by levelling the playing field 
and establishing the principle of “jurisdictional reciprocity”, whereby foreign 
regulators are obliged to apply the same additional capital buffers on their 
banks‟ lending to host country borrowers as the host regulatory authority puts 
on its own banks. However, this principle applies only to counter-cyclical capital 
buffers and not to all MPIs.  A good example of this type of challenge is in the 
eurozone where counter-cyclical buffers for large banks fall under the 
jurisdiction of the ECB (single supervisor), but banks also compete with local 
capital markets and non-banks for lending which are regulated by national 
authorities. Therefore MPIs in different Eurozone countries need to be tailor-
made in line with systemic risks in each individual economy as well as the 
broader Eurozone economy. 
 
The high levels of liquidity prevalent in the build-up to the 2007-2009 global 
financial crisis as well as the QE measures in the aftermath of the crisis gave rise 
to excessive and volatile cross-border capital flows which has created challenges, 
particularly for emerging markets. In this regard, it is of great importance that MPIs 
are used in the correct manner to reduce systemic risks relating to capital in- and 
outflows. According to the IMF (2011a), MPIs do not differentiate between 
residents and non-residents while capital controls make that distinction. An 
                                                 
12
 Regulatory arbitrage is where institutions take advantage of weaknesses in regulatory systems 
to avert certain types of regulation. These institutions usually end up conducting their business 
operations in locations where regulation is weaker or can more easily be circumvented.   
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example of this is the CCB that is consistent with the build-up of credit, which is 
triggered by high levels of credit growth from both resident and non-resident 
banks.   
 
Asset prices and cross-border credit extension are the key variables affected by 
cross-border capital flows in most emerging markets, particularly emerging Asia 
(IMF, 2014c). Excessive capital inflows often result in higher inflation, strong 
exchange rate appreciation as well as rapid asset price increases and monetary 
growth which negatively affect financial stability. Hence, MPIs should play a critical 
role in limiting the growth in cross-border credit extension.  
 
It is of critical importance that MPIs be consistent with other policy goals and that 
regulators consider their behavioural and cumulative impact on institutions, 
consumers and other regulatory measures so that intermediation in the economy 
is not compromised. For example, the implementation of Basel II regulation 
resulted in banks‟ changing their behaviour (by using special purpose vehicles to 
move assets off balance sheet – as explained in Chapter 2) due to different levels 
of capital charged against instruments held on their balance sheets.  
 
A transparent regulatory and institutional macroprudential framework requires a 
transparent and effective macroprudential toolkit of instruments that should be 
applied to most sectors in a financial system. The CGFS (2009) states that 
macroprudential policy has predominantly focused on judgement-based 
(discretion) rather than rules-based MPIs, with the objective of promoting 
resilience in the financial system by moderating financial cycles and curtailing 
excessive credit growth or prevent excess cross-border capital inflows.  Deciding 
on the stage of financial cycles, however, is challenging and therefore requires 
that MPIs be varied actively (depending on where systemic risks are emerging 
from) and calibrated quantitatively.  
 
In summary, MPIs need to capture the build-up of credit risk, act as early warning 
signals to detect stress in the financial system and be able to ascertain whether 
the financial system can absorb the risks (Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ), 
2013). In this regard, regulators have a variety of policy instruments at their 
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disposal, ranging from direct measures which control the availability and price of 
credit to indirect measures which affect the cost of funding through capital and 
liquidity requirements.   
 
 
4.4 WORLDWIDE EXPERIENCES WITH MACROPRUDENTIAL 
INSTRUMENTS  
 
a) Europe 
 
With regard to MPI‟s used in other regions, the European macroprudential 
framework has improved after the crisis, with stronger prudential requirements 
(ECB, 2015). EU legislation which previously consisted of the Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD IV) and the Capital Requirements Regulation 
(CRR), proposed a variety of MPIs to all national authorities in the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) (EBA, 2014).  In addition, the establishment of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) to complement the ECB‟s microprudential 
responsibilities resulted in the ECB taking over the supervision of the 
macroprudential function in the SSM countries.  
 
This change in legislation culminated in the ECB introducing a macroprudential 
toolkit consisting of capital instruments, such as the CCB, the systemic risk buffer 
(SRB), capital surcharges of systemically important banks (SIBs) as well as 
liquidity instruments, such as the LCR, which were designed to minimise structural 
systemic risk. The SRB is a CRD IV-specific, temporary buffer that applies only at 
times where excess credit growth needs to be curtailed. The ECB has also 
imposed higher risk weights on real estate exposures and higher limits on larger 
exposures.  
 
According to the IMF (2013c), the Basel III CCB is an essential but not a sufficient 
component of the toolkit, and therefore needs to be combined with other MPIs to 
address the cross-sectional and time dimension of systemic risk. MPIs have not 
been used extensively in Europe and most banks have typically relied on non-
price criteria to ration the supply of credit or assess the credit worthiness of 
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borrowers. For example, for many years, the ECB Bank Lending Survey has 
provided very useful information on price and non-price measures relied upon to 
tighten credit supply and those factors that affect credit supply. Placing ceilings on 
LTVs and DTIs in Europe has also been a successful measure of reducing 
mortgage credit growth or house price appreciation and have complemented the 
CCB.  
 
b) The US  
 
The macroprudential toolkit of the Fed is presently being developed and tested in 
the US financial system.  According to Brainard (2014), the objective of the Fed‟s 
macroprudential surveillance is to develop resilient banks and markets to ensure 
that risks are mitigated early enough to prevent disruptions to financial stability 
that could spill over into the real economy.  
 
The US macroprudential framework requires banks to hold sufficient levels of loss-
absorbing regulatory capital to enable banks to be more resilient when facing 
unexpected losses. This is particularly important for large interconnected SIFIs, 
where capital buffers can prevent spill-over effects into other banks and the 
broader financial system.  
 
In his regard, the US has made sufficient progress according to Yellen (2014). In 
addition to the Basel III liquidity requirements of reducing banks‟ reliance on short-
term wholesale funding, the Fed has also adopted its own stress tests and 
Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review process, which requires large US 
banks to maintain adequate capital levels to withstand large and unexpected 
economic shocks, as well ensure that each bank‟s internal capital planning 
processes are effective.  
 
Other macropudential measures aimed at identifying risks in the US wholesale 
funding market include imposing requirements on SIFIs to hold more and better 
quality capital, to have more stable sources of funding, and to maintain minimum 
margins for repurchase agreements. The Financial Stability Oversight Council 
which supervises non-bank financial institutions is now responsible for the 
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strengthening of the oversight of the US shadow banking system. However, the 
Fed has not progressed well in developing time-varying macroprudential tools to 
limit excessive credit growth during boom periods and is still contemplating ways 
in which to implement the Basel III CCB measure (Yellen, 2014).  
 
c) The world as a whole 
 
The IMF (2014a) conducted a survey on the overall use of MPIs and it became 
evident that 42 countries (28 emerging markets and 14 advanced economies) 
applied at least one MPI once between the period 2000-2013, while 23 countries 
in the survey did not implement any MPIs. According to the IMF, it made sense 
that emerging markets made more use of MPIs, due to their large exposures to 
external shocks and higher market failures. 
 
Table 4.4      Overall usage of MPIs by emerging markets and advanced economies 
 
 
Instrument Total  
countries 
Frequency 
of use 
Emerging 
markets 
Advanced 
economies 
Frequency  
emerging 
markets 
per year 
Frequency 
advanced 
economies 
 per year  
Loan-to-value 24 28% 13 11 20% 55% 
Debt-to-income 23 24% 16 7 25% 20% 
Limits on credit 
growth 
6 9% 6 0 12% 0% 
Limits on 
foreign lending 
15 14% 12 3 14% 15% 
Reserve 
requirements 
10 15% 10 0 20% 0% 
Dynamic 
provisioning 
7 8% 6 1 7% 9% 
Countercyclical 
requirements 
5 2% 2 3 2% 2% 
Total by 
classification 
42 100% 28 14 100% 100% 
Source: IMF (2014a) 
 
In terms of the actual usage by country groupings, LTV and DTI ratios are used 
the most by advanced economies, while other MPIs are seldom used (see Table 
4.4). Emerging market economies prefer using foreign exchange and liquidity-
related instruments to prevent systemic risk arising out of large and volatile capital 
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in- and outflows. Interestingly, advanced economies which are more concerned 
about excessive leverage, have a higher usage of LTVs (55 per cent) and DTIs 
(20 per cent).  
 
The next section provides an overview of the interaction between macroprudential 
policy and monetary policy. It is important that policy tools be used in a manner 
that takes into consideration the possible ill-effects of monetary policy on 
macroprudential targets, and vice versa.  
 
 
4.5 THE INTERACTION BETWEEN MONETARY POLICY 
(MICROPRUDENTIAL) AND FINANCIAL STABILITY 
(MACRORPDUENTIAL POLICY) 
 
Monetary policy and financial stability should have clear and distinct policy 
objectives, which need to be coordinated in such a way that they do not frustrate 
each other and transparency and accountability are maintained. In this regard, it is 
important that MPIs are used in the appropriate manner to support monetary 
policy and achieve financial stability objectives.  
 
Angelini et al. (2012) argue that the potential for conflict between both policy 
objectives is seemingly asymmetric and more likely to arise during economic 
downturns when a macroprudential supervisor would want to decrease buffers 
(lower the capital requirement) to prevent a credit crisis. At this stage, a 
microprudential supervisor would be hesitant to run down buffers as the monetary 
policy objective would be to protect the safety and soundness of individual banks 
in the financial system. However, this is not seen as a major concern because in 
an economic downturn, it might be challenging for a macroprudential supervisor to 
reduce the capital requirement for banks, largely because banks would be 
pressured to recapitalise anyway, given deteriorating economic conditions. A 
possible solution would be to raise buffers during normal economic times (instead 
of boom periods only) so that reductions in countercyclical policies in bust periods 
would be less harmful to banks.  
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The Banque de France (2014) and Chodorow-Reich (2014) point out that the 
interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies is dependent on the 
type of supply and demand imbalances in the financial system and their 
transmission to the wider economy. Another example of conflicting policy 
objectives is where an asset price bubble has been identified as a financial 
stability risk but at the same time there are strong deflationary price stability risks. 
In this scenario, it is argued that macroprudential measures should be used to limit 
credit and liquidity growth.  
 
However, the downside risk is that limiting credit growth could result in a 
contraction in economic activity and set a deflationary spiral in motion. So whilst 
macroprudential policy would meet its financial stability objective, there could be 
negative consequences for price stability, requiring a loosening of monetary policy 
to support economic activity. But then this loosening of monetary policy could 
exacerbate the asset price bubble and result in more financial imbalances. 
 
4.5.1 The transmission channel between monetary policy and financial stability 
 
The transmission channel between both policies consists of two links namely; the 
link between interest rates and key financial variables and, secondly; the link 
between these financial variables and the probability of large and disorderly 
macroeconomic disturbances.  
 
In the short term, tighter monetary policy (higher interest rates) is likely to reduce 
household aggregate demand, thereby reducing household and bank‟s earnings 
and profitability. In the medium term, however, the IMF (2013d) suggests that the 
weakening effect of higher interest rates on financial stability could reverse as 
these financial intermediaries adjust their balance sheets and behaviour in line 
with expectations of higher interest rates. 
 
The IMF (2013d: p11) also  identifies the following channels via which monetary 
policy can affect financial stability, namely, risk-taking practices of financial 
institutions; borrowing constraints and the probability of default; asset-price and 
exchange-rate externalities and, the stage of the financial cycle. 
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Risk-taking practices 
 
In a world of financial market imperfections and asymmetric information, individual 
institutional behaviour becomes distorted and gets out of control when agents take 
excessive risks to achieve higher returns. This is particularly evident during 
prolonged periods of low interest rates and economic booms where incentives are 
created for banks to overleverage and not screen borrowers in an appropriate 
manner. Moreover, if monetary policy is expected to remain accommodative 
during periods of economic contraction, this could give rise to additional incentives 
for banks to take on more risk, which would be a threat to financial stability as 
asset price bubbles and imbalances build up (Osinski et al., 2013).  
 
Borrowing constraints and the probability of default 
 
A loosening of monetary policy is characterised by falling interest rates, which 
result in lower external financing costs and thus encourage credit demand and 
aggregate spending. However, the opposite is also true. In the event of monetary 
policy tightening, that is, rising interest rates, the debt-servicing costs increase, 
thereby having a negative effect on a borrower‟s ability to repay a loan, and 
possibly leading to higher levels of debt default and financial instability (Drehmann 
and Juselius, 2012). 
 
Asset-price and exchange-rate effects   
 
Monetary policy has an influence on asset prices and ultimately exchange rates 
via the value of collateral which influences borrowing by consumers. As 
discussed, long periods of low interest rates and the resultant monetary expansion 
can result in inflated asset prices, which expand the value of collateral and thus 
encourage banks to provide even more credit, thereby leading to even further 
asset price increases.  
 
Conversely, the fall in asset prices due to higher interest rates lowers the value of 
collateral. This, in turn, discourages local borrowing and encourages borrowing 
from abroad in foreign currency, which leads to capital inflows and results in 
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appreciating exchange rates. Foreign currency denominated debt thus 
accumulates. In the event of a disorderly unwinding of these debt positions, the 
exchange rate could fall precipitously thereby destabilising the financial system. 
 
Stage of the financial cycle 
 
Traditionally speaking, the main variable used to characterise a business cycle is 
output, while the financial cycle is determined by variables such as credit, property 
prices and equity prices (Claessens et al. 2011).  Financial cycles play a critical 
role in determining the use of countercyclical macroprudential policy. This is 
largely due to the fact that financial cycles are self-reinforcing feedback loops 
within the financial system and between the financial system and real economy 
(Borio, 2014b). 
 
Financial cycles also play an important role in influencing the duration and 
strength of economic downturns (or recessions) and economic upswings (or 
recovery).  Economic recessions caused by the bursting of credit and house price 
bubbles are typically longer and more pronounced than economic recoveries 
which are modestly shorter in duration and stronger. However, this does not take 
into account domestic drivers of business cycles (for example financial flows and 
the trade account) and external factors (such as the global economic outlook and 
changes in commodity prices) (Claessens et al. 2011).  
 
Borio et al. (2001) also suggests that the financial cycle is a good function of credit 
volumes and property prices and it appears to be much longer in duration than the 
business cycle (by about 15 years) and is also more pronounced. The stage of a 
financial cycle is a critical determinant of when to consider deploying monetary 
policy or financial stability measures against a backdrop of economic downturns or 
upturns. 
 
During an upswing of a financial cycle, microprudential indicators would appear to 
indicate strong levels of credit growth and healthy balance sheets so authorities 
would analyse banks‟ credit standards and loan provisioning. Macroprudential 
authorities, on the other hand, would be monitoring the build-up of systemic risk 
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and would undertake measures to deploy MPIs such as the CCB, LTVs or other 
tools that affect credit growth. Borio & Drehmann (2009) refer to this type of 
scenario as the “paradox of financial instability”, that is, the financial system 
appears to be at its strongest when it can be at its most vulnerable. Likewise, 
during an economic downturn, microprudential authorities aim to ensure the 
stability of the financial system as a whole, while the concern of microprudential 
authorities is to ensure the stability of individual financial institutions. 
 
 An important consideration is whether the objective of macroprudential policy 
should be to enhance the resilience of the financial system or whether it should 
aim to tame the financial cycle by constraining lending booms. Borio (2014b) 
argues that MPIs do succeed in building resilience in the financial system by 
increasing capital buffers in boom times to withstand shocks in bust times. 
However, it is more challenging to tame the financial cycle. Although capital 
buffers do succeed somewhat in limiting excessive credit and asset price growth, 
some MPIs are not as effective as others. For example, DTI ratios and LTV ratios 
possibly achieve more success than increasing loan provisions or capital 
requirements. 
 
Constâncio (2014) also suggests that macroprudential policy should aim to temper 
the financial cycle through mitigating systemic risk, rather than just promoting 
financial system resilience. However, he argues that whilst this is possible through 
MPIs, it also comes with challenges as it is not just about building buffers but also 
about assessing exogenous and endogenous risks to financial stability.  
 
Exogenous financial stability risks are external shocks that include a deterioration 
in market sentiment, oil price shocks, changes in the country‟s terms of trade, 
geopolitical risk, a sovereign credit rating downgrade to a country‟s peer, or the 
failure of a large systemically important bank (Schinasi, 2005). Endogneous risks 
include accomodative monetary policy (low interest rates) that fuel a credit or 
asset price boom, resulting in excessive leverage and eventual banking crises. 
 
A comparison of South Africa‟s business and financial cycle is depicted in Figure 
4.4.  
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Figure 4.4 South Africa’s business and financial cycle 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank, Financial Stability Review, September 2015. 
 
South Africa‟s financial cycle is estimated by using financial variables such as total 
credit, residential house prices and equity prices. According to the SARB (2015b), 
South Africa‟s financial cycle has a lower frequency than the business cycle. The  
peaks of the financial cycle are highly correlated with episodes of financial stress, 
such as the early 1980s (ahead of the collapse of the gold price), the strong 
depreciation of the rand (ahead of the debt crisis in 1985) and the build-up to the 
2007-2009 global financial crisis.  
 
4.5.2 Should monetary policy have financial stability objectives? 
  
Policymakers and academics are constantly debating the degree to which 
monetary policy should take into account financial stability objectives. The RBNZ 
(2014:21-22) argues that there are two opposing views (“clean” and “lean”) on 
whether it is appropriate to tighten monetary policy to enhance financial stability 
during periods of credit or asset price booms.  
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The “clean” view proposes that monetary policy should respond to asset price and 
credit booms only to the extent that they impact on expected inflation outcomes. 
Bernanke & Gertler (1999) also argue in favour of this view, advocating that the 
effects of asset price fluctuations on price inflation are too asymmetrical for 
monetary policy to lean against them. In this sense, macroprudential instruments, 
rather than monetary policy instruments, should be deployed to minimise losses in 
the financial system and prevent financial instability by providing early warning 
signals on future crises. Using the interest rate as a tool to prick asset price 
bubbles and reduce aggregate demand could create further problems, particularly 
if central banks find themselves being trapped in providing more liquidity than is 
needed for long-run price stability. This is specifically relevant in instances of high 
debt levels after a financial crisis is not resolved (Smets, 2014). 
 
The “lean” view proposes that monetary policy should lean against credit booms 
for financial stability purposes, even if its main objective remains longer term price 
stability. In other words, central banks should be incentivised to lean against the 
building up of asset bubbles ex ante. Higher interest rates can be somewhat 
effective in limiting an asset price or credit boom without imposing additional costs 
on the wider economy. In this view, macroprudential instruments, on their own, are 
not sufficient to mitigate the build-up of systemic risk. The “lean” view is shared by 
Cecchetti et al. (2000) who argue that allowing the policy instrument to respond to 
asset prices will most likely reduce the probability of disorderly asset price 
movements and economic risks. It has also been contended by Borio and Lowe 
(2002) that monetary policy can respond to financial imbalances via the channel of 
higher interest rates as they build up.  
 
4.5.3 Institutional design in general 
 
Given the growing importance of macroprudential policy and financial stability on a 
world-wide level, central banks are facing challenges on institutional design in the 
context of additional financial stability mandates and how best to manage trade-
offs between price stability and financial stability. 
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Some of the challenges that arise out of the interaction between monetary policy 
and financial stability may limit the optimal use of macroprudential instruments, 
which suggests the importance of a high level of co-operation and co-ordination 
between monetary and macroprudential authorities. When the functions of both 
monetary policy and financial stability are performed in one central bank, for 
example the SARB, there might be improved co-ordination of these policy 
objectives. However, safety measures would still need to be activated to mitigate 
the risks of having dual mandates (IMF, 2013d). Some of these safety measures 
include separate decision-making structures for monetary policy and financial 
stability policies as well as separate accountability and communications 
structures.  
 
When the functions of monetary policy and financial stability are housed in 
different institutions, this gives rise to a different set of challenges, particularly 
where the functions are split between a central bank and the Treasury. For 
example, in Chile, the Treasury has the responsibility of chairing the Financial 
Stability Committee while the Central Bank of Chile has an observer status on the 
same committee (Jacome et al., 2012). Under these circumstances, conflict 
between both sets of policy objectives could arise with regard to the issue of 
central bank independence as the central bank might be constrained to participate 
in the committee or have limited formal powers to apply macroprudential tools. 
Furthermore, when the central bank implements measures for its price stability 
mandate (monetary policy), it might be difficult to propose macroprudential tools, 
given its single mandate of price stability, therefore resulting in challenging co-
ordination between the institutions concerned and ineffective management of 
macroprudential policy. 
 
The next section describes the institutional design of the SARB in consideration of 
its dual mandates of price stability and financial stability. 
 
4.5.4 Institutional design in South Africa: financial stability mandate 
 
On 27 October 2010, in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, the 
South African Ministry of Finance announced that the SARB was given an 
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expanded mandate to take on the responsibility for financial stability, in addition to 
its current mandate of price stability. South Africa made a commitment to 
implement a set of regulatory reforms to make the financial sector safer and 
better. This was outlined in a document entitled “Implementing a Twin Peaks 
Model of Financial Regulation in South Africa” (National Treasury, 2013). The 
Twin-Peaks model reforms were proposed by the Financial Regulatory Reform 
Steering Committee (FRRSC), whose main objective was to strengthen the 
regulatory framework in South Africa. In this regard, the SARB was given the new 
responsibility of a “systemic regulator”, with its role being the development of a 
macroprudential policy framework.  
 
The Ministry of Finance and the SARB created a joint task team, which included 
members of the SARB, National Treasury (NT) and the Financial Services Board 
(FSB) to implement an explicit financial stability mandate within an appropriate 
macroprudential framework in the SARB, as provided by the Financial Sector 
Regulation Bill, 2015 (FSR Bill). Additionally, the FSR Bill provides for the 
establishment of a Financial Stability Oversight Committee (FSOC), chaired by the 
Governor of the SARB with membership from the SARB, NT and financial 
regulators. The primary role of FSOC is to facilitate cooperation and co-ordination 
of action in respect of matters relating to financial stability. 
 
It is envisaged that the SARB‟s new role as “systemic regulator” will include both 
the oversight and maintenance of stability functions. The macroprudential 
framework would encompass identifying and mitigating systemic risk in the 
financial system through the monitoring and analysis of financial and economic 
variables that could affect financial stability.  
 
In recent years, other key global central banks such as those of the Netherlands, 
UK and Australia have successfully implemented the “Twin Peaks” model of 
financial regulation, while South Africa is close to finalising its macroprudential 
policy framework. 
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4.6 CONCLUSION 
 
The 2007-2009 global financial crisis and previous crises have proven that price 
stability does not guarantee financial stability and that MPIs need to be developed 
to target specific sources of financial imbalances to mitigate systemic risk in the 
financial system. 
 
It is of critical importance that policymakers understand how to choose and apply 
MPIs in different countries, given different policy objectives as well as structural 
characteristics of its financial system and wider economy. Although certain MPIs 
have been deployed in emerging markets and advanced economies alike, 
policymakers are still challenged by how MPIs can be properly applied to reduce 
procyclicality. It is essential that the pros and cons of each MPI are properly 
assessed before being applied, as there also exists the interplay between 
macroprudential policy and monetary policy that affects the implementation and 
effectiveness of MPIs.  
 
Because we live in an imperfect world with limited knowledge, macroprudential 
policies do not always reach their objectives and can fall short of not fully 
offsetting financial shocks or distortions. Similarly, when monetary policy has 
limited effectiveness, there will be higher demands placed on macroprudential 
policies to achieve objectives. The interaction between monetary policy and 
financial stability has important implications for institutional design so it is 
important that appropriate institutional frameworks and safeguard measures are 
put in place to enhance the credibility and transparency of both policy objectives, 
particularly when a central bank has dual mandates of price and financial stability. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CALCULATING THE COUNTERCYCLICAL CAPITAL BUFFER ADD-ON FOR 
BANKS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
5.1      INTRODUCTION 
 
The 2007-2009 global financial crisis led to policy makers around the globe 
stepping up on efforts to introduce policy tools and frameworks to manage 
economic fluctuations and address procyclicality in the financial system. As 
discussed in earlier chapters, one of the main causes of the crisis was the build-up 
of excessive credit growth which eventually had negative implications for GDP 
growth and the stability of financial systems globally. The Basel II regulatory 
framework had somewhat succeeded in improving the resilience of the global 
banking sector but was nonetheless unsuccessful in preventing the full-blown 
2007-2009 global financial crisis (Burra et al., 2014).  
 
Following the crisis, Basel III regulation introduced (i) the capital conservation 
buffer and (ii) the countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) to address such 
inefficiencies in the financial system. The objective of the capital conservation 
buffer, as a microprudential tool, is to provide an extra cushion in addition to 
minimum capital requirements to protect banks against excessive fluctuations in 
the fortunes of the financial system by applying restrictions on earnings 
distribution until the buffer is re-established at the required level. The objective of 
the CCB as a macroprudential tool is to encourage banks to build up capital 
buffers in good economic times that can be drawn upon in times of stressful 
economic conditions.   
 
According to the BCBS (2010c), the credit-to-GDP gap (credit gap) should be 
used as an indicator to monitor credit growth to detect the build-up of systemic 
risk, and enable national regulators to use their discretion on whether or not to 
apply the CCB. The credit gap can also be a useful indicator to support decisions 
on the timing of introduction of the CCB or the release of the buffer. 
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The focus of this chapter is to provide an overview of the BCBS‟s CCB guidelines 
and application thereof to South African conditions. The capital conservation 
buffer will not be discussed because it is largely a microprudential capital 
requirement, although to some extent, it can also have macroprudential effects. 
This chapter will also look at additional indicators for consideration in preparation 
for the implementation of the CCB add-on for South Africa.  
 
5.2 BCBS GUIDELINES TO OPERATE THE COUNTERCYCLICAL CAPITAL 
BUFFER  
 
The global financial crisis highlighted the dangers of systemic risk and 
procyclicality in the financial system after excessive credit extension by banks led 
to instability in the global banking sector and an economic downturn. As a result, 
Basel III reforms were introduced by the BCBS in 2009 to strengthen regulation of 
the banking sector and its risk management practices with a view to improving the 
banking sector's resilience to external shocks arising from distressed financial and 
economic conditions (BCBS, 2010a). One of the measures adopted by Basel III 
regulation to prevent procyclicality in the banking sector is the CCB which was 
designed to contribute towards capital adequacy during a crisis by requiring banks 
to hold adequate levels of capital to withstand economic and financial shocks. The 
Basel Committee expects national regulators to employ the CCB on an infrequent 
basis, with a likelihood of once every 10 to 20 years. 
 
The Basel III framework requires that banks hold a buffer that ranges between 
zero and 2,5 per cent to total risk-weighted assets. In addition, the national 
authority is allowed to impose a buffer in excess of 2,5 per cent (in line with 
national policy) for domestically domiciled banks. The SARB (2011) indicated that 
the planned date for the implementation of the CCB in South Africa was 1 January 
2016. In accordance with Basel III requirements, the maximum CCB requirement 
will start at 0,625 per cent of risk-weighted assets on 1 January 2016 and increase 
each subsequent year by an additional 0,625 percentage points, to reach its final 
maximum of 2,5 per cent of risk-weighted assets on 1 January 2019. Countries 
that experience excessive credit growth during this period are required to consider 
more rapidly building up the relevant percentage.  
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The BCBS (2010b: p2-5) proposed five general principles to be followed when 
making decisions on the CCB: 
 
Objectives: Any decision on the CCB should be guided by the objectives of the 
intended buffer, that is, to guard against potential bank losses by monitoring credit 
growth and limiting systemic risk. It is important to note that the buffer is not 
intended to manage economic cycles or asset prices, although there is bound to 
be some smoothing effect.  
 
Common reference guide:  The credit gap plays a central role and should be used 
as a reference point by the national authority when it takes decisions on the buffer 
but not in a mechanical way. The national authority should be able to explain the 
rationale of decisions made.  
 
 Risk of misleading signals: When using the credit gap guideline, the national 
authority should be mindful of the factors that could cause that guideline to provide 
misleading signals. In order to counteract this problem, the national authority 
should also identify supplementary early warning signals in order to determine 
whether they are consistent with the credit-to-GDP guide. Such early warning 
signals can be classified under macroeconomic variables, banking sector variables 
and cost of funding variables (to be discussed in section 5.5). It is important that a 
national authority use sound analysis and judgment to determine whether the 
behaviour of the credit gap is reflective of the build-up of systemic risks or whether 
is it as a result of a cyclical slowdown or contraction in GDP. 
 
Prompt release of the CCB: By promptly releasing the buffer in times of high stress 
in the financial system, the national authority can assist by reducing the risk of the 
supply of credit being constrained by regulatory capital requirements. When credit 
growth spontaneously moderates and systemic risks dissipate without leading to 
any banking stress, the national authority can gradually release the CCB. The 
guidelines also stipulate that, while increases in the CCB should be pre-
announced by up to 12 months to allow banks sufficient time to meet these extra 
capital requirements, a decision to decrease the level of the buffer should take 
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effect immediately. The timing of the release of the CCB is therefore critical and a 
key determinant of the buffer‟s success.  
 
Other macroprudential tools: The CCB is an important instrument in the 
macroprudential toolkit at the disposal of the national authority. When the national 
authority identifies an undue build-up of credit growth and hence of systemic risk in 
the financial system, the CCB should be applied, possibly in conjunction with other 
macroprudential tools as discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
In addition to the above-mentioned CCB guidelines, the BCBS (2010b, pp.13-14) 
also proposed a three-step approach for banks to calculate the CCB.  
 
Step 1 Calculate the aggregate private sector credit-to-GDP ratio.  
Step 2 Calculate the credit gap, that is, the gap between the ratio and its 
trend. 
Step 3 Transform the credit gap into the guide CCB add-on. 
  
The credit gap, which is dependent on deviations in the credit-to-GDP ratio from 
its long-term trend, is the main reference point and key determinant for the 
implementation of the CCB add-on. The BCBS (2010a) notes that the definition of 
credit includes all types of credit extended to households and other non-financial 
private entities by domestic and international banks, non-bank financial institutions 
(domestic or foreign), all debt securities issued domestically or internationally to 
fund households and other non-financial private entities, including securitisations.  
 
Typically, this would also include securities held by banks and other financial 
institutions as well as residents and non-residents.  Borio (2014a) also notes that 
credit refers to all types of lending by both banks and non-banks as well as asset 
purchases by banks and non-banks. 
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5.3 CALCULATING THE COUNTERCYLICAL CAPITAL BUFFER ADD-ON 
FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
Since historically most financial crises were precipitated by excessive credit 
growth, the credit gap qualifies as an early warning indicator of financial distress, 
which is why the BCBS (2010c) and the IMF (2014a) propose using it as the main 
point of reference for the CCB. The methodological approach to calculate the 
credit-to-GDP ratio and credit gap is described below. The CCB levels will be 
calculated and correlations will be done with the corresponding GDP growth rates.  
 
5.3.1 Methodology and data description for the calculation of the CCB add-on for 
South African banks 
 
The BCBS guidance proposes the use of a one-sided Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter 
to establish the trend in the time series of the credit-to-GDP ratio. A comparison of 
the actual credit-to-GDP ratio with its long-term trend obtained using the HP filter 
enables a jurisdiction to determine whether or not credit growth is excessive.  
 
In the generic form, the HP filter estimates the trend by using the following 
equation: 
 
   
 
 
 ∑   
 
   
𝓨t – μt)
2   + 
 
 
∑   
     
   
μt + 1 - μt) – (μt – μt – 1 )]
2 
 
Source: BCBS (2010b) 
 
For the purposes of the CCB, the one-sided HP filter with a high smoothing 
parameter, is used to calculate the trend (Trend(t) or µt in the above equation) and 
only data available at each point in time is used for the calculation.  
 
According to Hodrick and Prescott (1997), the HP filter decomposes a time series 
yt (t = 1, 2, 3, ….T) into a trend component (µt) and a cyclical component (yt − µt). 
On the right-hand side of the above equation, the first term records the average of 
the squared deviations from trend (the cyclical component), while the second term 
registers the average of the squared variations in the growth rate in trend. The 
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trend variable (µt) is then chosen in such a way that the sum (L) of these two 
terms is minimised. The smoothing parameter λ (which is set to λ= 400 000) 
determines how smooth the trend will be by penalising variation in its growth rate 
(BCBS (2010b).  
 
The HP filter has the benefit of allocating higher weights to the latest observations, 
which is a good indicator of increased systemic risk at the current point in time. 
This feature of the HP filter also deals more effectively with structural breaks 
(Farrell, 2013). According to Drehmann et al. (2010), the trend calculated using λ 
at 400 000 is a reasonably good measure of determining the long-term trend in 
credit extension to the private sector. 
 
As discussed earlier, the gap between the private sector credit-to-GDP ratio and 
its long term trend is calculated according to the BCBS 3-step guideline.  
 
5.3.2 Application of the BCBS three-step guideline for South Africa  
 
 
Step 1 : Calculation of the credit-to-GDP ratio 
 
 
The credit-to-GDP ratio is calculated by dividing credit figures by GDP figures and 
expressing the ratio as a percentage:  R(t) = credit(t)/GDP(t) x 100 per cent, 
where R(t) is the credit-to-GDP ratio in period t, credit(t) is a broad measure of 
credit to the private non-financial sector in period t, while GDP(t) represents the 
Gross Domestic Product over period t. Both GDP(t) and credit(t) are in nominal 
terms and on a quarterly frequency (BCBS, 2010b).  
 
For the application of the BCBS guidance to South Africa, data is used from the 
SARB‟s Quarterly Bulletin from 1Q1994 - 2Q2015 for “Quarterly expenditure on 
GDP at current prices” (seasonally adjusted and annualised, series code 
KBP6006L). Monthly data for “total credit extended to the private sector” is used to 
generate the corresponding quarterly values (KBP1347M). In this study, there are 
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85 data points over the period 1Q1994 to 2Q201513. From this data, the credit-to-
GDP ratio was calculated (see Figure 5.1). 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Credit-to-GDP ratio of South Africa  
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank and author‟s calculations 
 
 
Step 2: Calculation of the credit gap 
 
The credit gap is calculated as the difference between the credit-to-GDP ratio and 
its long-term trend. The trend is calculated by means of a one-sided HP filter using 
a recommended smoothing parameter (λ) of 400 000.  
 
According to the IMF (2014), the use of the HP filter is justified as financial cycles 
tend to be longer than business cycles. If there is a large positive gap, that is, the 
credit-to-GDP ratio is significantly above its trend, this indicates that the credit 
level in the economy might have exceeded the economy's growth rate.  Using the 
                                                 
13
 Data for the calculation of South Africa‟s credit-to-GDP ratio and credit gap can be accessed 
online at http://www.resbank.co.za/Research/Statistics/Pages/OnlineDownloadFacility.aspx 
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recommended smoothing parameter of 400 000 for the HP filter, the credit gap for 
South Africa since 1965 is illustrated in Figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.2 Credit gap for South Africa 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank and author‟s calculations 
 
From the above analysis, it is evident that the credit gap has been positive for 
several sustained periods since 1994, and exceeded the long term trend (that is, 
zero) for the periods 1990-1992, 1998–2000 and 2006-2010 (SARB, 2011 and 
Burra et al (2014). The gap started from -2,54 per cent in 1994, increased to 4,5 
per cent in 1998, before declining to -7,95 per cent in 2002 and peaking at a high 
of 11,33 per cent in 2008.  
 
The gap appeared to have delivered a strong warning signal for the CCB add-on 
from 2006-2010, which one might interpret as excessive credit growth or the build-
up of a housing bubble ahead of the 2008 financial crisis (Burra et al. 2014 and 
van Vuuren, 2012). During this period, loans and advances increased significantly 
while non-performing loans decreased. Figure 5.2 seems to suggest that there 
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was a housing bubble in South Africa at about the same time as that of the United 
States. Since the end of 2009, however, there has been a persistent declining 
trend in the credit gap, with the gap remaining negative and well below its long-
term trend.  
 
If one does apply the credit gap to different loan categories, the results are quite 
interesting (see Figure 5.3). Individual loan categories indicate different growth 
rates relative to their long-term trends. Two loan categories, namely “leasing 
finance” and “instalment sale credit” fluctuate little around their long-term trend, 
thereby implying levels of credit growth roughly corresponding with GDP growth. 
The credit gap for “mortgage advances” was not only well below its long-term 
trend, but also declined further during the past few years, indicating levels of credit 
growth below GDP growth.  
 
Figure 5.3 Selected private-sector credit gaps according to credit   
categories 
 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank and author‟s calculations 
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However, the credit gap for “other loans and advances” indicates that credit 
growth relative to GDP has remained above its long-term trend since the end of 
2012. The “other loans and advances” category is the biggest loan category of the 
SARB and is made up of 41 per cent of total credit, followed by “mortgage 
advances (40 per cent), “instalment sale credit” (12,0 per cent) and the remaining 
credit categories, including “leasing finance” (7,0 per cent) (SARB, 2015b).  
 
“Other loans and advances” is made up of general loans, bank overdrafts and 
credit card advances. Since 2014, this loan category has been the main driver of 
credit growth, largely owing to sharp increases in general loans extended to the 
corporate sector as well as a strong uptake of overdraft facilities possibly due to 
the large increases in civil servant employment causing many more people to 
qualify for bank overdrafts and other loans (SARB, 2015c). 
 
 Step 3: Calibration of the CCB add-on 
 
The last step in the process is to transform the credit gap into the CCB add-on 
(B(t)) by calibrating B(t) in accordance with banking conditions in South Africa, 
where, Bt  ∈ [B
L  = 0, BH  = 2.5], and BL and BH  are the minimum and 
maximum values for the add-on associated with the lower (L) and higher (H) 
threshold levels for the credit gap. 
 
The lower and higher thresholds L and H are important to determine the timing 
and the speed of the adjustment of the guide buffer add-on to underlying 
conditions. According to the BCBS (2010a), an adjustment factor based on L=2 
and H=10 provides a reasonable specification based on historical banking crises. 
However, this also depends on the choice of the smoothing parameter (λ), the 
length of the period over which the relevant credit and GDP data are recorded, 
and the exact setting of L and H. 
 
Setting L=2 means that when ((Credit(t)/GDP(t)) x 100% ) – (Trend(t)) <2%, the 
buffer add-on is zero. Setting H=10 means that when ((Credit(t)/GDP(t)) x 100% ) 
– (Trend(t)) >10%, the buffer add-on is at its maximum. 
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As per the BCBS guideline, the maximum buffer add-on (VBmax) is 2,5 per cent of 
risk-weighted assets. In light of the CCB calibration, when the credit-to-GDP ratio 
is 2 percentage points or less above its long term trend, the buffer add-on (VBt) 
will be 0 per cent. When the credit-to-GDP ratio exceeds its long term trend by 10 
percentage points or more, the buffer add-on will be 2,5 per cent of risk weighted 
assets. When the credit-to-GDP ratio is between 2 and 10 percentage points of its 
trend, the buffer add-on will vary linearly between 0 per cent and 2,5 per cent. This 
will imply, for example, a buffer of 1,25 per cent when the credit gap is 6 (half way 
between 2 and 10). 
 
Repullo and Saurina (2011) point out that it is important for the national authority 
to exercise caution when choosing thresholds, as the levels of L and H are only a 
recommendation from the BCBS. In this regard, L should be low enough to ensure 
that the CCB kicks in early enough to give banks sufficient time to build up capital 
ahead of a possible banking crisis. The BCBS guidelines prescribe that banks are 
allowed up to one year to raise additional capital, which means that the indicator 
should signal a crisis at least 2–3 years in advance. During normal times, L should 
be high enough so that no additional capital is required when there is no realistic 
threat of an impending crisis. H suggests the point at which no additional capital is 
needed, even if the gap were to continue increasing. That point should be high 
enough so that the buffer is sufficient to deal with a possible severe banking crisis 
but low enough so that no unnecessary burden to increase capital is imposed on 
the banks.  
 
When applied to South African banks, for the corresponding period (1Q1994 to 
2Q2015, 85 observations), the credit gaps were below L = 2 for 62 observations 
(73,0 per cent of the sample) and exceeded H = 10 for 7 observations (8.2 per 
cent of the sample). For the BCBS calibration (L = 2, H = 10), the guidance would 
be for a CCB add-on buffer to be implemented at about 27 per cent of the time 
since 1994 (and at the maximum level of 2,5 per cent for about 8.0 per cent of the 
time).  
 
At present (2Q2015), when applying the CCB calibration (L=2, H=10) to South 
Africa, it is evident that the credit gap remains well below the lower threshold of 
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the CCB add-on for South African banks. Therefore, there does not appear to be a 
need to consider a CCB add-on for domestic banks at present (SARB, 2015b). 
Furthermore, the SARB has not yet made a decision on applying the CCB add-on 
on individual loan categories, which is also not a requirement of the Basel III 
regulation at this stage. 
 
The timing of the CCB release is instrumental in determining the ultimate success 
of the CCB in providing banks with a cushion to absorb capital losses when their 
loan books become exposed to economic downturns (Burra et al., 2014). 
According to the SARB (2011), one of the most efficient ways of deciding on the 
timing of the release of the CCB add-on is to assess the performance of loan 
growth and non-performing loan growth.  An investigation into loan growth and 
non-performing loan growth in the South African banking sector indicated that 
between 2003 and 2006 (credit boom) loan growth increased substantially while 
non-performing loans declined. 
 
Figure 5.4 Loan growth and non-performing loans in South Africa 
 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank 
Source: South African Reserve Bank, Financial Stability Review, September 2015 
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After the onset of the crisis, when there was a global economic crisis, loan growth 
in South Africa declined while there was a sharp increase in non-performing loans, 
peaking at about 6,5 per cent of gross loans and advances in 2010. The SARB 
(2011) argued that loan growth and non-performing loan growth, in conjunction 
with supervisory discretion, could serve as useful indicators to decide on when to 
activate the CCB add-on, thereby playing a critical role in mitigating systemic risk 
in the banking sector.  
 
Overall, the credit gap is generally viewed as a good indicator to identify excessive 
credit growth and forthcoming financial crises. However, there have been 
concerns raised about its reliability under certain circumstances. The following 
section discusses some of the key criticisms of the credit gap as an indicator of 
future financial crises. 
 
5.4 CRITICISMS OF THE CREDIT GAP AS A PREDICTOR OF FUTURE 
FINANCIAL CRISES 
 
One of the guidelines stipulated by the BCBS is that jurisdictions need to make a 
proper distinction between weak and strong signals from the credit gap when 
making decisions about the CCB add-on (Burra et al., 2014). In this regard, the 
SARB recognised three international financial crises that led to periods of financial 
distress but not fully-blown financial crises in South Africa (SARB, 2011). These 
periods of financial distress included the (i) 1985-1987 debt-standstill and flight of 
capital crisis; (ii) 1997-1999 South-East Asian crisis; and (iii) 2007-2009 global 
financial crisis. 
 
The distinction between weak and strong signals for the credit gap could, for 
example, be applied to the 1997-1999 South-East Asian crisis where credit 
appeared to be lagging the business cycle with the result that South Africa‟s credit-
to-GDP ratio became negatively correlated with the GDP (Repullo & Saurina, 2011). 
In this instance, because the credit-to-GDP ratio rose due to declines in GDP 
growth rather than to increases in credit growth, the credit-to-GDP ratio became 
negatively correlated with GDP growth. The problem was exacerbated for the credit 
gap (that is, the deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio from its long-term trend), 
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because it took time for the trend line to rise due to GDP contractions and hence 
time for the gap to cross the trend line. 
 
From a South African perspective, Van Vuuren (2012) pointed out that there was 
evidence to show that South Africa‟s variables of credit growth and GDP lagged 
each other, thus rendering the credit gap unreliable as there could have been 
instances where excessive credit growth or overheating in the economy remained 
undetected.  
 
Interestingly, the BCBS (2010c) acknowledges that the credit gap might not be a 
reliable indicator of financial market distress during economic downturns and they 
propose that jurisdictions use their judgment when deciding on when to apply the 
buffer. 
 
An alternative to using the credit gap as a common reference point for deciding on 
the CCB add-on is to use deviations of credit growth with respect to its long-run 
average. Repullo and Saurina (2011) argued that deviations in credit growth from its 
long-run average would eliminate a lag effect as there is no direct consideration of 
GDP and hence no possibility of credit growth leading or lagging GDP growth. 
 
In order to act as a “common reference point” for building up capital buffers during 
financial booms and releasing capital buffers during financial busts, financial 
indicators should ideally be positively correlated with the financial cycle. In the case 
of South Africa, the SARB (2011) notes that most indicators are indeed positively 
correlated with GDP, with the exception of the credit gap which has a negative 
correlation with GDP. Given that the credit gap should be used as a reference point 
or leading indicator for the CCB add-on, the negative correlation with GDP raises 
concerns as it implies that capital buffers should be reduced when GDP growth is 
high and increased when GDP growth is low. This has implications for the timing of 
the release or withdrawal of the CCB add-on. In this regard, it is important that the 
SARB exercises a degree of caution and not use a mechanical approach when 
applying the CCB. 
The World Bank (2010) adds that the credit gap is not always a reliable indicator, 
largely owing to measurement problems relating to the calculation of the long-term 
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trend of the ratio, which has implications for policymakers who make decisions 
based on a trend on data end points (that is, most recent observations). 
Drehmann et al. (2011) and Ghosh (2015) point out that it is widely known that the 
HP filter has an end data point problem which makes it sensitive to data revisions. 
This means that the estimated trend at the end data point can undergo drastic 
changes as future data points come on stream. If the trend is revised once future 
data becomes available, it also affects the deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio 
from the trend, which raises questions about the reliability of the credit gap as a 
EWI for the CCB add-on (Farrell, 2013 and Edge & Meisenzahl, 2011). 
 
Geršl and Seidler (2012) point out that a similar type of challenge resides at the 
start of a time series that is used to calculate the credit gap or when there are 
structural breaks, particularly for short data series, typically found in emerging 
markets. In this regard, the BCBS (2010b) recommends that the credit gap can 
only be used as a reliable indicator for CCB decisions when at least ten years of 
data for the credit-to-GDP ratio are available. In their studies, they concluded that 
shorter time series data tends to produce large differences between credit gaps, 
thereby resulting in the trend being excessively high or excessively low for 
prolonged periods of time.  
 
Drehmann and Tsatsaronis (2014) also conducted simulations to determine 
whether the above-mentioned criticisms were valid. They used an estimated time 
series model to create 100 artificial series of credit-to-GDP ratios. Their findings 
indicated that measurement challenges relating to data start-and-end points were 
not severe and that even when there were differences in the gaps, the differences 
in the resulting CCB levels were small. Their results also showed that the credit 
gap is a reliable indicator if applied to at least ten years of data.  
 
However, their study did conclude that caution needed to be exercised in 
particular instances. For example, there were large differences in credit gaps 
calculated on shorter and longer samples, particularly where the shorter sample 
began close to the peak or the trough of the financial cycle. This implied that the 
trend remained excessively high or excessively low for prolonged periods of time. 
In this regard, they proposed that jurisdictions consider dropping some initial data 
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points. Farrell (2013), on the other hand, argued that the source of unreliability 
derived from updated data points could be resolved by jurisdictions applying more 
frequent revisions to GDP and other key indicators.  
  
Van Norden (2011) also did a similar study, concluding that holistically, the credit 
gap did possess reliable signalling ability.  His argument was based on the fact 
that a jurisdiction would not be able to apply a two-sided filter which required 
forecasting future values of the credit-to-GDP ratio and credit gap. Therefore, the 
credit gap derived from a one-sided HP filter would be a more reliable indicator of 
excessive credit growth in the financial system than a two-sided filter. This study 
indeed heeded this call and used the one-sided filter. 
 
Another criticism of the credit gap is that it could hamper the development of 
financial systems, particularly in emerging markets. The Reserve Bank of India 
(2013) believes that emerging markets that are in a growing phase can experience 
high levels and longer periods of credit growth as the middle-class population 
evolves. However, if the CCB add-on is applied at these levels of credit growth, 
credit growth can be impeded, thereby limiting financial deepening in these 
countries and making emerging markets less competitive with their advanced 
economy counterparts.  
 
Given the above-mentioned concerns and criticisms on the credit gap as a reliable 
indicator of financial crises, it important that jurisdictions exercise caution by 
investigating whether credit levels are sustainable or whether they are a risk to 
financial stability. This can be achieved by implementing a range of additional 
indicators to identify vulnerabilities in the financial system instead of just using a 
mechanical, rules-based approach to making decisions on the CCB buffer. The 
next section identifies additional variables that can be used as EWIs. 
 
5.5 ADDITIONAL EARLY WARNING INDICATORS 
 
Berg and Pattillo (2000) argue that different asset classes might give conflicting 
signals as they are affected by different risks. It is important that jurisdictions 
exercise judgment and treat the results of EWIs with caution and objectivity. EWIs 
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should consist of indicators that represent fundamentals and vulnerabilities which 
should complement each other. For example, a country with weak economic 
fundamentals but healthy liquidity conditions would not be able to sustain its 
favourable position for a long time. However, a country with strong economic 
fundamentals and weak liquidity conditions might be in a position to deal better 
with external shocks than the former country.  
 
Indicators should also include measures of financial market sentiment, as the 
financial and real sectors of the economy are interconnected. In addition, most 
economies are interconnected and developments in one country could have 
negative spillover effects into other countries. Drehmann and Juselius (2013) and 
Drehmann and Tsatsaronis (2014) add that timing is a critical component for 
EWIs, which should be sounding alarm bells at least one and a half years but no 
more than five years ahead of a crisis. 
 
Borio and Drehmann (2009a), Alessi and Detken (2011) identified a number of 
macroeconomic variables, banking sector activity variables and funding variables 
that can be used as EWIs to assess systemic risk and provide “a common 
reference point” for the set-up of the CCB. The next section surveys further 
possible reference points.  
 
5.5.1 Macroeconomic variables 
 
a) Real GDP growth 
 
This is an important indicator to assess whether credit growth during boom 
periods is excessively high or not. It should thereby be noted that it is credit 
growth in excess of GDP growth which is potentially dangerous as it suggests that 
credit is increasingly used to finance asset price increases rather than real 
economic growth. 
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b) Aggregate real credit growth 
 
This variable provides a reliable measure of credit extension across different 
categories during boom and bust periods. Useful information can be provided on 
deviations of credit growth from its long-term trend or average. Bas et al. (2012) 
state that while it is difficult to differentiate between favourable and unfavourable 
credit booms, unfavourable credit booms are usually larger and last longer. 
 
c) Asset price growth 
 
Similar to the credit-to-GDP ratio, asset prices (for example, property prices, 
equity prices etc.) generally reflect robust growth after banking crises and sharp 
declines during stressful financial conditions. Again, it is important to investigate 
the deviation of aggregate asset prices from their long-term trend. 
 
5.5.2 Banking sector variables 
 
a) Bank credit growth 
 
The growth rate of bank lending is positively correlated to the business cycle and 
can serve as a valuable indicator of the pace of credit extension by banks.  
 
b) Banking sector profits 
 
Profits by banks reflect the overall performance of the banking sector. For 
example, in times of boom periods, banks‟ earnings are high while in times of 
distressed economic conditions, earnings are lower.  
 
c) Aggregate losses 
 
There is generally a negative correlation between aggregate losses in the banking 
system and real GDP growth. Aggregate losses are due to cost components such 
as non-performing loans, loan provisions etc.). 
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d) Debt service ratios 
 
Debt service ratios have the ability to capture early liquidity constraints of 
borrowers by providing a measure of the cash flow that is available to pay current 
debt obligations (Drehmann & Juselius, 2012). High debt service ratios imply high 
indebtedness by households and firms which could result in higher loan defaults 
and trigger a banking crisis. 
 
5.5.3 Cost of funding variables 
 
a) Banking sector credit spread indices 
 
These types of indices serve as vulnerability measures that indicate systemic risk 
in the banking sector, for example, credit default swap (CDS) spreads. A CDS 
spread is the premium paid for protection by the buyer to the seller. CDS spreads 
are good indicators of default risk in the banking sector as a rise in CDS spreads 
would indicate a rising risk of debt defaults. 
 
b) Cost of liquidity 
 
The interbank market serves to redistribute, according to need, the total amount of 
cash that the central bank makes available to the banking system as a whole, 
usually through its open market operations with the larger banks. Given that banks 
themselves are often the first to know when fellow banks are in trouble, an 
increase in the interbank market rate may serve as an EWI for financial distress 
among banks. As the financial position of banks worsens, smaller banks pay more 
for liquidity than larger banks as smaller banks are more vulnerable to liquidity 
squeezes and don‟t always have direct access to central bank accommodation 
(Fecht, Nyborg and Rocholl, 2011).  
 
In essence, a shortage of liquidity in the interbank market caused by deterioration 
in banks‟ financial positions or other economic shocks could result in banks 
funding costs increasing as they have to pay more for liquidity, placing them in a 
139 
 
vulnerable position and having implications for systemic risk. This could adversely 
affect all asset classes and cause instability in the banking sector.  
 
c) Corporate bond spreads 
 
This is an important indicator of credit risk and credit quality. Corporations often 
issue bonds for a variety of reasons which include paying dividends to 
shareholders, buying another company, financing an operating loss, or expanding 
the company. The difference between corporate bonds and other bonds such as 
government or municipal bonds is that corporate bonds are taxable by the 
government. Therefore, corporate bonds have more credit risk attached to them 
that other types of bonds.  
 
Corporate bond yield spreads can provide important information about credit risk 
in bond markets. A yield spread typically refers to the difference in yield between a 
corporate bond and a government bond of comparable maturity, which is generally 
expressed in “basis points”. The higher the risk attached to a bond, the higher its 
yield spread, as investors need to be compensated for taking on the additional risk 
relative to the risk on a government bond. If an investment is seen be less risky, 
investors would require less compensation and if an investment is regarded as 
more risky, investors would need to be paid a higher yield or premium. 
 
Such bond spreads tend to fall during good economic times, while they generally 
widen during times of stressful financial conditions. That said, however, Gilchrist 
and Zakrajsek (2012) argue that in conditions of low perceived risk, financial 
systems could be vulnerable to crises, as credit is cheap and accessible, which 
could result in the build-up of  financial imbalances and a greater probability of a 
sharp rise in credit spreads.  
 
In addition, Chen et al. (2007) argue that liquidity is priced in corporate yield 
spreads. Using data that covers over 4000 corporate bonds, including both 
investment grade and speculative categories, they conclude that illiquid bonds 
have higher yield spreads, while the enhanced liquidity of bonds results in 
substantial declines in yield spreads relative to the yield on comparable 
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government bonds. Therefore it is important to monitor corporate bond spreads as 
they provide indications of credit risk as well as the credit quality of bonds. 
 
5.5.4 Leverage measures  
 
The IMF (2014c) also recognises leverage as an EWI. One of the main causes of 
the 2007-2009 financial crisis was the build-up of excessive on- and off-balance 
sheet leverage in the financial system. During the peak of the crisis, asset prices 
fell which resulted in large losses for banks with large amounts of toxic assets on 
their balance sheet which they had financed through repos in the wholesale 
money market. The accompanying reduction in bank capital forced these banks to 
deleverage which caused a contraction in credit extension and led to a reduction 
in real output. Measures of leverage (such as LTVs for property, margin 
requirements for OTC derivatives – discussed in Chapter 4) are regarded as 
useful EWIs to detect the build-up of systemic risks as these measures can 
provide a useful reference point for household debt relative to equity. 
 
5.6 EARLY WARNING INDICATORS IN USE BY CENTRAL BANKS WHICH 
HAVE IMPLEMENTED THE CCB  
 
In line with the BCBS proposals, the following central banks have already 
implemented the CCB and identified additional indicators to support the decision-
making process of the application of the CCB add-on: SNB, Norges Bank, BoE 
and Reserve Bank of India (RBI).    
 
The CCB was implemented by the SNB in July 2012. In Switzerland, financial 
stability risk has largely been driven by strong growth in the country‟s mortgage 
and property markets (SNB, 2012). The SNB uses the following indicators to 
assess systemic risk in the financial system: domestic mortgage volume indicators 
(that is, the ratio of mortgages to GDP), property prices, measures of interest rate 
risk, interest rate margins, and leverage ratios (SNB, 2014).  
 
The Norges Bank implemented the CCB on 30 June 2015 and identified the 
following four indicators to assess financial vulnerabilities in the domestic financial 
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system: (i) the ratio of total credit (households and enterprises) to GDP, (ii) the 
ratio of house prices to household disposable income, (iii) commercial property 
prices, and (iv) the wholesale funding ratio of domestic credit institutions. On a 
historical basis, these four indicators have been seen to have risen ahead of 
periods of financial instability (Norges Bank, 2015). 
 
The Financial Policy Committee (FPC) of the BoE implemented the CCB on 1 May 
2014. Aside from engaging in market intelligence and assessing results of stress 
tests, the FPC also uses the following indicators to assess risks to financial 
stability: capital ratios, leverage ratios, average risk weights, return on assets 
before tax, loan to deposit ratio, short-term wholesale funding, bank debt 
measures, bank equity measures, credit growth, net foreign asset position, gross 
external liabilities, current account balance, global corporate bond spreads, 
spreads on new lending, longer-term interest rates and the VIX index (volatility 
index of the Chicago Board Options Exchange) (BoE, 2015). 
 
Some of the key supplementary indicators used by the RBI include the credit-to-
deposit ratio, the industry outlook assessment index (and correlation to GNP 
growth) and the interest coverage ratio (and its correlation with the credit gap). 
Going forward, the RBI has announced that it would use indices such as the 
House Price Index or Residex as well as the Credit Condition Survey to make 
CCB decisions. 
 
The SARB uses a variety of indicators to determine the build-up of systemic risk in 
the financial system. These include; the Network Systemic Index for the Interbank 
Market (measuring the systemic importance of individual banks in the South 
African banking sector on a monthly basis); the monitoring of sub-categories of 
shadow banking (such as money market funds, hedge funds, finance companies, 
fixed income funds, multi asset funds etc.); measures to detect stress in the 
foreign exchange market (the Index of Exchange Market Pressure) and the  
adequate level of foreign exchange reserves (Guidotti Ratio). Other key measures 
include household debt to disposable income, growth in private sector credit 
advances to the domestic banking sector, developments in the non-financial 
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corporate sector, and building plans passed (SARB, 2015b and Burra et al., 
2014).  
 
 
5.7 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
 
The CCB is widely recognised as an effective measure of promoting financial 
stability by addressing procylicality in the financial system and ensuring that banks 
are adequately capitalised. A key lesson for all jurisdictions implementing the CCB 
is to ensure that the BCBS rules or guidelines are combined with judgment and 
adapted accordingly to each country‟s economic conditions, stage of development 
and institutional framework, instead of just taking a mechanical and rules-based 
approach to implement the buffer.   
 
The implementation of the CCB was phased in from January 2016. The analysis 
done on the application of the CCB (as at the second quarter of 2015) reflected a 
declining trend in the private-sector credit gap since the onset of the 2007 global 
financial crisis, thereby causing the gap to remain well below its long-term 
average. In addition, for most other categories of loans, the credit gaps either 
remained well below their long-term trend, or remained relatively constant, in line 
with the long-term trends. Overall, the credit gap remained well below the lower 
threshold of the CCB add-on for domestic banks, implying low levels of credit 
growth. Hence, there does not appear to be a need from a macroprudential 
regulatory perspective to consider a CCB add-on for South African banks. 
 
A lesson that the South African authorities can adopt is to distinguish between 
“weak” and “strong” signals from the credit gap and be aware that the credit-to-
GDP ratio could also possibly be an indication of cyclical slowdowns or declines in 
GDP growth rather than excessive credit growth. In this regard, the SARB could 
consider calculating the deviation in credit growth from its long-term trend to 
determine if there is a correlation between credit extension and the financial cycle. 
In theory, financial variable indicators should be positively correlated with the 
financial cycle. However, in South Africa, the credit gap has a negative correlation 
with GDP (SARB, 2011), implying that capital buffers should be reduced when 
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GDP growth is high and vice versa. In this regard, it is recommended that further 
research should be done on these phenomena as it could have implications for 
the timing of the release or withdrawal of the CCB when required.  
 
Another challenge with using the credit gap is measurement problems of the HP 
filter. Critics have pointed out that data revisions to the real-time SA credit gap 
mostly emanate from new data points as they become available, therefore 
accounting for a relatively small proportion of total revisions. This implies 
unreliability in the credit gap. However, studies have indicated that the credit gap 
is a reliable indicator if applied to at least ten years of economic data. 
Furthermore, any source of unreliability derived from updated data points can be 
resolved by the SARB considering more frequent revisions to GDP and other key 
indicators.  
 
It is important that jurisdictions including the SARB should use additional financial 
or economic EWIs to help reduce bank losses associated with banking crises by 
detecting possible crises and providing guidance to the national authority on the 
application of the CCB.  While South Africa has identified a set of EWIs, lessons 
can also be drawn by investigating the different EWIs used by countries such as 
the Switzerland, Norway, the UK and Hong Kong that have implemented the CCB 
guide.  
 
In summary, despite the overall robustness of the credit gap, there is no “one-size-
fits-all” approach, as reflected in some of the concerns raised above. It is must be 
noted that the objective of the buffer is to identify excessive credit growth and 
ensure that the banking sector had sufficient regulatory capital to endure 
economic and financial shocks, rather than managing the financial cycle. The 
SARB and other jurisdictions would benefit from exercising judgment, conducting 
sound quantitative analysis to meet the Basel III requirements for the CCB 
application as well as be transparent by clearly communicating the reason for its 
decisions. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
 
 
6.1       SUMMARY  
 
In the build-up to the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, there were widespread 
financial imbalances that existed, largely owing to many years of low financial 
market volatility and risk premia, rapid financial innovation and questionable 
lending practices in credit markets, low policy rates and favourable liquidity 
conditions. It was argued that during these pre-crisis years of high economic 
growth rates, central banks paid too much attention to inflation and price stability, 
and almost no attention to systemic risks associated with the growing 
macroeconomic imbalances. Banks lacked the diagnostic tools and clear 
mandates to supervise financial systems in their entirety as they failed to assess 
the common exposures of systemically important institutions and identify the pro-
cyclical build-up of asset price bubbles. It became clear that financial stability and 
macroprudential policy were needed to be strengthened to ensure proper 
regulation and supervision of the financial system as a whole. 
 
The property bubble eventually burst in 2007, resulting in increased loan 
delinquency and bankruptcy amongst systemically-important lenders and large 
hedge funds. Banks began to tighten their credit standards which led to a decline 
in domestic demand and consumer confidence. The distress among banks 
resulted in low levels of liquidity in interbank markets as banks became reluctant 
to lend to each other on fears of counterparty risks.  
 
These developments led to heightened risk aversion in financial markets and 
deleveraging by financial institutions which slowed down private sector credit 
growth.   As a result, there was contraction in US economic growth in 2009 and 
the combination of lower growth and a collapse in US equity prices negatively 
impacted on profitability of financial institutions, resulting in more bank failures.  
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Due to the interconnectedness of financial markets, there were spillover effects 
from the US subprime crisis to Europe, whereby European banks had large 
exposure to US banks as well as large amounts of subprime-related US structured 
products on their balance sheets.  Most emerging market economies did not have 
large exposures to US and European banks and therefore did not suffer system 
wide bank failures. However, the effects of a slowdown in growth in advanced 
economies were severe on emerging market growth due to their dependency on 
exports to advanced economies.  
 
In essence, four critical phases of the crisis were identified. The first stage of the 
crisis was in 2005, when US house prices began to decline rapidly and 
delinquency rates on subprime mortgages began to rise. At this stage, the Fed 
has begun raising interest rates. The second stage of the crisis was characterised 
by a widening in credit spreads in February 2007 on unregulated securitisation 
products as US and European banks began experiencing financial difficulties and 
securities backed by subprime loans were downgraded or placed on credit watch. 
Banks became reluctant to lend to each other on fears of counterparty risks, 
resulting in a spike in interest rate spreads on commercial paper and commercial 
bonds over government bonds, a shortening of maturities as well as wide-spread 
losses across most asset classes. Interbank lending in most advanced economies 
froze, causing severe liquidity problems throughout the US banking system.  
 
The third stage of the crisis was in September 2008, characterised by high levels 
of volatility as banks stopped lending to each other due to panic over their 
exposure to US sub-prime mortgages and structured finance packages. It was at 
this point that the credit crunch and liquidity crisis had spread to Europe. 
Conditions deteriorated after the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, 
followed by other large banks in the US, UK and eurozone, which also required 
government bail-outs. The problems were exacerbated by concerns of a solvency 
crisis instead of a liquidity crisis. This led to heightened risk aversion as money 
markets collapsed, equity prices plummeted and credit spreads rose sharply.  
 
Finally, the fourth stage of the crisis began in late 2008 when there were spillover 
effects from financial markets in advanced economies to the real sector, where 
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banks began experiencing problems in accessing capital, with tighter credit 
conditions leading to slower demand for credit and hence slower private sector 
credit growth and lower spending. Many advanced economies had experienced 
contractions in real GDP growth. 
 
In essence, what started off as a liquidity problem for US non-bank intermediaries 
had quickly transformed into a bank solvency problem in the US as well as 
Europe. The transmission of these liquidity shocks through financial system and 
into the real economy was deep and unprecedented and the crisis forced central 
banks in advanced economies to undertake a crisis management role along with 
their respective governments. Central banks in advanced economies embarked on 
unprecedented measures such as reducing their policy rates to a zero lower 
bound, while also adopting forward guidance to help reduce medium-term rates.  
 
Quantitative easing was made a priority in developed economies to prevent the 
financial crisis from sparking a deflationary spiral which would have even more 
serious spill-overs into the real economy, both locally and abroad. The 
implementation of quantitative easing and other credit programmes led to a sharp 
expansion in the size and composition of balance sheets in key advanced 
economies. The Fed, for example, saw its balance sheet grow from USD850 
billion in mid-2007 to around USD 4,0 trillion at the end of 2013, while other major 
central banks also expanded their balance sheets quite considerably. 
 
One of the key causes of the financial crisis is low interest rates. It has often been 
argued that US policy rates having been kept too low for too long was responsible 
for the sharp increase in demand for mortgage loans, thereby inflating house 
prices in the US. Another widely held view is that global current account 
imbalances contributed to the crisis. Excess savings over investment in emerging 
market countries, such as China, led to current account surpluses, which investors 
channelled to deficit countries such as the US. This led to looser credit conditions, 
hence lower interest rates, thereby fuelling the US credit boom.   
 
Other reasons cited as causes of the crisis included the failure of financial 
regulation, the introduction of financial innovation that led to increased complexity 
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of products; the mispricing of risk and inadequate risk assessment by credit rating 
agencies; compensation-driven incentives and greed which encouraged risk 
taking and inadequate supervision and regulation of shadow banks. Many newly 
innovated securitisation products were accompanied by unknown risks which 
regulators failed to identify, measure or mitigate in terms of their impact on the 
overall stability of the financial system. Regulators were blamed for being too 
preoccupied with the formal banking sector and ignorant of the risks accumulating 
in the shadow banking system. 
 
The global financial crisis questioned the effectiveness of monetary policy with just 
one objective (price stability) and one instrument (the policy interest rate). The 
main lesson learnt from the crisis was the important need for financial stability 
(macroprudential oversight) to be recognised as an additional central bank 
mandate, to mitigate the build-up of systemic risk in the financial system. It 
became a priority for central banks on a global level to establish prudent 
macroprudential policy frameworks to improve the resilience of the financial 
system. 
 
Since the crisis, various jurisdictions have come up with definitions of 
macroprudential policy and financial stability. For example, the G20 and IMF 
describe macroprudential policy as the deployment of prudential tools to limit 
systemic risk and minimise disruptions or market distress in the financial system 
that could have adverse consequences for the real economy.  
 
Similarly, the SARB refers to financial stability as a situation where the financial 
system is resilient to systemic shocks, facilitates efficient financial intermediation, 
and mitigates the macroeconomic costs of disruptions in such a way that 
confidence in the system is maintained. In this regard, financial stability is not an 
end in itself but, like price stability, is generally regarded as an important 
precondition for sustainable long-term economic growth and job creation. 
Interestingly, the SARB describes financial instability as ultimately becoming 
visible through systemic risk, banking failures, extreme asset-price volatility, 
interest and exchange rate volatility, and a collapse of market liquidity.  
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Accordingly, this manifests into a disruption of the payment and settlement 
system.  
 
An important concept in the above-mentioned definitions is “systemic risk”, which 
refers to the risk that a shock will cause damage to the financial system in its 
entirety. Systemic risk, which typically has spillover effects to the real economy, 
has two key dimensions, namely, a time dimension and a cross-sectional 
dimension. The time dimension reflects the build-up of systemic risk during 
cyclical upswings when agents underestimate the risks they are taking (known as 
procyclicality), therefore threatening financial instability. In this dimension, 
macroprudential instruments play a role in encouraging the build-up of buffers in 
good economic times to be drawn upon in bad economic times thereby acting as 
shock absorbers to mitigate financial market distress.  
 
The cross-sectional dimension reflects common (correlated) exposures which can 
cause a specific shock to spread and become systemic at any given moment in 
time. The objective of macroprudential tools, in this instance, would be to 
customise them in accordance with the individual influence on systemic risk as 
opposed to a microprudential approach, which applies common standards for all 
institutions that are regulated.  
 
In the South African context, the SARB began adopting financial stability as an 
additional central bank mandate by applying a macroprudential policy framework 
to enhance financial system stability. In October 2010, the South African Ministry 
of Finance announced that the SARB was given a revised mandate which, in 
addition to its current mandate of price stability, included being responsible for 
financial stability. South Africa made a commitment to implement a set of 
regulatory reforms to make the financial sector safer and better. This was outlined 
in a document entitled “Implementing a Twin Peaks Model of Financial Regulation 
in South Africa”. The Twin-Peaks model reforms were proposed by the Financial 
Regulatory Reform Steering Committee (FRRSC), whose main objective was to 
strengthen the regulatory framework in South Africa. In this regard, the SARB was 
given the new responsibility of a “systemic regulator”, with its role being the 
development of a macroprudential policy framework.  
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The Ministry of Finance and SARB also created a joint task team, which included 
members of the SARB, the National Treasury and the Financial Service Board to 
implement an explicit financial stability mandate within an appropriate 
macroprudential framework in the SARB. It is envisaged that the SARB‟s new role 
as “systemic regulator” will include both the oversight and maintenance of stability 
functions. The macroprudential framework would encompass identifying and 
mitigating systemic risk in the financial system through the monitoring and 
analysis of financial and economic variables that could affect financial stability. In 
recent years, other key global central banks such as those of the Netherlands, 
Australia and UK have successfully implemented the “Twin Peaks” model of 
financial regulation, while South Africa is close to finalising its macroprudential 
policy framework.  
 
In this regard, the objective of a macroprudential policy framework is to establish a 
more robust and less pro-cyclical financial system that promotes balanced and 
sustainable economic growth. This could be achieved by designing 
macroprudential instruments that respond to developments in the financial cycle to 
either mitigate the financial cycle or improve the economy‟s resilience to it. One of 
the biggest challenges facing policymakers is deciding on how to choose and 
apply macroprudential instruments.  The choice of macroprudential instruments is 
largely dependent on a country‟s institutional arrangements, its financial and 
economic conditions, prevailing law and market practices as well as the types of 
systemic risks that exist in the financial system. 
 
Due to the fact that there is no single instrument that influences the behaviour of 
all financial institutions consistently, central banks introduced a range of 
macroprudential instruments. These are classified under credit-related measures, 
liquidity-related measures and capital-related measures. The credit-related 
measures discussed in the study include maximum loan-to-value, loan-to-income 
and debt-to-income ratios and minimum haircuts/margins on secured lending. 
Liquidity-related measures include limits on net open currency positions/currency 
mismatches, limits on maturity mismatches, minimum reserve requirements and 
minimum liquidity funding ratios (in the context of Basel III requirements, this 
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would include the minimum liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio). 
Thirdly, capital-related measures consist of countercyclical capital buffers, 
leverage ratios, capital add-ons for global systemically important banks and 
dynamic loan provisioning.  
 
The countercyclical capital buffer was designed by the Basel Committee to 
prevent procyclicality in the banking sector by imposing requirements on banks to 
have adequate levels of capital to withstand economic and financial shocks. The 
Basel III framework requires that banks hold a buffer that ranges between zero 
and 2,5 per cent to total risk-weighted assets. In addition, the national authority is 
allowed to impose a buffer in excess of 2,5 per cent (in line with national policy) for 
domestically domiciled banks.  
 
For South Africa, the SARB indicated that the planned date for the implementation 
of the countercyclical capital buffer was 1 January 2016. In accordance with Basel 
III requirements, the maximum countercyclical capital buffer will start at 0,625 per 
cent of risk-weighted assets on 1 January 2016 and increase each subsequent 
year by an additional 0,625 percentage points, to reach its final maximum of 2,5 
per cent of risk-weighted assets on 1 January 2019.  
 
The BCBS proposed a three-step approach for banks to calculate the 
countercyclical capital buffer, namely, (i) calculate the aggregate private sector 
credit-to-GDP ratio; (ii) calculate the credit gap, that is, the gap between the ratio 
and its trend and ; (iii) transform the credit gap into the guide CCB add-on. 
 
In calculating the CCB, the BCBS proposes the use of a one-sided Hodrick-
Prescott filter to establish the trend for the CCB. The deviation of the actual credit-
to-GDP ratio from its long-term trend thus established enables a jurisdiction to 
determine whether or not credit growth is excessive. The Hodrick-Prescott filter is 
seen as beneficial as it has the tendency to give higher weights to the latest 
observations, which are more closely related to increased systemic risk at the 
current point in time, thereby also dealing more effectively with structural breaks. 
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In the study, the calculation of the countercyclical capital buffer was applied to 
South Africa. The results indicated that, since 1994, the credit gap had been 
positive for several sustained periods, exceeding the long-term trend (that is, zero) 
for the periods 1990-1992, 1998–2000 and 2006-2010. From the end of 2009 
onwards, there has been a persistently declining trend in the credit gap, with the 
gap remaining well below its long-term trend.  
 
Interestingly, the credit gap delivered a strong warning signal for the 
countercyclical capital buffer add-on from 2006-2010, which one might interpret as 
excessive credit growth or the build-up of a housing bubble ahead of the 2007-
2009 financial crisis. This raises questions on whether there would have been a 
bursting of the housing bubble in South Africa had there not been a subprime 
crisis in the United States. 
 
For most other loan categories, the credit gaps either remained well below their 
long-term trend or fairly closely followed that trend, thereby implying low levels of 
credit growth or credit growth commensurate with GDP growth. Interestingly, 
credit growth for “other loans and advances” has remained above its long-term 
trend since the end of 2012.  
 
In this regard, it is important that the SARB interrogates this category of credit to 
determine the underlying drivers of growth, given that this category is the largest, 
making up 41 per cent of total growth. Overall, however, the results of the 
countercyclical buffer calculation for South Africa indicate that the credit gap 
remains well below the lower threshold of the buffer add-on for South African 
banks and there does not appear to be a need to consider a capital add-on for 
domestic banks at present. 
 
In light of the different types of macroprudential instruments, the use of these 
instruments relative to the interaction between monetary policy and financial 
stability has important implications for institutional design. It is imperative that both 
policies have clear and distinct objectives that need to be co-ordinated in such a 
way that transparency and accountability are maintained. Monetary policy and 
financial (micro- and macroprudential) policy interact through the following 
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channels namely; (i) risk-taking practices of financial institutions; borrowing 
constraints and the probability of default; (ii) asset-price and exchange-rate 
externalities and; (iii) the stage of the financial cycle.  
 
Whilst accommodative monetary policy might be useful for boosting economic 
growth during periods of low growth, in times of asymmetric information, this could 
give rise to additional incentives for banks to take on more risk. This would pose a 
threat to financial stability as asset price bubbles and imbalances build up. Loose 
monetary policy also tends to result in a relaxation in collateral constraints as 
asset prices rise and a borrower‟s net worth increases, resulting in lower external 
financing costs which represent an easing in overall credit conditions. Conversely, 
when interest rates rise, debt-servicing costs increase, negatively affecting a 
borrower‟s ability to repay a loan, and possibly leading to higher levels of debt 
default and financial instability. 
 
Monetary policy also affects asset prices and ultimately exchange rates via the 
value of collateral which influences borrowing by consumers. Long periods of low 
interest rates and resulting inflated asset prices, encourage banks to provide even 
more credit, thereby leading to more increases in the value of assets. Conversely, 
higher interest rates could lead to tighter collateral constraints and excessive 
levels of capital inflows, thereby resulting in appreciating exchange rates and 
higher levels of borrowing in foreign currency. These factors would place 
downward pressure on the exchange rate and destabilise the financial system in 
the event of a disorderly unwinding of currency positions or capital flows. 
 
The stage of a financial cycle is an important determinant of the type of measures 
to deploy.  For example, both monetary policy and financial stability measures can 
be adopted during an economic upswing to encourage banks to build up capital 
and liquidity buffers. On the one hand, microprudential indicators could be used to 
analyse banks‟ credit standards and loan provisioning while on the other hand, 
macroprudential supervisors would use the necessary instruments to monitor risks 
that are systemic in nature. This type of scenario is known as the “paradox of 
financial instability”, because the financial system appears to be at its strongest 
when it can be at its most vulnerable. Similarly, during an economic downturn, 
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macroprudential authorities aim to ensure the stability of the financial system as a 
whole, while the concern of microprudential authorities is to ensure the stability of 
individual financial institutions. 
 
The study also looked at two opposing views from the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand (“clean” and “lean”) on whether it is appropriate to tighten monetary policy 
to enhance financial stability during periods of credit or asset price booms. The 
“clean” view proposes that monetary policy should respond to asset price and 
credit booms only to the extent that they impact on expected inflation outcomes. 
Under this scenario, the use of macroprudential instruments could be deployed to 
minimise losses in the financial system and prevent financial instability by 
providing early warning signals on future crises.  
 
The “lean” view proposes that monetary policy should lean against credit booms 
for financial stability purposes, with its main objective being longer term price 
stability. In other words, central banks should be incentivised to lean against the 
building up of asset bubbles ex ante. Higher interest rates can be somewhat 
effective in limiting an asset price or credit boom without imposing additional costs 
on the wider economy. Macroprudential instruments, on their own, are insufficient 
in mitigating the build-up of systemic risk.  
 
Given the above-mentioned interactions between monetary policy and financial 
stability, it is important that appropriate institutional frameworks and safeguard 
measures are put in place to enhance the credibility and transparency of both 
policy objectives. This is particularly relevant for central banks like South Africa, 
with the dual mandates of price and financial stability. 
 
It would therefore appear that in exploring the causes of, and key lessons learnt 
from the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, it is evident that macroprudential policy 
and financial stability are the missing pillars in the policy frameworks of central 
banks. The various macroprudential instruments and financial stability indicators 
suggested in the literature confirm that central banks, including the SARB, could 
benefit from their use thereof, in identifying and mitigating the build-up of systemic 
risk in the financial system.  
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6.2       RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
 
The 2007-2009 global financial crisis led to a change in emphasis from price 
stability by monetary policy to financial stability by macroprudential policy. It 
became evident that both sets of policies were needed to complement each other 
to ensure price stability and financial stability. A number of macroprudential 
instruments have been successfully applied by countries (even before the most 
recent crisis) to reduce the procyclicality of prior prudential regulation and mitigate 
systemic risks in the financial system. Examples of such countries include Ireland, 
Norway, Hong Kong, Korea, Spain, Switzerland, China, Brazil, Indonesia, United 
Kingdom, United States and Canada.  
 
It is important that jurisdictions, including the SARB, should use additional 
financial or economic EWIs to help reduce bank losses associated with banking 
crises by detecting possible crises and providing guidance to the national authority 
on the application of the CCB.  While South Africa has already identified a set of 
EWIs, lessons may still be drawn from the experience of countries that have 
implemented different EWIs such as the Switzerland, Norway, the UK and Hong 
Kong. Such indicators include macroeconomic variables (real GDP growth, 
aggregate real credit growth, asset price growth), banking sector activity variables 
(bank credit growth, banking sector profits, aggregate losses, debt service ratios) 
and cost of funding variables (banking sector credit spread indices, cost of 
liquidity, corporate bond spreads). Other early warning indicators that could be 
researched include leverage ratios, wholesale funding ratios and current-account 
deficits. 
 
Although the CCB is widely viewed as being a reliable indicator of excessive credit 
growth, concerns have been raised about whether the credit-to-GDP gap can 
accurately identify periods of excessive credit growth. Ideally, all financial 
indicators should be positively correlated with the financial cycle to enable capital 
buffers to act as a “common reference point” for building up capital buffers during 
financial booms and releasing capital buffers during financial busts.  This study, 
however, has noted that the majority of financial indicators are indeed positively 
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correlated with GDP, with the exception of the credit gap which has a negative 
correlation with GDP. This negative correlation with GDP raises concerns as it 
implies that capital buffers should be reduced when GDP growth is high and 
increased when GDP growth is low. This has implications for the timing of the 
release or withdrawal of the CCB add-on.  
 
In this regard, the SARB should be aware that the credit-to-GDP ratio could 
possibly be affected by cyclical slowdowns or declines in GDP growth and not 
necessarily excessive credit growth all the time. It is proposed that the SARB 
considers calculating the deviation in credit growth from its long-term trend to 
determine if there is a correlation between credit extension and the financial cycle. 
 
Finally, another challenge with using the credit gap is measurement problems of 
the HP filter. Critics have pointed out that data revisions to the real-time South 
Africa credit gap mostly emanate from new data points as they become available. 
There is a small amount of revisions that take place, which could possibly place 
question marks around the unreliability in the credit gap. However, studies have 
indicated that the credit gap is a reliable indicator if applied to at least ten years of 
economic data (40 quarterly data points). Furthermore, any source of unreliability 
derived from updated data points can be resolved by the SARB considering more 
frequent revisions to GDP and other key indicators. 
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APPENDIX I 
IMPLEMENTATION DEADLINES FOR BASEL III REQUIREMENTS 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 As of 
Jan, 1 
2019 
Leverage ratio Supervisory 
monitoring 
 Parallel run (Jan 1, 
2013 – Jan,1 2017)  
Disclosure starts 
Jan 1, 2015 
    Migration 
to pillar 1 
 
Minimum common 
equity capital ratio 
   
3,5% 
 
4,0% 
 
4,5% 
 
4,5% 
 
4,5% 
 
4,5% 
 
4,5% 
Capital conservation 
buffer 
      
0,625% 
 
1,25% 
 
1,875% 
 
2,5% 
Minimum common 
equity plus capital 
conservation buffer 
   
3,5% 
 
4,0% 
 
4,5% 
 
5,125% 
 
5,750% 
 
6,375% 
 
7,0% 
Phase-in of deductions 
from CET1 
    
20% 
 
40% 
 
60% 
 
80% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
Minimum Tier 1 capital    
4,5% 
 
5,5% 
 
6,0% 
 
6,0% 
 
6,0% 
 
6,0% 
 
6,0% 
Minimum total capital    
8,0% 
 
8,0% 
 
8,0% 
 
8,0% 
 
 
8,0% 
 
8,0% 
 
8,0% 
Minimum total capital 
plus conservation 
buffer 
   
8,0% 
 
8,0% 
 
8,0% 
 
8,625% 
 
9,25% 
 
9,875% 
10,5% 
Liquidity Coverage 
Ratio (LCR) – minimum 
requirement 
Observation 
period 
begins 
 Publishing of LCR 
data 
  
60% 
 
70% 
 
80% 
 
90% 
 
100% 
Net Stable Funding 
Ratio (NSFR) 
Observation 
period 
begins 
      Introduce 
minimum 
standard 
 
Source: Various BCBS publications 
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